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The 1990s saw an exponential growth in the number and political
sensitivities of claims by original owners of stolen art against
good-faith purchasers of that art. These cases have challenged courts,
threatened international relations, created public relations nightmares
for museums, and generally shaken the art world. In defining whose
claim should prevail as between original owners and good-faith pur-
chasers, states and nations have adopted significantly varied rules to
reach divergent resolutions of complicated issues of public policy and
private right. In the relatively rare case in which the original
owner/good-faith purchaser dispute is connected with a single state or
nation, the application of that sovereign’s chosen rules presumably
furthers the sovereign’s interest. When, as is much more often the case,
the journey of the art and the domicile of the claimants link the dis-
pute to more than one state or nation, the multijurisdictional character
of the case may substantially complicate the issue of ownership. When
implicated jurisdictions have been driven by different policy prefer-
ences to adopt different ownership rules, the result on a micro-level
will be a choice of law that may well further a single state or nation’s
interest. The result on a macro-level is virtually certain to undermine
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all relevant policy aspirations. This Article explores the cause and ef-
fect of this universally unattractive result.
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INTRODUCTION
Egon Schiele paintings on loan from an Austrian museum to
New York’s Museum of Modern Art are seized, first by state officials
and later by federal officials, after heirs of the original owners claim
that the paintings were stolen by the Nazis.1 An ancient manuscript
containing tenth-century copies of formulations of Archimedes, long
in the possession of a French family and consigned for auction at
Christie’s in New York, is claimed by a Middle Eastern monastery.2 A
fifteenth-century portrait, stolen from a castle in Germany by an
American soldier and sold to a private citizen on Long Island, is
claimed by a German museum.3 Sixth-century mosaics, stripped from
the walls of a church in northern Cyprus, are sold in Switzerland to an
Indiana gallery owner who offers them for sale in Indiana, where the
Cypriot government and the church discover and reclaim them.4
Paintings stolen from a Washington, D.C., family lie in pieces in a
garbage bag in a Pennsylvania house before they are bought by a
Pennsylvanian and later reclaimed by the family.5 The son of a Czech
painter seeks the return of one of his father’s paintings from an Illi-
nois art dealer working “out of a shopping bag,” who had purchased
it from “Fly-by-Nite Galleries,” which had in turn purchased it from a
hot tub dealer, who had seen it while buying fixtures from a defunct
Chicago art gallery.6
1. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 719 N.E.2d 897, 898-99 (N.Y. 1999), dis-
cussed infra at notes 382-411 and accompanying text.
2. Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate v. Christie’s, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 7664 (KMW), 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13257, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1999); see also infra notes 224-47, 318-24 and ac-
companying text (discussing the history of the case).
3. Kunstammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 832 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d,
678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982). The case is discussed infra at notes 205, 307-17 and accompanying
text.
4. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, 917 F.2d
278, 283-84 (7th Cir. 1990). For details of the case, see infra notes 175-97, 352-61.
5. Erisoty v. Rizik, No. 93-6125, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995), dis-
cussed infra in note 199 and in notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
6. Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 612 (7th Cir. 1986). This case is discussed infra at notes
65, 76.
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From the tragic to the ridiculous, these cases have challenged
courts,7 threatened international relations,8 created public relations
nightmares for museums,9 and generally shaken the art world.10 Al-
though the seizures of the Schiele works from the Museum of Modern
Art (MoMA) garnered the most international and domestic atten-
tion,11 they reflect only one of many disputes between heirs of original
owners and museums over artwork claimed to have been stolen by
the Nazis and their sympathizers. A lawsuit filed against the Seattle
Art Museum and later settled,12 as well as claims against the Fogg Art
Museum at Harvard, the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, the Min-
neapolis Institute of Arts, Vienna’s Art History Museum, and numer-
ous museums in the former Soviet bloc,13 present many of the same
ownership tensions as are presented by the claimants to the Schiele
7. Not only do the cases pitting original owners against good-faith purchasers of stolen art
present interesting glimpses at history, human motivation, artistic struggle, and national conflict,
they also seem to provide the judges who decide them with an irresistible opportunity to escape
the mundanity of the factual backgrounds presented in the “ordinary” case. In fact, as one
opinion noted, the judicial task in resolving claims arising between original owners and good-
faith purchasers of stolen art can resemble the process of observing and appreciating art itself.
Erisoty, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096, at *29.
8. The Schiele seizures, for example, created considerable tension between Austria and
the United States. See infra notes 394-95 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 12; see also Ralph E. Lerner, The Nazi Art Theft Problem and the Role of
the Museum: A Proposed Solution to Disputes over Title, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 15, 15
(1998) (describing the “tug-of-war that now exists between two innocent parties: an American
museum holding a work of art that may have been stolen by the Nazis during World War II and
the heirs of the original owner who perished at the hands of the Nazis during the War”).
10. See infra notes 396-99 and accompanying text.
11. The seizures, their legal implications, and their practical consequences are discussed
infra at notes 382-414 and accompanying text.
12. In the summer of 1997, the heirs of Paul Rosenberg claimed “Odalisque,” a 1927
painting by Henri Matisse. (For a sampling of Matisse’s work, visit http://www.artchive.com.)
Rosenberg, a French-Jewish art dealer, had owned the painting at the time it, along with most of
Rosenberg’s collection, was stolen by Nazi officials. The painting was, at the time of the heirs’
demand, a part of the Seattle Art Museum’s collection. After initially questioning the plaintiff’s
claim and later researching the painting’s provenance with the help of the Holocaust Art Resto-
ration Project, the museum agreed to return the work, valued at over $2 million, to the Rosen-
berg heirs. Regina Hackett, Seattle’s Matisse Will Go Back to Owners; Museum Returns Art
Stolen by Nazis, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, June 15, 1999, at A1. Commentators praised
the museum for its “precedent-setting act of moral courage that will go a long way in helping to
resolve future and pending cases in the United States involving artwork stolen by the Nazis
during WWII.” Id. (quoting Nancy Vineberg, director of the American Jewish Committee of
Greater Seattle).
13. Nazi’s Pillaging Still Haunts the Art World; Museums Worldwide Have Works with
Clouded Pedigrees, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Mar. 24, 1998, at A10.
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paintings. The claims are being brought not only against museums but
also against private collectors.14
Despite a 1987 prediction by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit that legal issues presented by efforts of original
owners to recover stolen art from good-faith purchasers, although in-
teresting, would not appear frequently,15 the last decade has seen a
sharp increase in cases raising these issues, and every indication at the
beginning of a new century is that the number and complexity of
original owner versus good-faith purchaser disputes over stolen art
will increase.16 As the seizure of the Schieles at MoMA suggests,
provenance17 issues will not solely be the subject of private lawsuits
between owners and good-faith purchasers but will also strain rela-
tions between museums and, ultimately, between nations.18
14. In Hoelzer v. Stamford, 933 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1991), discussed infra at notes 68, 247,
Judge Irving Kaufman commented on the general situation of good-faith private purchasers of
stolen art:
Collectors from all over the world have shown a willingness to pay exorbitant sums
for the privilege of privately exhibiting paintings, many of which the artists could not
sell during their lives. With this increase in value has come the inevitable increase in
theft and illegitimate trade. It is not uncommon, however, for purchasers of fraudu-
lently obtained art work to make their acquisitions from reputable art dealers and
galleries.
Id. at 1132.
15. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 108 n.5 (2d Cir. 1987), discussed infra at notes
153-74 and accompanying text.
16. There are numerous reasons to predict an increase in such disputes. Recent books have
detailed and catalogued the scope of Nazi plunder of European art. E.g., HECTOR FELICIANO,
THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE WORLD’S GREATEST WORKS OF
ART (1997); LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE’S TREASURES
IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1994). The World Jewish Congress is
beginning to turn its attention away from claims to Swiss bank accounts to claims to stolen art,
which ultimately may be more valuable. The fall of the Iron Curtain has also played a role, as
former Soviet museums have now begun to display their collections. Ariella Budick, Whose Art
Is It? U.S. Courts Are Involved in Determining Ownership of Works Looted by Nazis,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 11, 1998, at B3. Finally, there are simply more pieces of looted art entering the
art market. “As an older generation of collectors dies out, their holdings turn up on the auction-
house circuit, where they can be identified either by the families themselves or by investigators
who specialize in looted art.” Id.
17. “The word ‘provenance’ has developed in the art world as a term for the subject of title
to works of art.” Morgold, Inc. v. Keeler, 891 F. Supp. 1361, 1363 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Morgold is
briefly discussed below in notes 67, 80.
18. Not all museums have fought claims by original owners to recover stolen art. In 1997,
the Wadsworth Athenium in Hartford, Connecticut, agreed to return a sixteenth-century
painting to the Galleria Nazionale d’Arte Anticas in Rome, Italy. The painting had been stolen
from the Italian Embassy in Berlin by Soviet troops near the end of World War II. The director
of the museum stated at the time, “It was the right thing to do.” Christopher Hume, The Secret
Museum Curators Hide Artifacts and Shy Away from Masterpieces . . . Welcome to the Repatria-
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Although theft by the Nazis has captured the most recent atten-
tion, American and Russian soldiers apparently stole significant
works as well.19 Of course, with the escalation of art prices, art is most
often stolen in far less controversial circumstances. In fact, among the
thefts described in the pages that follow are ones committed by com-
mon thieves, business associates, trusted advisors, friends, and in-
laws.
Neither common law nor, with rare exception,20 statutory law has
“given works of art the distinction of a body of jurisprudence all its
own.”21 Rather, in most states and nations, the laws that govern title
issues with respect to art are those generally applicable to commercial
transactions in any moveable property.22 There are no statutory
mechanisms for registering or recording title to works of art23 such as
tion Game, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 28, 1998, at M1. And, as discussed above in note 12, the Seat-
tle Art Museum returned an artwork to its rightful owner after establishing that it was highly
likely that it had been stolen with the acquiescence of the Nazis.
19. E.g., DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 105 (involving a Monet stolen by American soldiers);
Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1155-56 (2d Cir. 1982) (arising from
the theft of two Duerers from Germany by American occupation forces).
20. E.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 338(c) (West Supp. 1999) (“The cause of action in the
case of theft . . . of any article of . . . artistic significance is not deemed to have accrued until the
discovery of the whereabouts of the article by the aggrieved party . . . .”).
21. Morgold, 891 F. Supp. at 1365.
22. Id. at 1366 (noting that “art is subject to any applicable provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code and various state analogues”); John Henry Merryman, American Law and
the International Trade in Art, in GENEVA WORKSHOP, INTERNATIONAL SALES OF WORKS OF
ART, 425, 426 (Pierre Lalive ed., 1985) [hereinafter GENEVA WORKSHOP]. In most states the
source of these rules is the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). See infra notes 71-80 and ac-
companying text.
In Europe, transfers of art are similarly governed by general commercial codes.
Quentin Byrne-Sutton, Who Is the Rightful Owner of a Stolen Work of Art? A Source of Conflict
in International Trade, in GENEVA WORKSHOP, supra, at 500, 500; see also Francesca Galgano,
Legal Aspects of Trade in Art in Italy, in GENEVA WORKSHOP, supra, at 129, 129 (“Works of art
other than those belonging to the State have the legal status of any other object . . . .”); Jacques
Ghestin, French Domestic Law on the Sale of Works of Art and Collector’s Items, in GENEVA
WORKSHOP, supra, at 155, 155 (“French law has no specific or general regulation on the sale of
works of art . . . . As a result, an object of art is governed theoretically by the common law on
sales.”).
23. Private registries for stolen art do exist, however. The first major international comput-
erized database, The Art Loss Register, maintained by the International Foundation for Art
Research (IFAR), began operation in 1991. The Art Loss Register, at http://www.artloss.com/
intro/about.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). IFAR, a non-
profit corporation, is supported by, inter alia, Lloyd’s of London, the British Institute for the
Protection of Cultural Property, Christie’s, and Sotheby’s. For a description of The Art Loss
Register, see Steven A. Bibas, The Case Against Statutes of Limitations for Stolen Art, 103 YALE
L.J. 2437, 2462-63 (1994).
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exist for land or automobiles. Even so, monies paid to acquire art rou-
tinely rival the costs of automobiles and in many cases exceed tenfold
even the priciest real estate.24 It is precisely these prices that make art
an increasingly attractive target for thieves.
One central feature characterizes disputes arising out of stolen
art, whatever the motive for the original theft. The disputes are be-
tween two relative innocents: the original owner from whom the art
was wrongfully taken or withheld and a person or entity who is, or at
least claims the status of, a good-faith purchaser. Such a juxtaposition
is one that renders it “impossible for the law to mete out exact jus-
tice.”25 The determination of which of the two prevails—owner or
IFAR also publishes a magazine that reports on stolen or lost art. Erisoty v. Rizik, No.
93-6125, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995). This magazine, published
ten times a year, circulates to law enforcement agencies, art dealers, museums, and private col-
lectors. Id.
24. For example, in the 1980s, buyers paid $53.9 million for Vincent Van Gogh’s Irises and
$47.85 million for Pablo Picasso’s Yo Picasso. Commentary, The Missing Piece: A Discussion of
Theft, Statutes of Limitations, and Title Disputes in the Art World, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1067, 1067 (1991). Although the passion for acquisition of art, or at least the
willingness to pay large sums to satisfy that passion, waned in the 1990s, near-record auction
prices remained newsworthy through that decade as well. E.g., Paul Lieberman, 5 Paintings Set
Auction Records; $60.5 Million Paid for a Cezanne, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1999, at A4 (reporting
that the auction on May 10, 1999, brought more than double the price ever before paid at auc-
tion for a Cezanne).
25. RAY A. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 193 (3d ed. 1975). It should be
noted, however, that in many cases the harm to either innocent party, the owner or the good-
faith purchaser, if the other prevails, may be minimized by other commercial realities. Often the
owner will have had and collected on insurance coverage on the stolen art. E.g., Erisoty, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096, at *3-4 (noting that the owners had collected on an insurance policy
covering art that was stolen from the owners’ home). Conversely, a good-faith purchaser who
loses possession to the true owner may be able to recover from her seller on a breach of war-
ranty claim. See U.C.C. § 2-312(1)(a) (1988) (granting an implied warranty by the seller that the
title conveyed shall be good and its transfer rightful); Note, Uniform Commercial Code War-
ranty Solutions to Art Fraud and Forgery, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 409, 414-16 (1972) (sug-
gesting that the U.C.C. may offer protection through provisions regarding express warranty,
warranty of merchantability, or warranty of fitness for a particular purpose). This may be
brought as a separately instituted action or as a third-party claim in the action brought by the
original owner against the good-faith purchaser. E.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 865
(N.J. 1980) (noting that the good-faith purchaser impleaded the seller). This and other remedies
will not be available to all good-faith possessors, however. For example, after the Seattle Art
Museum delivered “Odalisque” to the Rosenberg heirs, see supra note 12, it sued the New York
art gallery that sold the painting to the Bloedels, who were the donors. The suit was dismissed
by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington on the ground that
although there was evidence that the gallery had defrauded the Bloedels, the museum had not
been defrauded because the museum had not acquired the right to sue from the donors at the
time it acquired the painting. Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1167
(W.D. Wash. 1999). The court rejected the argument advanced by the gallery that museums, as
third parties to the original sale, could never prevail on a fraud claim. The outcome in the in-
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good-faith purchaser—raises complicated issues of public policy as
well as of private rights. As this Article later details, states and na-
tions have chosen widely different rules to define these rights and
prioritize these policy goals.
In the relatively rare case in which the original owner/good-faith
purchaser dispute is connected with a single state or nation, the appli-
cation of that sovereign’s chosen rule, whomever it favors, presuma-
bly furthers the sovereign’s interests. When, as is much more often
the case, the journey of the art and the domicile of the claimants link
the dispute to more than one state or nation, the multijurisdictional
character of the case may substantially complicate the issue of owner-
ship.26 If the connected jurisdictions have been driven by different
policy preferences to adopt different ownership rules, the result on a
micro-level will be a choice of law that may well further a single state
or nation’s interest. The result on a macro-level, however, is virtually
certain to undermine all relevant policy aspirations.
To explore the cause and effect of this universally unattractive
result and suggest the proper method for its avoidance, this Article
proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the substantive and procedural
rules adopted by individual states and nations to define the relative
rights of original owners and good-faith purchasers. Part II defines
the way in which United States and European courts decide choice-
of-law issues involving these rules when, because of multijurisdic-
tional contacts of the artwork or the parties, multiple rules are avail-
able. Part III examines the consequences of the choice-of-law out-
comes for the parties, the policies, the art world, the international
stant case was based upon the fact that the museum had not obtained the cause of action from
the Bloedels. Id. at 1166-67. The court later granted a motion for reconsideration and vacated its
dismissal order after the museum secured from the Bloedels’ heirs an assignment of the fraud
claim. Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, No. C98-1073L, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7770, at *8
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 22, 2000).
26. The geographic scope of transactions involving a single work of art can literally be
global:
A review of the provenance of a single, well-documented, 100-year-old painting
shows how complex a search can be. In her new book, Portrait of Dr. Gachet, Cynthia
Saltzman tracks a single, celebrated canvas by Vincent van Gogh from the artist’s
studio near Paris in May 1890 to the collection of Japanese businessman Ryoei Saito,
who paid $82.5 million for it in 1990. In that stretch of time, a short one relative to the
history of art, the painting had 12 owners besides Saito: “two affluent avant-garde
artists, three dealers, a German collector, a museum director, a member of the Nazi
elite, an Amsterdam banker, and a Jewish exile,” as Saltzman recounts.
John Marks, How Did All That Art End Up in Museums?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 8,
1988, at 38. For a cinematic portrayal along the same theme, see THE RED VIOLIN (Lions Gate
Films 1999).
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exchange of art, the public, and international relations. Part IV offers
observations regarding rules that may further the individual and col-
lective interests of these polities and policies.
Having detailed what this Article will address, it is appropriate to
devote a few words to what it will not address. The Nazi context of
the most widely publicized of these cases poses unique and difficult
issues with which claimants, organizations, museums, and govern-
ments are now just beginning to grapple.27 Until a domestic or inter-
national consensus is reached as to if and how Nazi-tainted thefts are
to be treated differently than other thefts, however, Nazi-tainted art
ownership disputes will be decided by application of the same legal
rules and subject to the same chaos as surrounds routine art theft
cases.28 This Article leaves to others the issue of whether Nazi-tainted
cases should be subjected to different rules.29
27. A case that might have contributed to the law in this area was settled before trial. The
case involved conflicting claims of a good-faith purchaser and the heirs of the owners to Edgar
Degas’s “Landscape with Smokestacks.” The Nazis stole the painting from Fredrich and Louise
Gutmann, both of whom died in Nazi concentration camps. The painting was purchased in 1987
by Daniel Searle, of the eponymous pharmaceutical company, for $850,000. The heirs, grand-
children of the owners, brought suit in federal court in Chicago, Illinois, claiming ownership. In
August 1998, just weeks before the trial, the parties settled the case by agreeing that the Art
Institute of Chicago, of which Searle was a trustee, would become the owner of the painting.
The Art Institute would pay the heirs approximately $500,000, representing one-half the then-
value of the work, and Searle would donate his half to the institute. Judith H. Dobrzynski, Set-
tlement in Dispute over a Painting Looted by Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1998, at A17. Al-
though the Institute clearly benefited, the heirs were left feeling the outcome was bittersweet.
“Both sides spent a ton of money. . . . It was a terrible waste, in a way. . . . We’re hoping this
could be a landmark case that would show other families one way to do it, so that they don’t
have to go through what we did.” Kevin M. Williams, Degas Settlement Lands in Uncharted Ter-
ritory, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998, at 43 (statement of Nick Goodman, one of the
heirs). A sampling of Degas’s work can be viewed at http://metalab.unc.edu/wm/paint/auth/
degas.
28. See infra notes 365-432 and accompanying text. The unique problems arising out of
theft of cultural property also will not be addressed here. For over three decades, the interna-
tional community has been engaged in a global evaluation and adoption of specialized rules
governing the export and import of objects of unique cultural significance. E.g., Convention on
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership
of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (attempting to prevent the loss of cultural
property). For a brief overview of this and earlier efforts, see Barbara Hoffman, How
UNIDROIT Protects Cultural Property, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3, 1995, at 5 (summarizing the impact of
the UNIDROIT Convention); see also Marilyn Phelan, Cultural Property, 32 INT’L LAW. 447
(1998) (reviewing the content of international conventions on the protection of cultural prop-
erty).
29. E.g., Ralph E. Lerner, The Nazi Art Theft Problem and the Role of the Museum: A
Proposed Solution to Disputes over Title, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 15, 77 (1998) (advocating
that the United States Information Agency (USIA) be strictly held to the terms of the Cultural
Property Implementation Act (CPIA)); Robert Schwartz, The Limits of the Law: A Call for a
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Additionally, although original owner versus good-faith pur-
chaser disputes have arisen outside the United States, particularly in
Europe,30 the major focus of this Article is on the United States. The
increase in disputes centered in the United States is grounded on
three factors: one economic, one cultural, and one legal. First, often
art follows wealth. Thus, in the post–World War II era, art came
here.31 American museums, auction houses, and collectors were hun-
gry to acquire European works. As a result, they now find themselves
vulnerable. Second, Americans may desire to acquire foreign art out
of a strong sense of ancestral connection.32 Third, American courts are
often “the claimant’s battleground of choice.”33 As will become clear
as this Article proceeds, certain American states, most notably New
York, have adopted rules that substantially, and quite intentionally,
favor the original owners.34 In Europe, on the other hand, a buyer of
stolen goods often is required to prove only that he bought an object
in good faith.35 Of course, as any good transnational lawyer knows,
mere suit in an American court should not and does not automatically
New Attitude Toward Artwork Stolen During World War II, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 4
(1998) (arguing for an “asserted effort on all fronts” to recover art stolen during World War II);
Kelly Diane Walton, Leave No Stone Unturned: The Search for Art Stolen by the Nazis and the
Legal Rules Governing Restitution of Stolen Art, 9 FORDHAM INTEL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
549, 607-15 (1999) (documenting a series of proposed solutions); Kelly Ann Falconer, Note,
When Honor Will Not Suffice: The Need for a Legally Binding International Agreement Regard-
ing Ownership of Nazi-Looted Art, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 383, 425 (2000) (calling for the
creation of a unified international response to claims regarding art stolen by the Nazis); Stephan
J. Schlegelmilch, Note, Ghosts of the Holocaust: Holocaust Victim Fine Arts Litigation and a
Statutory Application of the Discovery Rule, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 87, 91 (1999) (arguing for
“a statutory application of the Discovery Rule to title claims by Holocaust victims and other
victims of Nazi dispossession”).
30. For an excellent treatment of the law of European states on these issues, see generally
GENEVA WORKSHOP, supra note 22, which includes various articles on the sale of works of art.
31. Budick, supra note 16 (“The size of the art market, the number of museums, the fact
that so many pictures ended up here during and after the war—all mean that it is often up to
American courts to resolve issues that date back to Europe half a century ago.”).
32. As John Henry Merryman has noted,
the United States is a nation of immigrants, who came from modest circumstances
and brought little cultural baggage with them to the New World. As they and their
descendants acquired education, wealth and status, however, they and the museums
they established naturally sought to collect works from their ancestral cultures in
Europe (and in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East). Like its people,
the United States has had to import its art.
Merryman, supra note 22, at 425.
33. Budick, supra note 16.
34. See infra notes 204-19 and accompanying text.
35. Budick, supra note 16.
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trigger the application of American rules.36 The available rules re-
garding rights to stolen art from which an American court might
choose, the mechanisms for making the choice among those rules, and
the consequences of that choice are issues to which we turn in the
next sections of this Article.
I.  RIGHT-DEFINING RULES
When art is stolen, there is no question that the thief has commit-
ted, and the owner has suffered, a legal wrong. When stolen art finds
its way into the hands of a good-faith buyer, one who has paid sub-
stantial value for the art, that buyer is the innocent victim of a chain
of possession that began and remained wrongful. When the original
owner finally locates the stolen art in the possession of the good-faith
purchaser, the sympathy which each may have for the innocence of
the other rarely translates into recognition of the superior legal right
of the other. The demand for possession by the original owner, the re-
fusal of that demand by the good-faith purchaser, and the litigation
that often follows have provided the setting for the development of
virtually the entire body of law defining the rights of claimants to
stolen or misappropriated art.37 The litigation vehicle for determina-
tion of these rights in American courts is an action for either conver-
sion38 or replevin.39 Replevin is an action at law, normally treated as
36. E.g., Greek Orthodox Patriarchate v. Christie’s, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 7664 (KMW), 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1999) (analyzing whether to apply French or New
York law when the suit was filed in New York).
37. Although the vast majority of cases involve the owner as plaintiff and the purchaser as
defendant, occasionally the roles are reversed. In Erisoty v. Rizik, No. 93-6215, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2096 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995), the purchaser, believing he was required to do so, turned
the paintings that were the subject of the dispute over to FBI agents who visited his home to
demand them. The FBI returned the paintings to the true owners from whom the purchaser
then sought their return. Id. at *17-19. Another example is Naftzger v. American Numismatic
Society, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784 (Ct. App. 1996), in which a New York owner demanded the return
of stolen coins, prompting the good-faith purchaser to bring suit to quiet title in California. Id.
at 787.
38. Conversion “is any unauthorized exercise of dominion or control over property by one
who is not the owner of the property which interferes with and is in defiance of a superior pos-
sessory right of another in the property.” Morgold, Inc. v. Keeler, 891 F. Supp. 1361, 1367 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (quoting Meese v. Miller, 436 N.Y.S.2d 496, 500 (App. Div. 1981)).
Among the significant cases discussed in this Article in which the true owner sued for
conversion are Farkas v. Farkas, 168 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 1999), Charash v. Oberlin College, 14 F.3d
291 (6th Cir. 1994), and Graffman v. Espel, 96 Civ. 8247 (SWK), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1339
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1998).
39. Replevin is “[a]n action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods
or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken
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sounding in tort,40 through which the owner seeks to recover personal
property.41 Of the two, replevin is the cause favored by owners,42 al-
though occasionally the owner sells the art immediately after recov-
ering it.43
Historically, an action in replevin allowed the contested property
to be taken from the defendant’s possession and placed in the plain-
tiff’s possession prior to the trial. This was the central advantage of
the action. The nature of this procedural right led to replevin’s char-
acterization as a “local” action and, thus, to the conclusion that the
action could be brought only in the jurisdiction in which the property
was located.44 Today, an action in replevin has taken on broader pur-
poses and varied names. Most states differentiate between an action
in which the plaintiff seeks possession of the property but is content
or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1299 (6th ed.
1990).
40. This characterization of the action as one in tort is important to the choice-of-law issue
discussed in Part II. See infra notes 325-61 and accompanying text.
41. At common law, separate actions were available depending upon whether the defen-
dant’s possession had been wrongfully obtained, or unlawfully detained. Replevin was the ap-
propriate action for the former; detinue for the latter. These two actions were the only ones
available for wrongful deprivation of personal property. C.R. McCorkle, Annotation, Maintain-
ability of Replevin or Similar Possessory Action Where Defendant, at the Time Action Is Brought,
Is No Longer in Possession of Property, 97 A.L.R.2d 896, 899-900 (1964). Over time, in large
part due to its procedural advantages, the replevin action came to be used in both contexts.
42. E.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,
917 F.2d 278, 291 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Cyprus adequately established the elements of replevin un-
der Indiana law, on which ground alone we affirm the district court’s decision to award posses-
sion of the mosaics to the Church of Cyprus.”); Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 614 (7th Cir. 1986)
(rejecting the defendant’s assertion that the statute of limitations had run and returning the
painting to the original owner); Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1161
(2d Cir. 1982) (noting that the owner’s demand for return of art work turns the possessor into a
wrongdoer); DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688, 695 (S.D.N.Y.) (“To establish a cause of
action sounding in replevin under New York law, Mrs. DeWeerth must show that she has an
immediate and superior right to possession of the Monet.”), rev’d on other grounds, 836 F.2d
103 (2d Cir. 1987); O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 865 (N.J. 1980) (holding that the statute of
limitations tolls according to the discovery rule); Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569
N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. 1991) (rejecting the DeWeeth court’s extrastatutory construction of the
legal limitation period in New York and holding that “the imposition of a reasonable diligence
requirement . . . would be inappropriate for purposes of the Statute of Limitations”).
43. McCorkle, supra note 41, at 900-01. The Rosenberg heirs, to whom the Seattle Art Mu-
seum returned Matisse’s “Odalisque,” see supra note 12, immediately sold it to Steve Wynn, op-
erator of the Bellagio Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas, for $2 million. Norm Clarke, Wynn Ex-
pands Bellagio’s Art Collection with $2 Million Purchase, REV.-J. (Las Vegas), Oct. 4, 1999, at
A3.
44. McCorkle, supra note 41, at 900.
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to wait until adjudication of the parties’ rights and that in which the
plaintiff seeks a pretrial seizure of the property.45
The key difference between the two avenues for recovery of a
chattel, for purposes of this Article, lies in the nature of each as in
personam or in rem. Where an action is brought simply to recover a
chattel, the action is in personam, that is, the court’s jurisdiction is
based on the presence or contacts of the defendant. An order of sei-
zure, on the other hand, operates directly on the chattel and may be
brought only in the jurisdiction in which the chattel is situated.46 Thus,
the plaintiff may make strategic decisions, including those aimed at
choice of a particular law, by having the opportunity to sue the de-
fendant in different jurisdictions in the former type of action,47 but has
no choice regarding the place of the suit nor the governing rules when
the latter type of suit is contemplated.
Regardless of the cause of action chosen, the original owner
seeking to establish his right to recover from the good-faith purchaser
must first prove his own title to the art.48 Particularly if the stolen art
45. In New York, for example, the former goal is accomplished through an action for re-
covery of a chattel. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7101 (McKinney 1998). This action may proceed without
seizure of the property. § 7102(d). If the plaintiff desires such seizure, either before or during
the trial, New York requires a court order, which is issued after the defendant has been given
proper notice and the plaintiff has provided a surety against loss by the defendant. The court
must be satisfied and find that it is probable the plaintiff will succeed on the merits. § 7102(d)-
(e).
46. E.g., County Constr. Co. v. Livengood Constr. Corp., 142 A.2d 9, 12 (Pa. 1958) (noting
that “because of its in rem characteristics [such an action] may be brought ‘in the county in
which the property . . . is found’”).
47. E.g., Hobbs v. Bolz Cooperage Co., 224 S.W. 968 (Ark. 1920) (“An action for the re-
covery of personal property is transitory, and can be brought in any county where the defen-
dants may be found or may appear. The action is not local in its nature, and need not be brought
in the county where the property is situated.”); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1072 (1987)
(“The action may be brought in a county in which a civil action may be brought or in the county
in which the property to be replevied is found.”).
48. Republic of Croatia v. Trustee of the Marquess of Northampton 1987 Settlement, 610
N.Y.S.2d 263, 265 (App. Div. 1994). The Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Hungary
brought suit in New York Supreme Court to recover treasure alleged to have been discovered
within their respective borders. At trial, the jury rendered a verdict against the republics on the
single ground that they had not proved by the preponderance of the evidence that the treasure
was discovered within their borders. On appeal, the republics argued that the trial court had
erred in not requiring the defendant trustee to prove the trust’s claim of title. The appellate
court affirmed the court’s ruling that it was plaintiffs’ burden to prove their title. Until plaintiffs
met that burden, the defendant, being in possession, was not required to prove its status. Id. at
264.
The title of the plaintiff was similarly at issue in Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox
Church v. Goldman & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 290-93 (7th Cir. 1990). The plain-
tiff was the Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, which owned the Kanakaria Church in
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originated in pre-war Europe, this may be a daunting task. In
Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon,49 the court’s description of
the plaintiff’s proof of ownership of the Duerer paintings at issue
took it on a historical, geopolitical, and jurisprudential foray through
the major European political upheavals of the twentieth century.50
Once the plaintiff’s right or title has been established, the key
question is whether the good-faith purchaser or a successor to a good-
faith purchaser can properly claim the benefit of either a substantive
or procedural rule to establish the supremacy of his claim over that of
the plaintiff. In all American jurisdictions and most foreign ones,51 the
northern Cyprus in 1974 when that part of Cyprus came under Turkish military rule. Id. at 280.
The Turkish forces declared the northern third of Cyprus, which they occupied and controlled,
to be the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (TFSC) and later the “Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus” (TRNC). Id. Only Turkey granted recognition of the TRNC; all other nations
continued to recognize the Republic of Cyprus (Republic) as the only legitimate government for
Cyprus. Id.
A mosaic that had been affixed to the Kanakaria Church for centuries was taken from
it, presumably by theft, after the Turkish invasion. Id.; see also The Kanakaria Mosaics, at
http://www.greekvillage.com/hcaao/kanakaria.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2001) (containing details
on the theft and a picture of a portion of the mosaic) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). In
the suit by the church to recover the mosaic from the Indiana gallery that came to be in posses-
sion of it, the gallery asserted that the plaintiff was not the owner of the mosaic, and thus was
not entitled to its return, because decrees of the TFSC and TRNC had divested the church of its
title. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 917 F.2d at 291.
In response to this argument on appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted
that it would not comment on the validity of the Turkish administration of northern Cyprus it-
self. Rather, it simply relied on the fact that the United States had never recognized the TFSC
or TRNC and declined the defendant’s invitation to give those entities “de facto” recognition.
Id. at 293. In light of the fact that, “despite their best efforts,” Turkish forces did not completely
displace the Republic and the fact that the “Republic of Cyprus remains the only recognized
Cypriot government, the sovereign nation for the entire island,” the decrees were ineffective to
divest plaintiff of its title. Id. For further discussion of the Autocephalous case, see infra notes
175-97, 352-61 and accompanying text.
49. 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
50. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals described its task as “a labyrinthian journey
through 19th century German dynastic law, contemporary German property law, Allied Mili-
tary Law during the post-War occupation of Germany, New York State law, and intricate con-
ceptions of succession and sovereignty in international law.” Id. at 1153. Similarly, an English
judge, required to resolve various claims to a painting stolen at the end of World War II, de-
scribed the case “as packed with [as many] different characters and issues as the images of the
painting. I have been introduced to SMERSH, trophy brigades, the art smugglers of Moscow
and ‘Big Mamma’ in order to resolve disputes of fact and to the learning of commentators on
the German civil code in order to resolve disputes of German law.” Gotha City v. Sotheby’s, slip
op. at 6-7 (Q.B. Sept. 9, 1998) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
51. Richard Crewdson, Some Aspects of the Law as It Affects Dealers in England, in
GENEVA WORKSHOP, supra note 22, at 47, 50; Henri Steinauer, The Transfer of Ownership of
Art in Swiss Law, in GENEVA WORKSHOP, supra note 22, at 118, 118-19.
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original owner who did not intend to part with title52 begins in a supe-
rior legal position to the good-faith purchaser whose chain of posses-
sion was at one point, and may continue to be, “wrongful.”53 As a re-
sult, the burden is typically on the good-faith purchaser to prove his
entitlement to the benefit of a rule trumping the owner’s title. This
rule may be substantive in nature, in the sense that the good-faith
purchaser relies on a rule that directly converts his title to a position
above the title of the original owner.54 Alternatively, and more often,
this rule, specifically the bar of the statute of limitations, is procedural
in nature.55 In such cases, the superior title of the original owner can-
not be asserted against the purchaser or the purchaser’s successors
because of the limitation, and this bar often is described as resulting
in a de facto recognition of a superior title in the good-faith pur-
chaser.56 A number of courts addressing the issue in the art theft con-
text have concluded that, although statutes of limitations are designed
to bar actions and not divest title, the effect is in fact to divest title.57
52. This often is a factual question at trial. In O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (1980), the
defendant, a good-faith purchaser, claimed title based on the alleged fact that the artist’s hus-
band had sold the painting to the defendant’s predecessor in interest, in essence arguing that his
chain of possession began rightfully. The plaintiff, artist Georgia O’Keeffe, argued that the
paintings had been stolen. Id. at 865; see also Charash v. Oberlin Coll., 14 F.3d 291, 294 (6th Cir.
1994) (stating that the possessor claimed title through gift by the artist to possessor’s donor).
The same issue would have been raised in the Searle litigation, described supra note 27. Adam
Zagorin, Saving the Spoils of War; The Nazis Looted Them. America Bought Them. Now Holo-
caust Victims Want Them Back, TIME, Dec. 1, 1997, at 87 (reporting that Searle’s [the pur-
chaser’s] lawyers assert that the Degas in issue was legitimately sold by the Goodman’s uncle
[the original owner], not stolen by the Nazis).
53. As will be seen, the owner-purchaser conflict arises precisely because the owner’s con-
tinued dispossession is deemed wrongful, either because the art was stolen or because a bailee,
rightfully in possession of the art, converted it. See infra notes 63-123 and accompanying text.
The question of exactly when and under what circumstances the possession is and remains
wrongful is a central one for both substantive law and choice-of-law purposes. See infra notes
289-94 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 63-89 and accompanying text.
55. In most cases pitting the original owner against the good-faith purchaser, the purchaser
does not claim to have received good title directly. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
The purchaser’s claim is grounded initially in rights as a possessor. The fact of the purchaser’s
possession then gives the owner a claim against the possessor, and the core issue focuses on
when this claim became time-barred.
56. See infra notes 94-219 and accompanying text.
57. E.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 873-74 (N.J. 1980) (holding that the discovery
rule does not change the effect of the statute of limitations, which effectively vests title in the
possessor, and that subsequent transfers of chattel are not separate acts of conversion which
start the statute of limitations running).
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Before the expiration of the statute, the possessor has both the chat-
tel and the right to keep it except as against the true owner. The
only imperfection in the possessor’s right to retain the chattel is the
original owner’s right to repossess it. Once that imperfection is re-
moved, the possessor should have good title for all purposes.58
Because title is treated as having vested in the good-faith purchaser,
he may transfer that title without resurrecting a new right of the
owner against the successor.59 The rules, whether substantive or pro-
cedural, defining the relative rights of original owners and good-faith
purchasers are referred to generally throughout this Article as “right-
defining rules.” Each of the major right-defining rules is discussed in
the sections that follow.
A. Substantive Right-Defining Rules
Substantive right-defining rules are those that directly favor the
rights of the good-faith purchaser over the original owner by immedi-
ately shifting title to the good-faith purchaser at the moment of the
purchase. As the following sections explain, such rules are extremely
rare in American jurisdictions.
1. Rules Recognizing the Immediate Title of the Good-Faith
Purchaser of Stolen Art. The substantive rule that most favors the
rights of the good-faith purchaser over the rights of the original
owner is that which vests title in the purchaser immediately upon his
good-faith acquisition. A few foreign nations, including some in
Europe from which much stolen art originates, apply such a rule in
limited circumstances. Italy, for example, embraces such a rule when
the victim of the theft is a private person or entity, but not when the
victim is a public institution.60 England has a more limited rule, of
ancient origin, known as “market overt.” This rule will immediately
58. Id. at 874. As Dean Ames of the Harvard Law School wrote more than 100 years ago,
and O’Keeffe noted, “[a]n immortal right to bring an eternally prohibited action is a metaphysi-
cal subtlety that the present writer cannot pretend to understand.” J.B. Ames, The Disseisin of
Chattels, 3 HARV. L. REV. 313, 319 (1890), quoted in O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 874.
59. Even before title is recognized in the good-faith purchaser, successive purchasers, all of
whom meet the standard of good faith, may “tack” their periods of possession such that the
owner does not benefit from a new statute of limitations clock with each transfer. “Subsequent
transfers of the chattel are part of the continuous dispossession of the chattel from the original
owner. The important point is not that there has been a substitution of possessors, but that there
has been a continuous dispossession of the former owner.” O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 874-75.
60. Galgano, supra note 22, at 129.
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vest title in a purchaser if the object was offered for sale in a public
market and purchased in good faith.61 These “immediate vesting”
rules represent a minority position among nations, however, at least
where the owner has been involuntarily dispossessed through theft.
No American state has embraced such a rule where the owner has
been involuntarily dispossessed of his property through theft.
2. Rules Recognizing the Immediate Title of the Good-Faith
Purchaser After Voluntary Dispossession by the Original Owner.
Under American law and the law of many foreign states there is only
one scenario in which a good-faith purchaser’s claim of title is
immediately recognized over that of the original owner. This scenario
will arise when the owner voluntarily parts with possession by the
creation of a bailment,62 the bailee converts the chattel, and the
nature of the bailment allows a reasonable buyer to conclude that the
bailee is empowered to pass the owner’s title.63 Such a situation might
arise out of a loan of the art for exhibit, the turning over of the art to
a restorer, the consignment64 of the art to a gallery for sale,65 or
61. Crewdson, supra note 51, at 50. The differences between the Italian rule and the Eng-
lish rule presented a difficult conflict of law issue in Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods,
Ltd., [1980] 1 Ch. 496, discussed infra at notes 299-302 and accompanying text.
62. A bailment arises when one who is not the owner of a chattel is in possession of it:
A bailment “may be created by operation of law. It is the element of lawful posses-
sion, and the duty to account for the thing as the property of another, that creates the
bailment, whether such possession results from contract or is otherwise lawfully ob-
tained. It makes no difference whether the thing be intrusted to a person by the
owner or by another. Taking lawful possession without present intent to appropriate
creates a bailment.”
Martin v. Briggs, 663 N.Y.S.2d 184, 187-88 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Seaboard Sand & Gravel
Corp. v. Moran Towing Corp., 154 F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir. 1946)).
63. Graffman v. Espel, No. 96 Civ. 8247 (SWK), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1339, at *9-11
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1998). This is not a rule unique to American states. Steinauer, supra note 51,
at 118 (“[I]f the alienator does not have the power to dispose of the object because it was simply
left in his care . . . the acquirer is protected and becomes owner if he believes in good faith that
the alienator had the power to dispose of the chattel . . . .”).
64. A consignment arises out of the transfer of possession from the owner to the consignee,
who is to attempt to sell the item to a third party:
Under a “true” consignment, the owner of goods delivers them to a consignee for
sale. If the consignee sells them, he must account to the owner-consignor for the pro-
ceeds of sale less his commission. If he does not sell the goods, he must return them,
but he does not in any case become liable to the consignor for the price of the goods if
they are not sold. Title to the goods remains in the consignor during the consignment
and passes, when the goods are sold, directly to the purchaser.
1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 3.5, at 73-74 (1965).
65. E.g., Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1986). Mucha involved what the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit described as “a 59-year bailment.” The artist,
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myriad other ways unknown to the ultimate purchaser.66 The essential
fact in all these scenarios is that the owner has voluntarily parted with
possession and the bailee has wrongfully sold or transferred the art,
either completely without authorization of the owner or in excess of
limited authorization given by the owner.67 A slightly different type of
Alphonse Mucha, a Czech who is widely credited as the originator of “Art Nouveau,” (for a
brief biography of Mucha and a sampling of his work, visit http://www.nymuseum.com/
Mucha.htm) in 1921 consigned the painting at issue, “Quo Vadis,” and many other works to the
Newcomb-Macklin Gallery of Chicago. At the time, Mucha was a resident of Paris. The con-
signment letter to the gallery listed a suggested price for “Quo Vadis” at $10,000. In a somewhat
unusual arrangement, Mucha provided, in effect, that the gallery would retain the difference
between the price at which the paintings sold and the price it was to remit to Mucha. A normal
consignment agreement then and now would provide for the gallery retaining a fixed percentage
of the final cost. As the court noted, “[u]nder this arrangement . . . [the owner of the gallery] if
he anticipated that the paintings would appreciate would have an incentive to store them rather
than sell them, since the appreciation would benefit him exclusively.” Mucha, 792 F.2d at 606.
Given this fact, it was perhaps not surprising that the gallery’s owner placed “Quo Vadis” and
other works in a warehouse rather than exhibiting them in the gallery.
For many years after 1930, first Mucha and then his widow and son, Jiri, made written
inquiry of the gallery to determine the status of Mucha’s paintings in its possession. None of the
gallery’s correspondences mentioned “Quo Vadis.” Id. at 608-10.
In 1979, the then-owner decided to close the gallery and liquidate its contents. One
Rupprecht, of Great Lakes Hot Tubs, Inc., having purchased a fan and icebox from the gallery’s
assets, asked the owner whether he could have any of the rolled-up paintings he had seen in the
gallery basement. The owner consented. One year later, Rupprect sold “Quo Vadis,” one of
those rolled-up paintings, for $150 to a Chicago art dealer who did business under the name
“Fly-by-Nite Galleries.” King, an art dealer whom the court describes as working “out of a
shopping bag,” purchased “Quo Vadis” for $5000 from the “Fly-by-Nite” owner in 1981. Id. at
612.
In 1982, one of King’s friends wrote Jiri Mucha seeking information about the painting.
After concluding that the Newcomb-Macklin Gallery had improperly either sold or given away
the painting, Jiri Mucha brought suit against King in 1983. Id. at 612-13. At the time of the suit,
“Quo Vadis” was in the hands of a restorer to whom King had brought the painting for restora-
tion. It remained in her custody until determination of the title and payment of the remainder of
her fee, King having already paid $8500, representing half the fee. Id. at 604. For the outcome of
the dispute, see infra note 76.
66. Crewdson, supra note 51, at 47.
A person who offers to sell an object to a dealer may have obtained possession by a
trick; or he may have it on loan, or it may be in his custody for some other reason
such as revaluation or repair. The true owner may be the wife or the husband or an-
other close relation of the person with whom the dealer is negotiating, or the object
may belong to a trust so that it is only the trustees who have the right to sell.
Id. at 51.
67. E.g., Morgold, Inc. v. Keeler, 891 F. Supp. 1361, 1366-67 (N.D. Cal. 1995). One of the
two owners of an oil-on-canvas painting by Alfred Bricher entitled “Marlton’s Cove, Grand
Manan, Maine,” sold the painting in violation of a written agreement with his co-owner. The
court acknowledged that a good-faith purchaser could acquire good title in spite of the allegedly
unauthorized action. Id. at 1365. (For a brief biography of Bricher and sample of his work, visit
http://www.whitemountainart.com/Biographies/bio_atb.htm.)
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bailment occurs in the rare situation where the owner loses or
misplaces the work.68
The key to understanding why substantive rules arose to favor a
good-faith purchaser69 in this scenario is to note that, with the excep-
tion of property that is lost, it is the owner who purposefully triggered
the chain of events that ultimately led to the unauthorized sale to the
purchaser. As a California court put it, “[a]n owner who entrusts his
property to another bears some responsibility for creating a situation
whereby an innocent purchaser is led to buy goods from an agent who
is acting in excess of his authority.”70
This policy is reflected in the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) rule that an owner who entrusts possession of goods to a
merchant who deals in that kind of goods gives that merchant the
power to transfer all rights to a buyer in the ordinary course of busi-
Essentially the same issue was presented in Leonardo Da Vinci’s Horse, Inc. v. O’Brien,
761 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D. Pa. 1991). The plaintiff-owner alleged that the sale of the disputed art
violated the consignment agreement. Although noting that a good-faith purchaser could acquire
title, the court suggested that the “bargain basement” price paid by the purchaser undermined
its claim of good-faith: “A ‘bargain basement’ price is often a sign that the seller’s rights to dis-
pose the object are not on the level.” Id. at 1228. See discussion infra notes 77-88 and accompa-
nying text. A similar issue was presented in Graffman v. Espel, No. 96 Civ. 8247 (SWK), 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1339 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1998). In 1992, Sture Hjalmar Graffman, the owner of
a Picasso painting, “Le Peintre et Son Modele,” contracted with Miguel Espel, acting on behalf
of his trading company, MTS, to make MTS the exclusive agent for the sale of the painting. The
contract authorized MTS to sell the painting through intermediaries. At least 90% of the pro-
ceeds were to go to Graffman. Graffman v. Delecea, No. 96 Civ. 7270, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15525, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1997). After selling the painting, Espel pocketed the proceeds.
Espel, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1339, at *3. The remainder of the facts of this and related cases
are set forth infra in note 79.
68. E.g., Hoelzer v. Stamford, 933 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1991). The story of the artwork at is-
sue in this case began with the Works Progress Administration, a creation of President Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s administration, which was intended to provide public work for unemployed
Americans during the 1930s. One of the elements of the program was designed to sponsor work
in the arts. “Among its other achievements, the arts project generated creation of thousands of
murals for display in public buildings around the country.” Id. at 1133.
One set of such murals was painted by James Daugherty for the walls of Stamford High
School, a public school in Stamford, Connecticut. These murals, eight feet tall and more than
100 feet long, hung in the high school from 1934 until 1970.
In 1970, when the school was being renovated, the murals were to be removed carefully
and stored to prevent their being damaged. Instead, unbeknownst to school officials, workmen
removed the murals and placed them with construction debris near an outdoor dumpster. For-
tunately, a student discovered the murals and took them home. Id. at 1134. (The remainder of
the Hoelzer facts are described infra at note 247.)
69. Good-faith status is a central factor when artwork is purchased from a seller who is in
lawful possession but unauthorized to sell the artwork. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying
text.
70. Naftzger v. Am. Numismatic Soc’y, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 789 (Ct. App. 1996).
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ness.71 The U.C.C. defines entrustment broadly, including within the
term “any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of possession.”72
The significance of this definition is that it captures not only the con-
signment situation but also the situation in which the owner leaves
the art with the bailee for repair73 or exhibit. The result is that “a mer-
chant may vest good title in the [good-faith] buyer even as against the
owner.”74 The lack of authority of the merchant to make the sale does
not affect this result.75
Under these rules, however, in order to prevail over the original
owner, the buyer must qualify as “a buyer in ordinary course of busi-
ness.”76 The U.C.C. defines such a buyer as “a person who in good
faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the
ownership rights . . . of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary
course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind.”77 A
merchant, as purchaser, will be held to a higher standard of good faith
than will other purchasers.78 Thus, an art gallery owner purchasing a
work of art will be held to a heightened standard, but the individual
71. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1977). The entrustment rule is “designed to enhance the reliability
of commercial sales by merchants (who deal with the kind of goods sold on a regular basis)
while shifting the risk of loss through fraudulent transfer to the owner of the goods, who can
select the merchant to whom he entrusts his property.” Porter v. Wertz, 421 N.E.2d 500, 500-01
(N.Y. 1981).
72. U.C.C. § 2-403(3). Whether there is an entrustment is a question of fact, although Pro-
fessor Grant Gilmore, “father” of the U.C.C., once wrote that the Code “defines ‘entrusting’ as
including everything short of armed robbery.” Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea
and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605,
618 (1981).
73. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 175-76 (3d
ed. 1988).
74. O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 873 (N.J. 1980).
75. See Graffman v. Espel, No. 96-8247, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1339, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 9, 1998) (“Even where an agent has violated his or her instructions, Section 2-403 may op-
erate to bind the principal such that the purchaser acquires good title from the principal’s
agent.”).
76. U.C.C. § 2-403(2). In Mucha v. King, King did not prevail over Mucha because Rup-
precht, who had originally purchased the work from the gallery, could not qualify as “a buyer in
the ordinary course of business.” 792 F.2d 602, 612 (7th Cir. 1986). Therefore, Rupprecht did
not gain title to “Quo Vadis” and could not transfer title to a subsequent buyer. Id.
77. U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
78. Espel, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1339, at *15 (“Merchants are held to a higher standard of
good faith than other purchasers.”). The U.C.C. provides that “[g]ood faith in the case of a mer-
chant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade.” U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b).
REYHAN 03/13/01 12:39 PM
2001] A CHAOTIC PALETTE 975
purchaser from the gallery will be held to the “normal” standard.79
Most jurisdictions leave the precise height of the bar of “reasonable
commercial standards” to the trier of fact.80
Where the U.C.C. does not govern the case,81 common law
agency principles may also favor the good-faith purchaser over the
owner in the voluntary dispossession scenario. Following basic agency
principles, “if the seller of a painting has authority to sell it, a buyer
and all subsequent buyers will gain whatever title to the painting the
seller initially possessed.”82 Whether authority exists is a question for
the trier of fact.83 Such authority may be actual, implied, or apparent,84
79. An example of the significance of this difference is well illustrated by Espel. Both the
ultimate purchasers and the Avanti Gallery, through which the Picasso had passed, sought
summary judgment claiming the status of good-faith purchasers from a merchant to whom the
Picasso had been entrusted. As to the gallery, the court denied summary judgment, noting that
the question was one for the trier of fact:
Whether the Avanti Defendants met the reasonable commercial standards of the art
industry is a question for the trier of fact. Whether the standards of the art industry
required the Avanti Defendants to make an inquiry into the provenance of the
Painting is also a question for the trier of fact. If the trier of fact were to determine
that reasonable commercial standards require an investigation into provenance only
when there are warning signs the questions of whether there were warning signs, and
what degree of investigation was reasonable, are factual inquiries. Thus, there are
questions of fact as to whether the Avanti Defendants acted in good faith and are en-
titled to the protection of Section 2-403.
Espel, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1339, at *16-17 (citation omitted).
With respect to the ultimate purchasers (the “Does”), however, the court held “[a]s a
matter of law, [they] had no obligation to investigate the provenance of the Painting.” Id. at *18.
As purchasers who were “honest in fact,” they met the good-faith standard. Id. at *17-19.
80. See id. at *15-16 (noting that whether a merchant applied reasonable standards is a
question for the trier of fact); Morgold v. Keeler, 891 F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (con-
sidering whether the purchasers had taken reasonable steps to verify title). In Morgold, the
court concluded that the ultimate and penultimate purchasers acted with the required good faith
inasmuch as “both conducted themselves in a manner reasonable in the art industry.” Id. at
1368. In the absence of “warning signs” regarding the provenance of the disputed Bricher
painting, industry practice would not require “a buyer to require a seller to make disclosures
about the chain of title or the prices paid at every link in the chain.” Id.
81. All states have adopted the U.C.C. Issues arise, nonetheless, in which the circumstances
of the case do not strictly meet the requirements of U.C.C. section 402, the entrustment section,
such as where the bailee is not a merchant who deals in that kind of goods as required. Addi-
tionally, the U.C.C. does not govern in foreign nations.
82. Espel, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1339, at *6 (denying the plaintiff-owner and the defen-
dant-sellers’ cross-motions for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s action to recover the paint-
ing and for damages; the court granted the good-faith purchasers’ motion for summary judg-
ment).
83. Id. at *7.
84. Actual authority is express authority given by the principal (the owner) to the agent.
Graffman v. Delecea, No. 96 Civ. 7270, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15525, at *8-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Implied authority is “actual authority given implicitly . . . [or a] kind of authority arising solely
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although most disputed art title cases involving the owner’s voluntary
disposition of the art to a bailee turn on the issue of apparent author-
ity.85 Under agency principles, apparent authority doctrine leads to
the conclusion that “the loss should fall on the principal who has
armed the agent with apparent authority and thus has enabled him to
obtain the advantage of the person with whom he trades, rather than
on the purchaser.”86 Although it is always the case that the pur-
chaser’s reliance on the representations of the agent must be reason-
able, where apparent authority exists, “the [purchaser] ordinarily has
no duty to inquire as to the agent’s actual authority, except when the
transaction is conducted under extraordinary circumstances that
should alert the third party to the danger of fraud,” or where the third
party is under a special duty.87 As is true in the entrustment context,
art dealers have been held to have a heightened duty to inquire as to
such authority.88
In both the entrustment and the apparent authority context, the
good-faith purchaser is able to claim the benefit of a rule that bestows
good title on him immediately upon purchase. Although the acts of
the seller or a predecessor to the seller may be wrongful to the origi-
nal owner,89 the possession by the good-faith purchaser is never
wrongful as to that owner. Thus, a cause of action never accrues in fa-
vor of the owner against the purchaser.
from the designation by the principal of a kind of agent who ordinarily possesses certain pow-
ers.” Id. at *10 (quoting Marfia v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, 100 F.3d 243, 251 (2d Cir. 1996)).
Implied authority is “dependent on verbal or other acts by the principal which reasonably give
an appearance of authority to conduct the transaction.” Id. Apparent authority, grounded on
estoppel principles, “arises when a principal places an agent in a position where it appears that
the agent has power to act for the principal, although the agent does not actually possess such
power.” Id. at *11-12.
85. Delecea, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15525, at *10.
86. Naftzger v. Am. Numismatic Soc’y, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 790 (Ct. App. 1996) (quoting
Carter v. Rowley, 211 P. 267, 268 (Dist. Ct. App. 1922)).
87. Delecea, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15525, at *12; see also Naftzger, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790:
Under agency law principles, a similar result may be had if the court precludes the de-
frauded owner from disputing the validity of the innocent purchaser’s title. The court
will estop an owner who, by his conduct, has led the purchaser to believe that the
agent was authorized to sell the property.
88. See supra notes 67, 79.
89. The owner will normally have a cause of action for misdelivery against the bailee. For
examples of this, see Graffman v. Espel, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), and Dele-
cea, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15525, in which the original owner brought claims against all bailees
in the chain that ultimately vested title in the good-faith purchaser.
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B. Procedural Right-Defining Rules: The Bar of the Statute of
Limitations
The far more common scenario in which the claim of the original
owner of art against the good-faith purchaser arises is that following
the involuntary dispossession of the original owner through theft of
the art. The rules that have emerged in this context are grounded in
policy considerations born of the wrongfulness of the act that parted
the owner from his property. When art is stolen, the thief’s possession
is immediately wrongful, and because the owner’s claim accrues im-
mediately, the statute of limitations on that claim is triggered imme-
diately.90 This rule applies even when the owner is unaware of the
theft at the time of its occurrence.91 Thus, a thief who holds the stolen
art beyond the statutory period in which a claim for conversion must
be made is not subject to a civil recovery by the owner, although he
does not gain title against the owner. Of course, what the bar of the
statute of limitations gives the thief, the criminal law takes away.92 Far
more immediate motivations, primarily monetary ones, usually in-
spire the thief to part with possession long before the conversion limi-
tations period would bar suit by the true owner. Interestingly, how-
ever, the influence of the statute of limitations becomes far more
complicated when the art, initially in the hands of a thief, comes to
rest in the hands of a good-faith purchaser.
90. See Sporn v. M.C.C. Records, Inc., 448 N.E.2d 1324, 1326-27 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that
exclusive control and use of a “master tape” constituted a conversion, rather than an ongoing
trespass).
A similar outcome occurs in other scenarios involving an immediate characterization of
wrongfulness. For example, in New York City Transit Authority v. New-York Historical Society,
635 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1995), the Transit Authority brought an action to recover items in
the possession of the Society. These items had been given to the Society over the course of four
decades by the New York City Board of Transportation. The court noted that “[i]t is well set-
tled that where the initial possession of a chattel is wrongful or unlawful, the cause of action to
recover the chattel accrues and the Statute of Limitations begins to run at the time of the initial
unlawful possession.” Id. at 1000. Because Article VIII, section 1 of the New York constitution
prohibits agencies such as the Board from making gifts, the gifts to the Society were unlawful
from the time of each transfer, and the statute of limitations having been thus triggered, the
plaintiff’s cause of action was time-barred as early as 1949. Id. at 1001.
91. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991); see also
New-York Historical Soc’y, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 1001 (“A transfer may be wrongful and constitute a
conversion even where the defendant acted in good faith and the plaintiff was unaware at the
time that the taking was wrongful. All that is necessary is that the defendant had no right to pos-
sess the property in question.” (citations omitted)).
92. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 450.10(5) (McKinney 2000) (“If stolen property comes into
the custody of a court, it must . . . be delivered to the owner, on satisfactory proof of his
title . . . .”).
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Both American and foreign jurisdictions are essentially in accord
about the immediate consequences of a transfer by a thief. A thief
cannot transfer title because he does not have title.93 The significance
of the good-faith purchaser’s lack of title lies in the fact that the title-
holder, the owner, has a right to sue the purchaser for the return of
the work and, in some circumstances, for damages arising out of the
purchaser’s wrongful possession. The question is when the statute of
limitations begins to run on the owner’s claim against the good-faith
purchaser.
1. Accrual at Acquisition: Good-Faith Possession as an
Immediate Wrong. The traditional rule in American states, and the
modern rule in many foreign countries, treats the purchase by a
subsequent possessor from a thief, even in good faith, as wrongful
from the instant that possession begins.94 This fact of wrongfulness
immediately triggers the clock of the statute of limitations on the
owner’s cause of action for replevin or conversion against the good-
faith purchaser. The fact of immediate wrongfulness may, in the short
93. See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,
917 F.2d 278, 291 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Indiana law); Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elico-
fon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying New
York law); Naftzger v. Am. Numismatic Soc’y, 499 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 788 (Ct. App. 1996) (stat-
ing California law); O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 867 (N.J. 1980) (stating New Jersey law).
British law recognizes the principle “nemo dat quod non habit,” meaning simply that a person
who does not have good title may not pass good title. Crewdson, supra note 51, at 50.
It is often said that a purchaser from or through a thief can acquire only what the thief
has. This statement is misleading in a crucial way, because subsequent purchasers, even pur-
chasers in good faith, in fact may get less than what the thief has. Such an arguably absurd result
occurs when the subsequent possessor is not entitled to claim the benefit of the same rules with
respect to time limitations on the owner’s right to reclaim the property as would have been
available to the thief. In Guggenheim, the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged but was
not moved to remedy the “seemingly anomalous” result that a good-faith purchaser cannot take
advantage of the favorable application of the statute of limitations accrual date available to a
thief. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 429.
94. For the American rule, see, for example, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 229
(1965) (describing purchase by a subsequent possessor from a thief, even in good faith, as
wrongful from the instant that possession begins); Christiansen Grain, Inc. v. Garden City Coop-
erative Equity Exchange, 391 P.2d 81, 85 (Kan. 1964) (same); Bozeman Mortuary Ass’n v.
Fairchild, 68 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Ky. 1934) (same); and Shelby v. Shaner, 115 P. 785, 786 (Okla.
1911) (same). For foreign countries, see, for example, Hans Hanisch, Legal Aspects of Interna-
tional Trade in Art in the Federal Republic of Germany, in GENEVA WORKSHOP, supra note 22,
at 191, 193 (stating that the German statute of limitations runs in ten years from a good-faith
purchaser’s acquisition, so long as the purchaser remains in good faith through the ten-year pe-
riod) and Steinauer, supra note 51, at 119 (stating that under Swiss law, an owner who has been
dispossessed of an object through theft has five years from the loss of possession to bring a suit
for recovery of the object).
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run, expand the legal exposure of the possessor by opening the full
range of liabilities that attend the torts of conversion and replevin.95
Significantly, in the context of stolen art and the statute of limitations,
this characterization in fact benefits the subsequent purchaser.96
Because the possession is immediately characterized as wrongful, a
claim for replevin or conversion has accrued, often despite the fact
that neither the owner nor the good-faith purchaser knows it. Unless
tolled, the statute will run on the original owner’s right to sue
relatively quickly and often before the owner is able to discern where
and by whom the art is wrongfully possessed.97
What, if anything, will toll a statute of limitations to prevent such
an outcome varies significantly among states. One ground recently
emerging as relevant in the context of good-faith possession of stolen
art is the “fraudulent concealment” rule.98 In most states, a defen-
dant’s fraudulent concealment of a cause of action tolls the statute of
limitations for the period during which the claim is undiscovered or
reasonably undiscoverable by the plaintiff, in essence estopping the
95. See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 717 F. Supp. at 1404 (“[D]amages may be
awarded for loss of the use of the property in a replevin action.”), aff’d, 917 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir.
1990). For additional discussion, see DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1987),
infra at notes 153-74 and accompanying text.
96. See Stephen L. Foutty, Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg
& Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.: Entrenchment of the Due Diligence Requirement in Replevin Actions
for Stolen Art, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1839, 1843 (1990) (“While this rule, which considers the good
faith purchaser to be in unlawful possession upon receipt of the property . . . seems to favor the
true owner, the rule actually benefits the good faith purchaser in replevin actions.”).
97. The limitation periods themselves for replevin or conversion normally fall in a range
from two to five years. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338 (West Supp. 2001) (three years); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(h)-(i) (West Supp. 2001) (four years); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-
205 (West 1992) (five years); N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 214(3) (McKinney Supp. 2001) (three years);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (West Supp. 2001) (two years).
98. One notable source states:
[F]raudulent concealment of a cause of action from the one in whom it resides, by the
one against whom it lies, constitutes an implied exception to the statute of limitations,
postponing the commencement of the running of the statute until discovery or rea-
sonable opportunity of discovery of the fact by the owner of the cause of action; un-
der this rule, one who wrongfully conceals material facts and thereby prevents dis-
covery of his wrong or the fact that a cause of action has accrued against him is not
permitted to assert the statute of limitations as a bar to an action against him, thus
taking advantage of his own wrong, until the expiration of the full statutory period
from the time when the facts were discovered or should, with reasonable diligence,
have been discovered.
34 AM. JUR. Limitation of Actions § 231 (1941); accord 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions
§ 147 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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defendant from asserting the limitations defense.99 “[T]he rule of
fraudulent concealment is an equitable principle designed to effect
substantial justice between the parties; its rationale ‘is that the culpa-
ble defendant should be estopped from profiting by his own wrong to
the extent that it hindered an ‘otherwise diligent’ plaintiff in discov-
ering his cause of action.’”100 The essential fact necessary to a showing
99. An excellent example of estoppel to bar the defense of the statute of limitations in a
claim concealment context is Farkas v. Farkas, 168 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 1999). In this intra-family
dispute, which reads like a modern Grimm Brothers’ tale, the mother-in-law, Ruth, brought suit
against her estranged daughter-in-law, Arlene, for conversion of several pieces of art that for
years had resided in the home of Arlene and Ruth’s son, Bruce. Arlene, in turn, counterclaimed
against Ruth for fraud and conversion of art, money, and other marital assets. Ruth died before
trial, and Bruce continued as her representative. The jury returned a verdict finding that Arlene
had converted nothing and that Ruth had converted more than $700,000 of art and other prop-
erty. Id. at 639-40.
Bruce moved to set aside the verdict against Ruth on the ground that the statute of
limitations on Arlene’s counterclaims had run. The district court agreed and vacated the jury’s
verdict against Ruth. Id.
Before examining the Second Circuit’s reversal, it is both illuminating and darkly enter-
taining to consider the underlying facts. Bruce and Arlene were married for thirty years before
Bruce left and entered into a bigamous marriage with the mother of his children. Not surpris-
ingly, Arlene sued and Bruce countersued for divorce. In 1994, two years after the divorce ac-
tions commenced, Ruth asked Arlene to return to her certain pieces of art that were hanging in
Bruce and Arlene’s apartment, in which Arlene still lived. Ruth claimed that this art had been
on loan to the couple. Arlene refused to deliver possession to Ruth, claiming that the art had
been a gift. When Ruth then sued Arlene, Arlene countersued, claiming that Ruth improperly
removed from the couple’s apartment a Dali painting, a Hassam painting, and a Rodin sculp-
ture, among other things. The court described the following scheme, which the jury apparently
believed Arlene had proven:
Ruth had given various pieces of art to the couple over the years; Bruce engineered
the removal of the art from the marital home; Ruth and Bruce then arranged for the
art to be sold and for the proceeds to go to Ruth, who in turn then lent the money to
Bruce. Evidence to prove that Ruth and Bruce engaged in this scheme included a di-
rect correlation between the amounts of money received from the sale of individual
pieces of art and the amounts of money Ruth “lent” to Bruce.
Id. at 640.
In holding that Arlene’s claims against Ruth were barred, the district court set the lat-
est date at which the conversion occurred as 1990. Because Arlene did not bring her claim for
conversion until 1995, it was beyond the applicable three-year statute of limitations. Id. at 639.
The court further held that Arlene had not presented sufficient evidence to support equitable
estoppel as a bar to the statute’s running.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the district court had
“misapprehended” the standard for equitable estoppel under New York law. Id. at 641. The
Second Circuit concluded that intentional concealment of the conversion by the defendant
barred the use of a statute of limitations defense. In the instant case, Arlene had offered more
than ample evidence that, at a minimum, Ruth intentionally engaged in a scheme to convert and
conceal the monies derived from the sale of the artwork. Id. at 642.
100. Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 873 P.2d 613, 615 (Cal. 1994) (quoting Sanchez
v. South Hoover Hosp., 553 P.2d 1129, 1133-34 (Cal. 1976)).
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of fraudulent concealment is that the defendant has done something
affirmatively to prevent discovery of the claim.101
Significantly, however, although courts have held that fraudulent
concealment of the existence of the cause of action tolls the statute of
limitations, several courts called upon to address the issue have re-
fused to extend the doctrine where the cause of action is known to the
plaintiff but the identity of the defendant is fraudulently concealed.
The distinction between “concealed claims” and “concealed identi-
ties” is crucial in the art theft context, because most owners know of
the theft, and thus of the cause of action, long before they know the
identity of the current possessor.102
A significant minority of states has been willing to extend the
doctrine to the situation where the identity of the defendant is
fraudulently concealed. Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries of
California, Inc.103 is illustrative. The California appellate court noted
that the general rule that concealed identity does not toll the statute
of limitations was an outgrowth of an assumption that the normal
limitations period, often extended by the filing of a Doe complaint,104
usually provides sufficient time to discover the identity of the wrong-
doer.105 “The question here, however, is whether the general rule
should apply when, as a result of the defendant’s intentional con-
cealment, the plaintiff is not only unaware of the defendant’s identity,
but is effectively precluded as a practical matter from ascertaining it
101. Riddell v. Riddell Washington Corp., 866 F.2d 1480, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1990). If the plain-
tiff establishes fraudulent concealment, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the
plaintiff could have discovered the cause of action through the exercise of due diligence. Hob-
son v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
102. This is not always true. Naftzger v. American Numismatic Society, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784
(Ct. App. 1996), involved the claims of a good-faith purchaser of rare coins against the museum
from which they were stolen. Although the theft took place sometime prior to 1970, it was dis-
guised by the substitution of identical but inferior coins. Only in December 1993 was the fact of
the theft determined. Id. at 787.
103. 873 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1994). Prior to Bernson, California had followed the traditional rule,
which was accepted in almost every state, that “ignorance of the identity of the defendant is not
essential to a claim and therefore will not toll the statute.” Id. at 616 (citing Gale v. McDaniel,
13 P. 871 (Cal. 1887)).
104. Under California law, plaintiffs in civil actions may file such a complaint where the
name of the defendant is unknown. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 474 (West 1979) (“When the
plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint . . . and
such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name . . . .”). The pur-
pose of this section is to enable the plaintiff to file suit before the statute of limitations runs.
Olden v. Hatchell, 201 Cal. Rptr. 715, 718 (Ct. App. 1984).
105. Bernson, 873 P.2d at 616.
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through normal discovery procedures.”106 Although Bernson is not an
art theft case,107 the court acknowledged that “[t]he problem arises not
infrequently when the owner of stolen artwork discovers its where-
abouts many years after the theft and files an action to recover the
property.”108 As is true when the cause of action itself is concealed,
fraudulent concealment of the identity of the defendant tolls the stat-
ute only until the plaintiff discovers or, through the exercise of due
diligence, should have discovered the identity of the defendant.109
Only one court has applied the “concealed identity” variant of
the fraudulent concealment doctrine in an art theft case to toll the
statute of limitations for the owner in a replevin action against the
possessor, and that court did so as an alternate ground for its hold-
ing.110 In Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg, the
church brought suit against an Indiana art gallery and its owner to re-
cover extremely valuable mosaics that had been stolen from the
Kanakaria Church in northern Cyprus.111 The bulk of the district
court’s opinion discussed the application of the discovery rule112 to
106. Id. at 617.
107. Bernson involved a defamation suit in which the plaintiff knew of material defaming
him but did not know the identity of its authors. Id. at 614.
108. Id. at 617. In 1983, the California Legislature amended the statute of limitations period
for seeking the return of stolen art to make clear “that the cause of action does not accrue until
the owner, the owner’s agent, or the investigating law enforcement agency discovers the where-
abouts of the stolen articles.” Naftzger v. Am. Numismatic Soc’y, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 786 (Ct.
App. 1996) (discussing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c) (West 1979)).
109. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917
F.2d 278, 288 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that the plaintiff must exercise due diligence during the pe-
riod of fraudulent concealment).
110. See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,
717 F. Supp. 1374, 1376 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (concluding that the doctrine of fraudulent conceal-
ment would toll the running of the statute of limitations in favor of the original owner), aff’d,
917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (declining to address the issue after having affirmed the district
court’s statute of limitations conclusion on another ground). O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862
(N.J. 1980), hinted at the applicability of the doctrine, noting in the context of the discovery/due
diligence rule, discussed infra at notes 128-203 and accompanying text, that “[i]f a chattel is con-
cealed from the true owner, fairness compels tolling the statute during the period of conceal-
ment.” Id. at 872.
Although the fraudulent concealment doctrine applies when the possessor actively con-
ceals the art in order to gain the benefit of the limitations bar, principles of adverse possession
offer analogies to support the acquisition of title in a possessor who does precisely the opposite.
Where possession is “hostile, actual, visible, exclusive and continuous,” adverse possession will
eventually extinguish the title of the original owner and recognize a new title in the adverse pos-
sessor. Id. at 870.
111. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 717 F. Supp. at 1375. For additional discussion
of this case, see infra notes 175-97 and accompanying text.
112. The discovery rule is discussed infra at notes 128-203 and accompanying text.
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postpone the accrual of claims against the good-faith purchaser, the
primary ground upon which the court found the church’s action to be
timely.113 The court then turned to the alternate ground of its holding,
that the church’s action was timely under the doctrine of fraudulent
concealment.114
The court began by noting that the doctrine of fraudulent con-
cealment presupposes that the defendant is in wrongful possession of
the property and thus that the plaintiff’s cause of action has ac-
crued.115 Indiana law had already embraced the fraudulent conceal-
ment doctrine as applicable in suits for conversion of personal prop-
erty, including stolen property,116 and no Indiana case foreclosed
application of the doctrine to concealed identity in the art theft con-
text.117 The court concluded that the plaintiff’s inability to discover the
possessor of the stolen mosaics was due to the fraudulent conceal-
ment of the mosaics by the defendants’ predecessors.118 The court also
noted that the plaintiff had exercised due diligence to discover the
fraud, as required by Indiana law, and was therefore entitled to in-
voke the doctrine of fraudulent concealment to toll the statute.119
The application of the “concealed identity” variant of the
fraudulent concealment doctrine in art theft cases serves the policy
interest of barring a defendant from gaining repose through his own
fraudulent acts. “[W]here the bar [of the statute of limitations] be-
comes a sword rather than a shield, wielded by a party that has inten-
tionally cloaked its identity, factors of fairness and unjust enrichment
come into play, which courts are bound to consider in equity and
good conscience.”120 Nevertheless, the doctrine will rarely be of use to




117. One Indiana case had held that the doctrine did not extend to concealment of the iden-
tity of the defendant. Landers v. Evers, 24 N.E.2d 796, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 1940). The Auto-
cephalous Greek-Orthodox Church court found that that case did not foreclose recognition of
the doctrine in concealed identity cases because Landers involved a situation where the plaintiff
easily could have discovered the proper identity of the defendant. Autocephalous Greek-
Orthodox Church, 717 F. Supp. at 1392-93 n.13.
118. Id. at 1392.
119. Id. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but only on the first ground, the
applicability in art theft cases of the discovery rule. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 917
F.2d 278, 290 (7th Cir. 1990). Because it found no error, legal or factual, in the district court’s
adoption and application of that rule, it declined to pass on the fraudulent concealment issue.
Id.
120. Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 873 P.2d 613, 618 (Cal. 1994).
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plaintiffs in art theft cases. Although the thief and those with knowl-
edge of the theft might intentionally conceal their identity,121 good-
faith purchasers are unlikely to do so. Such purchasers are not re-
quired to be open and notorious in their possession, as might be the
case if they were affirmatively claiming title by adverse possession.122
Rather, in the scenarios where their possession is deemed wrongful
from its inception, the statute of limitations will begin to run at that
inception, and the toll will occur only in the rare case where the good-
faith purchaser has acted affirmatively to prevent discovery of the
claim. As a result, in virtually all cases of an owner seeking recovery
from a good-faith purchaser deemed to be in wrongful possession, the
uninterrupted running of the statute will bar the suit and give title to
the purchaser.123
2. Accrual Delayed: Wrongfulness of the Good-Faith
Purchaser’s Possession Postponed. An increasing number of
jurisdictions do not characterize possession by a good-faith purchaser
as wrongful from its inception, even in situations where the
dispossession of the owner originally occurred through theft. These
jurisdictions postpone the legal finding of wrongfulness until either
the owner demands return of the item and the possessor refuses the
demand (the “demand and refusal” rule),124 or until the time at which
the owner, through the exercise of due diligence, knows the identity
of the possessor (the discovery rule).125 The fact that the legal
conclusion of wrongfulness is postponed delays the accrual of the
plaintiff’s claim. This delay of accrual in turn delays the triggering of
the statute of limitations. In limited respects, these rules deferring the
characterization of wrongfulness protect the good-faith purchaser
from liabilities flowing from wrongful possession.126 This benefit is
121. This fact has led one influential court to conclude that owners of stolen art are justified
in doing nothing to publicize the theft for fear that publicity will encourage continued conceal-
ment. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430-31 (N.Y. 1991), dis-
cussed infra at notes 206-20 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 110.
123. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 204-19 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 128-203 and accompanying text.
126. See Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 848 (E.D.N.Y. 1981),
aff’d, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982):
The rule is a reasonable and just one, that an innocent purchaser of personal property
from a wrongdoer shall first be informed of the defect in his title and have an oppor-
tunity to deliver the property to the true owner before he shall be made liable as a
tortfeasor for wrongful conversion.
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essentially illusory, however. Although intended to protect innocent
purchasers, delayed wrongfulness rules actually benefit original
owners in suits to recover stolen art. By delaying the point at which
the statute of limitations would begin to run, delayed wrongfulness
rules delay the point at which the original owner’s suit would be
barred.127
a. Accrual delayed: the discovery rule. The discovery rule
delays the accrual of a cause of action against the good-faith
purchaser, thus postponing the triggering of the statute of limitations,
until “the injured party [the owner] discovers, or by exercise of
reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered, facts
which form the basis of the cause of action,”128 including the identity
of the possessor.129 This rule is comprised of two parts. First, it asks
when the owner learned enough facts to form the basis of a cause of
action “which must include the facts that the works are being held by
another and who, or at least where the ‘other’ is.”130 Second, the rule
demands that instead of accepting the invitation to “laziness” that
might appear to be tolerated or encouraged by the nature of the first
inquiry, the true owner must throughout this time “exercise due
diligence to investigate the theft and recover the works.”131
(internal quotations omitted).
127. Foutty, supra note 96, at 1862; see also DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 108 (2d
Cir. 1987) (“[The ‘demand and refusal’ rule] may disadvantage the good-faith purchaser, how-
ever. . . . For if demand is delayed, then so is accrual of the cause of action, and the good-faith
purchaser will remain exposed to suit long after an action against a thief or even other innocent
parties would be time-barred.”). The facts of DeWeerth are described infra at notes 156-69 and
accompanying text.
128. O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 869 (N.J. 1980); see also Autocephalous Greek-
Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1389 (S.D. Ind.)
1989) (noting that the “discovery rule prevents the statute [of limitations] from beginning to run
in situations where a plaintiff, using due diligence, cannot bring suit because he is unable to de-
termine a cause of action”), aff’d, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990); Erisoty v. Rizik, No. 93-6215,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096, at *29 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (reciting the same rule).
129. O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 870. This rule differs in key respects from the “fraudulent con-
cealment” rule, which acknowledges the wrongfulness of defendant’s possession but tolls the
running of the statute of limitations while the identity of the possessor is concealed. There, the
focus is on the mala fides of the possessor in seeking to conceal possession in part to gain the
benefit of the otherwise applicable statute of limitations, which would eventually bar the plain-
tiff’s claim. The discovery rule, examined here, focuses instead on the acts of the true owner in a
situation where the possessor is assumed to be acting in good faith.
130. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 917 F.2d at 289.
131. Id.
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The seminal art theft case incorporating the discovery rule into
an owner/good-faith purchaser dispute is O’Keeffe v. Snyder.132 In
1976, artist Georgia O’Keeffe133 brought suit to recover three of her
paintings from a New Jersey art gallery owner named Barry Snyder.
O’Keeffe alleged that the paintings had been stolen in 1946 from a
New York art gallery operated by her husband, the famous photogra-
pher Alfred Stieglitz.134 O’Keeffe did not immediately inform anyone,
including her husband, of the theft.135 Although she did tell her hus-
band later, neither he nor she informed the police or any other law
enforcement agency, nor did they advertise the loss of the paintings.
They did mention the loss to associates in the art world. Not until
1972 did O’Keeffe authorize the reporting of the theft to the Art
Dealers Association of America, which maintained a private registry
of stolen paintings.136 In early 1976, O’Keeffe learned from a New
York City art gallery that the paintings had been sold for $35,000 to
defendant Snyder. When O’Keeffe demanded that Snyder return the
paintings, he refused.137
Snyder’s claim to the paintings traced back through one Ulrich
Frank. Frank had sold the paintings through the New York gallery
where Snyder had purchased them. Frank claimed possession through
a gift from his father in 1965. Frank had kept the paintings in his
homes in New Jersey and Pennsylvania and, in 1968, had publicly ex-
hibited them anonymously in a one-day art show in New Jersey.138
The two parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The
trial court granted summary judgment to Snyder, the good-faith pur-
chaser.139 The intermediate appellate court reversed and granted
summary judgment to O’Keeffe.140 Both courts felt constrained by
then-existing precedent to treat the issue as one of adverse possession
132. 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980).
133. Unlike many of the other artists whose works have been the subject of the disputes
chronicled in this Article, Georgia O’Keeffe led a long life, dying just short of her 100th birth-
day. She began studying art in 1905 and continued painting until just before her death in 1986. A
sampling of her work can be found at http://www.michelangelo.com/okeeffe.
134. Some of Stieglitz’s most notable photographs can be viewed at http://masters-of-
photography.com/S/stieglitz/stieglitz.html.
135. O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 865.
136. Id. at 866.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 865.
140. Id.
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of chattels,141 and both courts held that Frank had not held the paint-
ings “visibly, openly and notoriously.”142 Notwithstanding this finding,
the trial court held that the statute of limitations commenced at the
time of theft and expired before O’Keeffe’s suit.143 The intermediate
court treated the defenses of adverse possession and the statute of
limitations as identical, and thus its resolution of the former governed
the latter.144
The New Jersey Supreme Court overruled the earlier case145 that
had applied the adverse possession doctrine to chattels and an-
nounced that henceforth New Jersey would follow the discovery rule.
The court, therefore, remanded the issues of whether in fact the
paintings had originally been stolen and the discovery rule’s impact
upon the timeliness of the plaintiff’s claim.146 Because it left such is-
sues for determination below, the significance of the court’s opinion
lies in its approval of the application of the discovery rule in the art
theft context and in its articulation of broad factors relevant to de-
fining what constitutes due diligence in a given case.
According to O’Keeffe, the underlying purpose of the discovery
rule is equitable: “to mitigate unjust results that otherwise might flow
from strict adherence to a rule of law.”147 The discovery rule is highly
fact-sensitive and flexible.148 Courts adopting the rule have identified
numerous factors relevant to the determination of whether the owner
is entitled to its benefit. These factors include the particular efforts
undertaken by the owner to search for the stolen art,149 whether those
efforts were reasonable and sufficient given the nature and value of
the art and the circumstances of the theft,150 and whether the owner’s
141. See discussion in supra note 110.
142. O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 871.
143. Id. at 865.
144. Id.
145. Redmond v. N.J. Historical Soc’y, 28 A.2d 189 (N.J. 1942).
146. O’Keefe, 416 A.2d at 867.
147. Id. at 869.
148. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917
F.2d 278, 289 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Soc’y of Cal. Pioneers v. Baker, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865, 873
(Ct. App. 1996) (“The steps a party should take to recover stolen art objects vary according to
the facts of each case and are, therefore, subject to proof of the relevant standard in the par-
ticular community affected.”). It is precisely this case-specific sensitivity of the discovery rule
that has led to its rejection in art theft cases by at least one influential jurisdiction. Solomon R.
Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430 (N.Y. 1991); infra notes 207-16 and accom-
panying text.
149. O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 870.
150. Id. at 873.
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efforts were sufficiently continuous.151 The burden is on the owner “to
establish facts that would justify deferring the beginning of the period
of limitations.”152 A brief discussion of the facts of two cases involving
the discovery rule illustrates the application of the rule.
In the first case, DeWeerth v. Baldinger,153 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals predicted that New York would impose a duty of
reasonable diligence on owners of stolen art for purposes of the stat-
ute of limitations.154 Although this prediction proved wrong,155 the
Second Circuit’s opinion offers valuable insight into what constitutes
a lack of due diligence for purposes of the rule.
DeWeerth involved competing claims to “Champs de Ble á
Vetheuil,” a painting by Claude Monet, valued at the time of suit at
$500,000.156 In 1922, Gerda DeWeerth, a citizen of West Germany, in-
herited the painting from her father, who had purchased it in 1908.157
The painting hung in DeWeerth’s home until 1943, when she sent it to
her sister’s home, a castle in Oberbalzheim in southern Germany, for
safekeeping during the remainder of World War II.158 After the War,
American soldiers were quartered in the castle.159 Upon their depar-
151. See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 917 F.2d at 289 (requiring the plaintiff to
“all the while . . . exercise due diligence to investigate the theft and recover the works”); see also
O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 870 (directing courts to consider whether the owner exercised due dili-
gence after the theft). Although the fact of successive possession, see supra note 59, may not in
and of itself defeat the good-faith possessor’s claim of title by virtue of the limitations bar, it
may strengthen the owner’s argument that the statute of limitations has been tolled in discov-
ery/due diligence jurisdictions. As O’Keeffe noted, “subsequent transfers of the chattel may af-
fect the degree of difficulty encountered by a diligent owner seeking to recover his goods. To
that extent, subsequent transfers and their potential for frustrating diligence are relevant in ap-
plying the discovery rule.” O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 875.
152. O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 873.
153. 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987).
154. Id. at 108.
155. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429-30 (N.Y. 1991)
(noting that the “Second Circuit should not have imposed a duty of reasonable diligence on the
owners of stolen art work for purposes of the Statute of Limitations”); infra notes 210-16 and
accompanying text.
156. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 104. To view a sampling of Claude Monet’s work, visit
http://www.ocaiw.com/monet.htm. The DeWeerth court describes Monet as “perhaps, the most
well-known and widely admired member of the school of impressionist painters active in France
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,” whose work reflected “unsurpassed ability
to capture on canvas the dazzling and magical play of light on the natural world.” DeWeerth, 836
F.2d at Id. at 104.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 105.
159. Id.
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ture, DeWeerth’s sister noticed that the painting was missing.160 The
sister notified DeWeerth in the fall of 1945.161 In 1946, DeWeerth in-
formed the military government of her loss.162 She also asked her law-
yer about insurance coverage for the theft.163 In 1955, she wrote to an
art professor in Germany, sending him a picture of the Monet and
asking him to investigate.164 He returned the picture, stating that the
photo was insufficient evidence upon which to begin a search.165 In
1957, DeWeerth informed the Bundeskreminalamt, the West German
equivalent of the FBI, of the theft.166 None of these efforts were fruit-
ful, and she made no further effort to locate the painting.167
The Monet surfaced in the international art market in 1956,
when it was consigned by a Swiss art dealer to a New York art gallery.
Edith Baldinger purchased the painting from the gallery in June of
1957 for $30,900. From 1957 until 1983, the painting hung in Bald-
inger’s apartment. On two occasions during this time it was publicly
exhibited in New York, on one of the occasions for two days and on
the other for a month.
In 1981, DeWeerth learned of Baldinger’s possession of the
painting through her nephew, who saw a picture of it in a published
volume of Monet’s work. The volume had been published in 1974,
and the nephew saw it in a museum not twenty miles from
DeWeerth’s residence.168 In 1982, DeWeerth retained counsel in New
York and brought an action against the gallery listed in the volume to
compel disclosure of the current possessor. The court ruled in her fa-
vor, and the gallery identified Baldinger. Two months later,
DeWeerth demanded that Baldinger return the Monet, and Baldinger
refused.169
In holding that the plaintiff’s suit was time-barred, the court con-










169. Id. at 106.
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gent search’” undertaken by owners in other cases.170 The court noted
not only the limited utility of what DeWeerth did but also the signifi-
cance of what she did not do. “Conspicuously absent from her at-
tempts to locate the painting is any effort to take advantage of several
mechanisms specifically set up to locate art lost during World War
II.”171 Additionally, DeWeerth did not take advantage of what the
court considered “potentially fruitful” search channels by publicizing
her loss to museums, galleries, or collectors.172 Most significantly,
DeWeerth conducted no search at all for twenty-four years.173 During
this time “if DeWeerth had undertaken even the most minimal inves-
tigation . . . she would very likely have discovered the Monet, since
there were several published references to it in the art world.”174
By contrast, the second case provides an example of diligent ef-
fort by an original owner. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of
Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.175 involved the claim of
the Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus to recover a
mosaic held by an Indiana art gallery. The mosaic had been affixed to
the Church of the Panagia Kanakaria in the sixth century.176 Over the
ensuing centuries, it had become a holy relic to Eastern Orthodox
Christians.177 Although the mosaic survived until the middle of the
twentieth century intact, it did not survive tension in Cyprus between
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. By 1974, Cyprus was a divided
country, with Turkish military forces occupying the north of the is-
land, Greek Cypriot forces in the south, and a United Nations
peacekeeping force in between.
After Turkey invaded in 1974, the Turkish military began forcing
an exodus of Greek Cypriots to the south. By 1976, virtually all Greek
Cypriots had been forced to flee, including the priests who until then
continued services at Kanakaria. By late 1979, officials in the Repub-
lic of Cyprus178 received word that Kanakaria Church, like many oth-
170. Id. at 111 (quoting Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 852
(E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982)).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 112.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1989).
176. Id. at 279.
177. Id.
178. This is the government recognized as the only legitimate government of Cyprus by
every nation in the world except Turkey. Id. at 280.
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ers in the north, had been plundered by vandals, who had ripped the
mosaic from the church wall in pieces.179
The Republic of Cyprus immediately contacted and sought the
assistance of international organizations, museums, and Byzantine
scholars worldwide, including journalists, scholars, museums, and
collectors in the United States.
The overall strategy behind these efforts was to get word to the ex-
perts and scholars who would probably be involved in any ultimate
sale of the mosaics. These individuals, it was hoped, would be the
most likely (only?) actors in the chain of custody of stolen cultural
properties who would be interested in helping the Republic and
Church of Cyprus recover them.180
These efforts paid off, leading the Republic to the mosaics.
The mosaics had been purchased by Peg Goldberg, the owner of
an Indiana art gallery. In 1988, when Goldberg was on a trip to
Europe to purchase works for her gallery, a friend who was also an
art dealer encouraged her to consider purchasing “four Christian mo-
saics.”181 The friend arranged a few meetings between himself, Gold-
berg, a Dutch art dealer, and a California lawyer.182 The Dutchman,
whom Goldberg knew had been convicted of art forgery by a French
court, showed Goldberg pictures of the mosaics.183 He told her that
the seller was a Turkish antiquities dealer who had found the mosaics
in northern Cyprus, exported them to Germany with the permission
of the Turkish Cypriot government, and now needed cash.184 The
dealer, said the Dutchman, wanted $3 million for the mosaics.185
Goldberg asked the California attorney to inform the seller of her in-
terest, which he did. The next day the four met again and agreed to
purchase the mosaics jointly and split any profits on resale.186
After securing financing in Indiana, Goldberg traveled to Ge-
neva, Switzerland, and was allowed to view the mosaics in crates at
the airport there.187 She then waited in Geneva for the purchase
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money to arrive.188 Her testimony, which the trial judge found doubt-
ful, was that she contacted the International Foundation for Art Re-
search (IFAR) and other similar organizations to determine whether
any of the mosaics had been stolen from Cyprus. IFAR had no record
of Goldberg’s inquiry.189 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted:
The only things of which [the trial judge] was sure was that Gold-
berg did not contact the Republic of Cyprus or the TRNC [Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus] (from one of whose lands she knew
the mosaics had come); the Church of Cyprus; “Interpol,” a Euro-
pean information-sharing network for police forces; nor “a single
disinterested expert on Byzantine art.”190
When the purchase money arrived, in $100 bills, Goldberg
packed it into two satchels and returned to the Geneva Airport.191
There she exchanged the money for the mosaics. The following day,
Goldberg returned to the United States “with her prize.”192
Once back in Indiana, Goldberg began attempting to resell the
mosaics.193 Her efforts alerted an expert at California’s Getty Museum
to her possession of the mosaics, and he contacted Cypriot authori-
ties.194 Not surprisingly, Goldberg refused the Cypriot Republic’s de-
mand for return of the mosaics.195
Applying the discovery rule, as suggested by Indiana law, the dis-
trict court held, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,
that the cause of action did not accrue until Cyprus learned of the
gallery’s possession.196 “[A]s a necessary precondition to the applica-
tion of the discovery rule,” the court found first that Cyprus had exer-
cised due diligence and second that it would not reasonably have
been on notice of the location of the mosaics until the gallery made its
purchase and possession public.197








196. Id. at 288-89.
197. Id. As a result, Cyprus recovered the mosaics. As a gesture of good will, the govern-
ment of Cyprus and officials of the Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church allowed the mosa-
ics to be displayed for a month in the Indianapolis Museum of Art. Nearly 40,000 people visited
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One of the interesting respects in which the due dili-
gence/discovery rule is fact-sensitive is in the sophistication of the
owner. Several courts have recognized that more may be required of
institutional or sophisticated art owners than of private owners who
lack sophistication about, or a relationship to, the art world.198 A lack
of familiarity with the art world and the devices within it for the re-
covery of stolen art will render the failure to employ these devices
less damaging to the owner’s claim to have satisfied the due diligence
standard.199
The policy behind the discovery rule is clear. The rule is intended
to place responsibility on the owner and to remove from the good-
faith purchaser the burden of meeting a particular standard of be-
havior200 in order to rest assured of title. As O’Keeffe expressly ac-
knowledged, “[t]he discovery rule shifts the emphasis from the con-
duct of the possessor to the conduct of the owner” by inquiring
“whether the owner has acted with due diligence in pursuing his or
the exhibit. Isabel Wilkerson, Hoosiers Glimpse Bit of Byzantium, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1991, at
A6.
Ironically, in 1998, Peg Goldberg found herself the direct victim of art theft when her
home was robbed of art and other property worth $15,000. John M. Flora, 2 Men Tie Up, Rob
Art Dealer in her Home During Daylight, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 24, 1998, at N1.
198. Erisoty v. Rizik, No. 93-6215, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096, at *38 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23,
1995).
199. Erisoty. is illustrative. Paintings by Corrado Giaquinto were stolen from a family home
in Washington, D.C., in 1960. The family immediately reported the theft to District police and
the FBI and, through the FBI, Interpol. Law enforcement officials discouraged the family from
hiring a private investigator. For nearly twenty years, the family and the FBI were in contact. In
1974, the family reported the theft to the Art Dealers Association of America, which had then
recently begun maintaining a registry of stolen art. From 1979 through 1993, when the FBI
found the paintings, the family had no contact with the FBI.
What the family did not do was publicize the theft. They did not place notices in art
journals or other periodicals. They did not provide museums, galleries, or scholars with informa-
tion about the paintings. Although they periodically visited museums to look for the paintings,
they were “neither art collectors nor participants in the so-called fine arts community. They nei-
ther subscribe[d] to nor read periodicals covering fine arts or antiques.” Erisoty, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2096, at *8.
In interpreting the significance of what the family failed to do, the court specifically
noted that the family members “are neither a government entity nor even serious art collectors;
rather, they are merely a family in search of lost art work that decorated the walls of their family
home.” Id. at *37-38. The court found that the owners exercised the required due diligence.
For a sampling of the work of Corrado Giaquinto, visit
http://www.artcyclopedia.com/artists/giaquinto_corrado.html.
200. This burden is lifted only if the good-faith purchaser is not engaged in fraudulent con-
cealment of either the fact of the theft or the fact of his possession. See supra notes 98-119 and
accompanying text.
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her personal property.”201 If such diligence is exercised, “owners may
prevent the statute of limitations from running.”202 In placing this bur-
den on the owner, the discovery rule “should encourage good faith
purchases from legitimate art dealers and discourage trafficking in
stolen art without frustrating an artist’s [or owner’s] ability to recover
stolen artworks.”203
b. Accrual delayed: the “demand and refusal” rule. The
“demand and refusal” rule holds that a good-faith purchaser’s
possession does not become wrongful until the owner has made a
demand for return of the art and the purchaser has refused that
demand.204 This rule inures to the enormous benefit of true owners in
their effort to recover art that has been stolen from them.205 This is
201. O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 872 (N.J. 1980).
202. Id. at 873.
203. Id.
204. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991). The court
acknowledged the “seemingly anomalous” distinction between the rule for accrual when the
stolen property is in the hands of a thief, supra note 90-92 and accompanying text, and the much
later accrual event when the stolen property is in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value.
Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 429; see also Golden Budha Corp. v. Canadian Land Co. of Am.,
931 F.2d 196, 201-02 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a claim against an innocent art possessor did
not accrue, and thus the statute of limitations did not begin to run, until a demand and refusal).
205. See Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 848 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(stating that the statute of limitations does not start to run on the true owner’s claim until de-
mand and refusal), aff’d, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982). Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar involved
the claim of the then–East German museum, owner of two Albrecht Duerer paintings, against
the New York good-faith purchaser of the paintings. Fearing bombardment by the Allies during
World War II, the director of the Staatliche Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar, a museum in Ger-
many, had valuable items at the museum, including the Duerers, transferred to a storeroom in a
nearby castle, Schloss Schwarzburg. When the war ended, the Land of Thuringia, in which the
castle was located, was designated a part of the zone over which the Soviet Union had military
authority. Between the surrender of Germany and the takeover of the zone by the Soviet mili-
tary, American soldiers were in control of areas of Thuringia, including Schloss Schwarzburg.
According to the director of the museum, the disappearance of the Duerers coincided with the
departure of American soldiers from Schloss Schwarzburg at the latest on July 1, 1945. Id. at
831.
The defendant, Edward Elicofon, purchased the paintings, not knowing they were
Duerers, from a young American soldier who appeared at his home in Brooklyn in 1946. The
soldier allegedly stated that he had purchased the paintings in Germany. The paintings hung in
Elicofon’s home until 1966, when a friend told him he had seen the paintings in a list of stolen
art. Elicofon then made public his possession of the paintings. Shortly thereafter, the
Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar, successor to the Staatliche Kunstsammlungen, demanded return
of the paintings. Elicofon refused to return them. The museum was not immediately able to
press its claim for return of the paintings in American courts, because at the time the German
Democratic Republic, of which the museum was a state agency, was not recognized by the
REYHAN 03/13/01 12:39 PM
2001] A CHAOTIC PALETTE 995
not an incidental result of the “demand and refusal” rule as applied to
stolen art; it is the intended purpose of the rule. The rule takes on
added significance because it is the one embraced by New York, the
state that is arguably the art center of the world.206 Not surprisingly,
the leading case affirming the “demand and refusal” rule and
explaining the value it serves in the art world is a case decided by the
New York Court of Appeals. Quite simply, Solomon R. Guggenheim
Foundation v. Lubell207 has become synonymous with the “demand
and refusal” rule.
The Guggenheim court was unabashed in embracing the value of
protecting the rights of owners of property to recover that property
United States. Id. at 833. The Republic gained such recognition in late 1974 and the court rec-
ognized the museum’s right to assert its claim in February 1975.
The court, applying New York law, held that the plaintiff’s suit was timely. The cause
of action accrued at the point of Elicofon’s refusal of the museum’s demand. The plaintiff being
under a legal disability (nonrecognition), the statute of limitations was tolled until the disability
was removed, and the plaintiff’s suit was timely after the removal of its disability. Id. at 847-48.
206. See Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 431 (“[O]ur decision today is in part influenced by our
recognition that New York enjoys a worldwide reputation as a preeminent culture center.”).
207. 569 N.E.2d 426. Guggenheim arose out of the theft of a Marc Chagall gouache from the
Guggenheim Museum in New York City. Id. at 427. For a sampling of the work of Marc Cha-
gall, see http://www.artchive.com/artchive/ftptoc/chagall_ext.html. According to officials at the
Guggenheim, a museum employee stole the gouache sometime after the spring of 1965. Id. at
427 (noting that the painting was last seen in 1965 and that a museum employee was “suspected
of the theft”).
Among the factual issues in dispute between the parties was precisely when the mu-
seum learned that the gouache had been stolen. Id. at 428. The museum acknowledged that it
knew the gouache was missing earlier, but it claimed it did not know the gouache was stolen un-
til a complete inventory of the museum’s collection was finished in 1970. Id. Mrs. Lubell as-
serted that the museum knew of the theft as early as 1965. Id.
There was no factual dispute that the museum did not alert the police, the FBI, Inter-
pol, other museums, galleries, or artistic organizations of the theft. Id. At trial and throughout
appeal, the museum asserted that “this was a tactical decision based upon its belief that to pub-
licize the theft would succeed only in driving the gouache further underground and diminishing
the possibility that it would ever be recovered.” Id. In 1974, believing the gouache would never
be recovered, the museum removed it from its records. Id.
In 1967, Rachel Lubell and her husband bought the painting for $17,000 from a well-
known Madison Avenue gallery. See id. They exhibited the painting twice, both times at the
gallery from which they had purchased it. Id. In 1985, the museum learned that the Lubells pos-
sessed the gouache after a private art collector brought a transparency of it to Sotheby’s for an
auction estimate. Id. The Sotheby’s employee who evaluated it had previously worked at the
Guggenheim and recognized the gouache. Id. In January 1986, the museum wrote Mrs. Lubell
and demanded return of the gouache. Id. Mrs. Lubell refused. Id. At the time of trial, the
gouache was valued at $200,000. See id. (noting that this amount was demanded in the alterna-
tive).
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even where it is in the hands of a good-faith purchaser for value.208 Al-
though the court recognized that the “demand and refusal” rule “is
not the only possible method of measuring the accrual of replevin
claims, it does appear to be the rule that affords the most protection
to the true owners of stolen property.”209
Because the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit had earlier predicted that New York courts would apply the dis-
covery rule,210 the New York Court of Appeals addressed the reasons
for its preference for, and reaffirmance of, the “demand and refusal”
rule.211 First, the court found no reason to obscure “clarity and pre-
dictability” and the “straightforward protection of true owners” pro-
vided by the “demand and refusal” rule.212 Adoption of a discovery
rule would impose “arbitrary rules of conduct that all true owners of
stolen artwork would have to follow to the letter if they wanted to
208. Id. at 429. This interest in protecting owners is described by the court as one of long
standing. Id.
209. Id. at 430. The court described the “[l]ess protective” models as including
(1) recognizing accrual at the time of the theft even when the stolen work finds its way into the
hands of a good-faith purchaser; (2) recognizing accrual at the time the good-faith purchaser
acquires possession; and (3) the discovery rule. Id.
210. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 1987). After the Guggenheim court
rejected the Second Circuit’s DeWeerth prediction that New York would apply a discovery rule
to suits by owners against good-faith purchasers of artworks, DeWeerth brought a motion to
vacate the original judgment in her case. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), rev’d, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir. 1994). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a fed-
eral district court to relieve a party from a final order in five enumerated circumstances and for
“any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P.
60(b)(6). The Second Circuit had indicated that Rule 60(b)(6) is “properly invoked where there
are extraordinary circumstances . . . or where the judgment may work an extreme or undue
hardship.” Matarese v. LeFevre, 801 F.2d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 1986). The Second Circuit disagreed
with the trial court’s determination that the import of the Guggenheim case was an extraordi-
nary circumstance under Rule 60(b)(6). DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1272 (2d Cir.
1994). It therefore reversed the trial court’s vacatur of its earlier judgment, leaving intact the
original outcome, which had held DeWeerth’s claim time-barred. Id.
211. New York had earlier committed itself to the “demand and refusal” rule in Menzel v.
List, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (App. Div. 1964). Erna Menzel, owner of a Chagall painting, left the
Chagall behind when he fled the German invasion of Belgium in 1940. Menzel v. List, 246
N.E.2d 742, 743 (N.Y. 1969). For twenty years, the Menzels did not know the whereabouts of
the painting. Id. Then, in 1962, Mrs. Menzel noted a reproduction of the painting in an art book
and traced the painting to Albert List, who had purchased the Chagall in good faith from a New
York art gallery. Id. The New York intermediate appellate court rejected List’s argument that
the statute of limitations had run on Mendel’s claim. 253 N.Y.S.2d at 44. The court instead held
that the statute did not even begin to run until the owner locates the work, demands that the
possessor return it, and is refused. Id.
212. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 427, 430.
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preserve their right to pursue a cause of action in replevin.”213 Second,
the court noted the influence on its decision of the rather discordant
facts that New York is both “a preeminent cultural center”214 and a
venue where “illicit dealing in stolen merchandise is an industry all its
own.”215
To place the burden of locating stolen artwork on the true owner
and to foreclose the rights of that owner to recover its property if
the burden is not met would, we believe, encourage illicit trafficking
in stolen art. Three years after the theft, any purchaser, good faith or
not, would be able to hold onto stolen art unless the true owner
were able to establish that it had undertaken a reasonable search for
the missing art. This shifting of the burden onto the wronged owner
is inappropriate. In our opinion, the better rule gives the owner rela-
tively greater protection and places the burden of investigating the
provenance of a work of art on the potential purchaser.216
In light of its potential significance to choice of law,217 it is crucial
to reiterate the precise function of demand and refusal under this
rule. Although the requirement of a demand in many contexts is sim-
ply a procedural prerequisite to the bringing of the claim,218 in this
context the demand and refusal are substantive requirements of a
cause of action to recover chattels under New York law.219 That cause
of action does not accrue until the last act necessary to its creation—
the refusal to deliver possession—occurs.
213. Id. at 431. The court expanded on this point by noting:
All owners of stolen property should not be expected to behave in the same way and
should not be held to a common standard. The value of the property stolen, the man-
ner in which it was stolen, and the type of institution from which it was stolen will all
necessarily affect the manner in which a true owner will search for missing property.
We conclude that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to craft a reasonable dili-
gence requirement that could take into account all of these variables and that would
not unduly burden the true owner.
Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 427.
216. Id. at 431.
217. See infra notes 289-94 and accompanying text.
218. Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 848 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(stating that a procedural demand is one which is “a ‘condition of maintaining the action and
not an essential part of it’”) (quoting Dickinson v. Mayor of New York, 92 N.Y. 584, 590
(1883)), aff’d, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
219. N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. New-York Historical Soc’y, 635 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1001 (Sup. Ct.
1995). This case is discussed supra note 92.
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c. The bar of equity: the laches defense to recovery by the
original owner. After Guggenheim, it was clear not only that the New
York Court of Appeals had closed the door to the use of the
discovery rule for statute of limitations purposes but also that it had
left open a window: good-faith purchasers could use the original
owner’s lack of diligence in locating the work to support a laches
defense. This defense, “directed at the conscience of the court and its
ability to bring equitable considerations to bear in the ultimate
disposition of the painting,”220 may be applied “where it is clear that a
plaintiff unreasonably delayed in initiating an action and a defendant
was prejudiced by the delay.”221 Because the parties in Guggenheim
settled their dispute prior to determination of Lubell’s equitable
defense, it remained unclear precisely how a good-faith purchaser
would be able to show the requisite prejudice beyond the fact of
payment of the purchase price.222
The scope and effect of the laches defense in art theft cases has
been considered in two cases since Guggenheim.223 By far the most
220. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. 1991).
221. Robins Island Pres. Fund, Inc. v. Southold Dev. Corp., 959 F.2d 409, 423 (2d Cir. 1992)
(considering a claim to land confiscated during the American Revolution from a loyalist to the
British crown).
222. Two days into the trial, the case settled. Richard Perez-Pena, Stolen Chagall; An Art
Museum and a Collector Reach a Quiet Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1994, § 4, at 2. The ex-
act terms of the settlement were kept confidential. Id. They apparently allowed Lubell to keep
the painting but obliged her and the two art dealers through whom she had bought the work to
pay the Guggenheim approximately $200,000. Id. Although the settlement involved shared vic-
tory and “shared sacrifice” by the parties, as with the Goodman v. Searle settlement described
supra at note 27, it left the art world and lawyers hungering for more.
[The] balance of principles and responsibilities [at issue in the case] is a serious matter
to lawyers and art collectors, and answers in this case, one of the most closely
watched in years in the art world, could have been instructive to all those who buy
and sell art whose provenance might be questioned. Instead, the law worked as it
usually does, except on television and in film, away from the public eye, through
rough compromise rather than ringing conclusion.
Id.
223. A case currently being litigated in state court in Manhattan may provide additional in-
struction regarding the details of the laches defense. Czartoryski-Borbon v. Turcotte, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 28, 1999, at 27 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Apr. 28, 1999). Prince Czartoryski, an heir of the
pre–World War II Polish nobility, claims ownership of a painting entitled “Portrait of a Lady,
Presumably Anne of Bretagne” by Jan Mostaert. Id. (For a small sampling of the work of Jan
Mostaert, visit http://users.pandora.be/bernard/Artpics.ENP.htm.) Donald Turcotte claims the
painting by virtue of a 1963 gift from his mother, who had purchased it in 1959 from the
Knoedler Art Gallery in New York. Czartoryski-Borbon, supra, at 27.
In 1996, Turcotte consigned the painting with Sotheby’s for sale at auction. Id. The sale
was scheduled for January 1997. Id. Before the sale took place, Czartoryski requested that So-
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significant contribution in this regard is provided by Greek-Orthodox
Patriarchate of Jerusalem v. Christie’s, Inc.,224 a case involving con-
flicting claims to an invaluable palimpsest.225 Known as the Ar-
chimedes Palimpsest, the manuscript is of considerable importance.
Its original text was a tenth-century copy of two of the most signifi-
cant works of Archimedes, “On Floating Bodies” and “Method of
Mechanical Theorems.”226 In the twelfth or thirteenth century, due to
limited supplies of paper, the original writing on the Archimedes
Palimpsest was partially washed away and replaced with Greek litur-
gical text. For an undetermined period of time thereafter, it was kept
in the library of the Mar Saba monastery in Palestine.227 In the nine-
teenth century, the monastery’s collection was incorporated into the
theby’s withdraw the painting from sale, which it did. Id. After he was notified by Sotheby’s of
Czartoryski’s claim, Turcotte declined to return the painting to the prince. Id.
Czartoryski brought suit in May 1997 and immediately moved to bar sale of the paint-
ing. Id. His request for a preliminary injunction was granted in December 1997. Id. Both Czar-
toryski and Turcotte sought summary judgment regarding ownership of the painting. Id.
Many of the facts were undisputed, including the fact that the painting had been owned
by Czartoryski’s family prior to the German invasion of Poland in 1939, that the painting had
been stolen by the Nazis, and that the Prince had succeeded to ownership of the painting
through the will of his uncle. Id. Expert opinion confirmed that the painting stolen by the Nazis
was the one consigned by Turcotte to Sotheby’s. Id.
Citing Guggenheim, the court noted that the Prince’s claim was unquestionably timely
under the “demand and refusal” rule relevant to triggering the statute of limitations. Id. The
laches issue was more difficult, however, and led the court to deny both summary judgment mo-
tions. Id. The court noted that “[t]he party asserting the laches defense must establish that there
was an unreasonable delay and that this resulted in prejudice.” Id. (citation omitted). Because
the prince had not established as a matter of law that he and his family had exercised due dili-
gence in pursuing the claim, and Turcotte had not established that they had not, disposition by
summary judgment was deemed inappropriate. Id.
224. No. 98 Civ. 7664 (KMW), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1999).
225. “[A] palimpsest is a text from which the original writing has been washed off, so that
the paper can be reused.” Id. at *2.
226. Judge Kimba Wood offered the following background on these works:
The originals of these texts are believed to have been destroyed in the fire that con-
sumed the library of Alexandria, Egypt, in the third century. . . . According to legend,
Archimedes conceived of the principles of “On Floating Bodies” while in the bathtub.
The story holds that King Hiero II of Syracuse asked Archimedes if he could deter-
mine whether the King’s goldsmith had delivered to the King a crown made of gold,
as ordered, or of gold mixed with silver, without damaging the crown. Archimedes
was thinking of this problem while taking a bath, and realized that he could evaluate
the composition of the crown by the amount of water it displaced. Archimedes leapt
from the bathtub and ran naked through the streets, exclaiming “Eureka!” meaning
“I’ve found it!”
Id. at *2-3 (citations omitted).
227. Id.
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Library of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem.228 The Palimpsest and a sub-
stantial number of other documents were at some later time trans-
ferred to Constantinople, now Istanbul, to be held in the Metochion
of the Holy Sepulchre, owned by the Patriarchate.229 As recently as
1908, the Archimedes Palimpsest was still there.230
At some unknown point thereafter, Mr. Marie Louis Sirieix, a
French civil servant and businessman, acquired the Palimpsest.231 Sig-
nificantly, as we shall see, the circumstances of Sirieix’s purchase are
not known. Sirieix kept the Palimpsest in his Paris home until a few
years before his 1956 death when his daughter, Anne Guersan, took
over care of the manuscript.232 In the early 1960s, Madame Guersan,
who was concerned about the Palimpsest’s condition, consulted ex-
perts and eventually had the manuscript treated and restored in Paris.
The experts she consulted also advised her about the Palimpsest’s
provenance.233 In the early 1970s, Guersan first considered selling the
Palimpsest. Her family prepared and circulated two hundred bro-
chures about the manuscript, one hundred in French and one hun-
dred in English. The brochures drew numerous expressions of inter-
est, but no sale resulted from this effort.234
The Palimpsest was brought to New York in 1998 after Guersan
entered into a consignment agreement with Christie’s. In August
1998, Christie’s informed the Greek government that an auction of
the Palimpsest was planned. In September 1998, Christie’s publicly
announced that the auction would be held the following month.
The Archimedes Palimpsest, which had survived for nearly ten
centuries without turmoil, became, in a single week in late October
1998, the subject of frenetic attention and legal maneuvering. After
reviewing the Patriarchate’s rather sudden attention to its claim, the
court pointed out that prior to the lawsuit, “the Patriarchate had
never asserted claims over other Metochion manuscripts in private
228. Id. at *4. The Patriarchate is an order of monks “devoted to large-scale educational and
philanthropic activities and to protecting Christian holy places in the territory which is now Is-
rael, Jordan, and the Palestinian authority.” Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at *6.
232. Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257, at *6.
233. Id. at *7.
234. Id. Among other sources, these inquiries came from Yale University’s Beinecke Rare
Book Library, New York’s H. P. Kraus Rare Books and Manuscripts, the University of Texas’s
Humanities Research Center, and the University of Pittsburgh. Id. at *8.
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hands or announced the disappearance, loss, or theft of any Meto-
chion manuscripts.”235
After a limited amount of discovery, the defendants moved for
summary judgment. The initial issue relevant to that motion was
whether French or New York law applied.236 The court held that
French law was applicable.237 French law recognized title in the pos-
sessor, so the court’s laches discussion is dicta. It is useful, however, as
a clear explication of the role of the laches defense, because it takes
the analysis of the defense two steps further than had Guggenheim238
or Czartoryski-Borbon.239 The first step was a more defined explana-
tion of the prejudice that must be shown by the party relying on the
defense, in this case the good-faith purchaser. Quoting the Second
Circuit, the court explained that such prejudice can arise “either be-
cause it would be inequitable, in light of a change in defendant’s posi-
tion, to allow plaintiff’s claim to proceed or because the delay makes
it difficult to garner evidence to vindicate his or her rights.”240 The
prospect of prejudice resulting from the increased difficulty in pre-
serving or garnering evidence over great time or distance is more eas-
ily envisioned in the art theft context than is prejudice due to a detri-
mental change of defendant’s position.
The second step, facilitated in part by the first, was the court’s
willingness to grant summary judgment on the laches issue. The court
found no genuine issue of material fact on either the reasonableness
of the plaintiff’s behavior or the evidence-garnering prejudice suf-
fered by the defendant. On the first issue—whether the Patriarchate
was sufficiently diligent—the court concluded that it “was not diligent
at all.”241 The Patriarchate had been unaware that the manuscript was
missing until Christie’s publicized the auction, and it had never sug-
gested that any of the Metochian manuscripts were missing.242 The Pa-
triarchate sought to have its ignorance and inaction excused on the
ground that “as an order of monks, it could not be expected to search
235. Id. at *9.
236. The resolution of that issue is discussed in Part II. See infra notes 318-24 and accompa-
nying text.
237. Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257, at *18.
238. See supra notes 204-16 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 223.
240. Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257, at *32 (quoting Robins
Island Pres. Fund, Inc. v. Southold Dev. Corp., 959 F.2d 409, 424 (2d Cir. 1992)).
241. Id. at *30.
242. Id. at *30-32.
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for a painting.”243 The court did not hesitate to note that “if the Patri-
archate was able to retain counsel with impressive speed to bring this
action the night before the Christie’s auction, it could have retained
counsel to search for the Palimpsest, or at least make some inquiries,
at some point during the previous seventy years.”244
The prejudice to the defendant resulting from the plaintiff’s lack
of diligence was equally clear. According to the court, the Patriar-
chate’s delay in claiming ownership made it nearly impossible for the
Guersans to prove the circumstances of their predecessor’s acquisi-
tion.245 Mr. Sirieix was dead, memories had faded, and key documents
that may have existed were missing. The distance over which the
Palimpsest may have traveled during the century—from Constanti-
nople to Paris, with any number of possible stops in between—exac-
erbated the difficulty in preserving evidence.246 “It is because this case
turns on ancient and unascertainable facts that the law favors re-
pose.”247
243. Id. at *31.
244. Id.
245. Id. at *32.
246. Id. at *33.
247. Id. at *34 (quoting Robins Island Pres. Fund, Inc. v. Southold Dev. Corp., 959 F.2d 409,
424 (2d Cir. 1992)). Equity also may step in to recompense one who loses possession to the true
owner. Where a good-faith purchaser or possessor has expended funds to restore or preserve
the art, the owner may be required to render compensation in quantum meruit. Hoelzer v. City
of Stamford, 933 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1991), is illustrative. The circumstances under which the city
lost possession of the artwork are described supra in note 68. The murals passed from their
finder, who stored them in his mother’s garage, to the federal General Services Administration,
which delivered them to Hiram Hoelzer, a New York art restorer, in 1971. Hoelzer, 933 F.2d at
1134. The restoration project was described by the court as “massive.” Id. The city learned that
the murals were in Hoelzer’s possession in 1980 and ultimately demanded their return in 1986.
Id. at 1135. Hoelzer claimed ownership and refused to return them. Id. In 1989, Hoelzer brought
suit in New York state court seeking a declaratory judgment to quiet title. Id. The city removed
the case to federal court. Id. By 1990, the murals were appraised at as much as $1.25 million. Id.
Applying New York law, the court chose New York’s statute of limitations. Id. at 1136.
The court held that the cause of action accrued in 1986 and that the city’s claim was not time-
barred either by the statute of limitations or by laches. The latter determination was based on
the fact that Hoelzer had suffered no prejudice and that his expenses would be recoverable in
his then pending quantum meruit action. Id. at 1137-39.
In the quantum meruit action, the trial court judge awarded Hoelzer $557,200. Hoelzer
v. City of Stamford, Conn., 972 F.2d 495, 496 (2d Cir. 1992). The city appealed, contending that
Hoelzer was not entitled to equitable relief because he had not performed the restoration in
good faith. Additionally, the city claimed that the damages against it were excessive in light of
the benefit received by the city. Id. The Second Circuit affirmed but modified the lower court’s
judgment to allow the city to exercise the option of paying the damages or abandoning their
claim of ownership and returning the murals to Hoelzer. Id. at 498; see also Mucha v. King, 792
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C. Reflections on Right-Defining Rules
When the original dispossession of the owner is voluntary, the
range of possible rules to govern the rights of original owners and
good-faith purchasers is relatively narrow, even as cases cross na-
tional borders. Although jurisdictions may vary at the margins in the
exact definition of what constitutes conversion after a voluntary dis-
possession, and in the precise contours of good-faith purchaser status,
on the core issue of who shall prevail as between the original owner
and a subsequent good-faith purchaser, American and foreign juris-
dictions are remarkably consistent in giving superiority to the rights
of the purchaser.
There is no such constancy in the more common scenario—
where the original owner has been dispossessed through theft. Here,
the range of applicable rules extends from those that recognize title in
the good-faith purchaser immediately upon purchase, through those
that characterize possession after such purchase as immediately
wrongful with a concomitant immediate triggering of the limitations
period, through those that find such immediate wrongfulness but toll
for fraudulent concealment, through those that delay wrongfulness
while due diligence by the owner would not accomplish discovery,
through those that delay wrongfulness until actual discovery, and
finally to those that delay wrongfulness until demand and refusal. At
one end of this spectrum are rules that reward the purchaser with title
or so favor the purchaser’s rights that title is likely to be the
purchaser’s reward sooner rather than later.248 At the other end of the
spectrum lie rules that will virtually always result in the owner’s
retention of title.249
Not only is this range remarkably wide, but there are also sover-
eign adherents to every point within it. The trend in recent cases fa-
vors a discovery rule, but the jurisdictions that have rejected the dis-
covery rule have not simply disfavored it, but condemned it; and
there remain a large number of jurisdictions that have yet to declare
their allegiance to any of the rules in a stolen art context.
Given the various rules without the influence of choice-of-law
considerations, it would seem that the original owner would be highly
F.2d 602, 604 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the true owner, upon recovery of possession of the
stolen art, must reimburse the cost of restoration incurred by the purchaser).
248. See supra discussion in Part I.A.1, Part I.B.1.
249. See supra discussion in Part I.B.2.b.
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motivated to bring suit,250 if possible, in a forum that has wedded itself
to rules at the owner-favoring end of the spectrum. In this light, the
seizure in New York of the Schiele paintings on loan from an Aus-
trian museum251 and the suit in New York by a Jerusalem monastery
against a French purchaser who consigned the painting for sale in
New York252 would make obvious sense.
Although original owners might await physical presence of the
claimed artwork in such an owner-favoring venue, the original owner
would not necessarily be required to exhibit such patience. If the
owner were satisfied, at least initially, with a simple declaration of his
rights vis-à-vis the good-faith purchaser, all that is necessary is the ex-
ercise of constitutionally sustainable personal jurisdiction253 over the
defendant in an owner-favoring venue. A determination reached by
such a state or nation based on its own law, assuming the choice of
that law was permissible under constitutional or international stan-
dards, would be entitled to recognition and enforcement in the state
or nation in which the art was located under applicable full faith and
credit254 or comity255 standards.
From the owner’s standpoint, would that it were so easy. In fact,
as Part II now details, in the typical art-theft scenario, the parties and
the art have touched multiple jurisdictions, and the forum cannot be
counted on to apply its own rule. Instead, should either party raise the
issue, the court must choose among right-defining rules that may span
the entire range. The palette of rules for choosing among conflicting
250. Although the original owner is normally the plaintiff, see supra note 37 and accompa-
nying text, the good-faith purchaser may turn the tables. Knowing that the owner is likely to sue
for replevin of the art, the good-faith purchaser may bring suit in the available forum of his
choice for a declaration of relative rights. E.g., Naftzger v. Am. Numismatic Soc’y, 49 Cal. Rptr.
2d 784, 787-88 (Ct. App. 1996) (examining a situation in which the purchaser sued for declara-
tory relief against an original owner).
251. See infra notes 382-411 and accompanying text.
252. Greek Orthodox Patriarchate v. Christie’s, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 7664(KMW), 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13257 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1999).
253. See infra notes 415-32 and accompanying text.
254. The federal Full Faith and Credit Clause requires each state to give “Full Faith and
Credit . . . to the . . . judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
255. Where either the court rendering the judgment or the court asked to recognize and en-
force it sits in a foreign nation, the mandate of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is inapplicable.
Instead, courts are generally moved by broad principles of sovereign respect, known as comity,
to give full effect to foreign country judgments that are based on fair and impartial proceedings.
E.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (“‘Comity,’ in the legal sense . . . is the recogni-
tion which one nation allows within its territory to the . . . acts of another nation . . . .”). See gen-
erally Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 9 (1966) (examining the com-
ity doctrine as adopted by American courts).
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right-defining rules offers an equally broad spectrum of techniques,
but with remarkably predictable outcomes.
II.  RIGHT-DEFINING RULES IN CONFLICT—THE CHOICE OF
LAW CHALLENGE
Before setting forth into the abstract world of conflicts of laws as
it manifests itself in the art theft context, it should be noted that not
every art theft case, even those most notable for articulating compet-
ing rules regarding the relative rights of original owners and good-
faith purchasers, presents conflict-of-laws issues.256 This may be so for
any one of three reasons. First, the case may present no multistate or
multinational aspects.257 Second, even where such multijurisdictional
connections exist, the significance of these connections and their rele-
vance to the possible application of another state or nation’s laws
must be raised by one of the parties. Thus, the parties may “localize”
or “domesticate” a case by either failing to recognize or choosing to
minimize multijurisdictional links.258
Third, what appears for other purposes to involve multistate or
multinational contacts may not be so viewed in the conflicts setting.
The party asserting the applicability of a foreign259 state or nation’s
law must plead and prove the content of that law and must establish
that the forum law and the foreign law conflict not only on their face
but also when applied to the instant case. Differences in law without
litigation consequences are not “conflicts” with which choice-of-law
rules are concerned. For example, in Erisoty v. Rizik,260 three jurisdic-
tions, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia, were
connected to the parties and transfers of the stolen art. All three used
the discovery rule,261 and therefore there was no conflict about the
definition of when the owner’s cause of action accrued. Although
256. E.g., Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430 (N.Y. 1991) (reit-
erating New York’s commitment to the “demand and refusal” rule).
257. E.g., Soc’y of Cal. Pioneers v. Baker, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865, 866-69 (Ct. App. 1996) (re-
citing the relevant connections, all in California); Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 426 (noting that
all relevant connections are in New York).
258. Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 604 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Where, as in this case, the parties
either explicitly or by implication agree to be governed by the substantive law of the forum
state, their agreement will be enforced.”).
259. When used in a conflict of laws context, “foreign” is synonymous with “nonforum,”
encompassing sister states as well as foreign nations.
260. No. 93-6215, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995).
261. Id. at *28 n.5.
REYHAN 03/13/01 12:39 PM
1006 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:955
Pennsylvania had a two-year statute of limitations, and Maryland and
the District gave owners three years to bring suit, the owners in Eri-
soty did not act within either period. Therefore, the conflict was ir-
relevant, and the court applied Pennsylvania law, the law of the fo-
rum, by default.262
In the dispute between original owners and good-faith purchas-
ers over the title to artworks, this third scenario is most likely to arise
in the misappropriation context, where the owner has voluntarily re-
linquished possession to a bailee who then wrongfully sells the
work.263 This is because American states and European nations are
remarkably consistent in their preference for the good-faith purchaser
under such circumstances. Quite the contrary is true in the more
common case in which the dispute between the owner and the good-
faith purchaser originated in a theft of the claimed work. In this con-
text, as Part I details,264 widely varying rules have been embraced by
states and nations. Significantly, this embrace is a passionate rather
than a casual one: it encompasses policy goals and party preferences
to which sovereigns are deeply committed. When multijurisdictional
contacts exist and rules are in conflict in a given case, the choice of
governing law to resolve the dispute is likely to further one sover-
eign’s policies and preferences and defeat another’s.265 Although such
an outcome is one that accompanies a true conflict of laws in any
case,266 the broader consequences for all owners, all good-faith pur-
chasers, all art dealers, all museums, and all sovereigns make the con-
flicts issues in these theft-originated cases so disquieting.
Before turning to that disquietude in Part III, this part examines
how those courts that have resolved these conflicts have done so. This
examination will illustrate that the methods employed to choose the
right-defining rules by which owner-purchaser disputes are to be re-
solved are as divergent as the right-defining rules themselves.267
262. Id. at *28.
263. See supra notes 62-89 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 90-247 and accompanying text.
265. See discussion infra notes 366-75 and accompanying text. This can be seen most notably
where the owner is domiciled in a jurisdiction with owner-favoring rules and the good-faith pur-
chaser is domiciled or the purchase occurs in a purchaser-favoring jurisdiction. E.g., Winkworth
v. Christie, Manson & Woods, Ltd., [1980] 1 Ch. 496, discussed infra notes 299-302 and accom-
panying text.
266. See infra note 415 and accompanying text.
267. The multistate or multinational connections that characterize title contests arising out
of art thefts will not only affect the law that will be applied to those contests but also influence
in which court system—federal or state—the contest is staged. The fact that the art has crossed
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This divergence flows from the fact that courts undertaking
choice-of-law analysis to determine the relative rights of owners and
purchasers are not even in accord in their characterization of the con-
flict. Characterization of the context in which a conflict is embedded
is a crucial step in most choice-of-law analyses, because different
choice-of-law models are often employed depending upon the charac-
terization. Within a given jurisdiction, one choice-of-law model may
be applicable to torts, another to contracts, and a third to issues of
procedure.268 Such a multifocal view can be blurred enough at the in-
borders often will mean that the parties themselves are linked by citizenship to different states
or to a state or foreign nation. This diversity of citizenship will, in nearly all cases, give the plain-
tiff or defendant access to federal court either on the basis of diversity or alienage. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a) (1994). It is, therefore, not surprising that the majority of cases examined in Part I
were decided by federal courts.
The fact that federal courts often hear these cases should not, however, change in the
slightest the substantive law issues or the resolution of the conflicts of laws presented in them
(although, as note 210 details, Mrs. DeWeerth could be forgiven for ultimately believing other-
wise inasmuch as a misprediction of state law denied her title to and possession of her claimed
property). In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), the
United States Supreme Court specifically directed that a federal court sitting in diversity apply
the choice-of-law rule of the state in which it sits. Each of the federal court cases discussed in
Part I expressly noted that obligation.
In Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1986), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit called attention to a common misstatement of this obligation. The lower
court stated, “[a]s this Court’s jurisdiction is grounded upon the parties’ diversity of citizenship,
Illinois law governs this case.” Id. at 604. The appeals court commented:
This implies that in a diversity suit the substantive law of the state where the federal
court is located always governs. Not so. The federal court in a diversity suit applies
the choice of law rules of the forum state, and those rules may or may not make the
substantive law of that state the governing law for the suit.
Id. (citations omitted). For citation to the general point in the stolen art context, see, for exam-
ple, Charash v. Oberlin College, 14 F.3d 291, 296 (6th Cir. 1994) (“It is well settled that a federal
court sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits.”) and
Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278,
286 (7th Cir. 1990) (“As a federal court sitting in diversity, the district court was obligated to . . .
apply the law of the state in which it sat . . . . This included Indiana law as to which body of sub-
stantive law to apply to the case, i.e. Indiana’s choice of law rules.”) (citations omitted).
268. New York provides an excellent illustration. New York applies the traditional rule that
in matters characterized as procedural, forum law governs (although that law may defer to the
rule of another state). See infra notes 269-81 and accompanying text. If the conflict of laws is
one involving contract rules, New York applies a “center of gravity” or “grouping of contacts”
test. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stolarz, 613 N.E.2d 936, 939 (N.Y. 1993); Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d
99, 102 (N.Y. 1954). If the conflict is one between rules arising in tort, New York draws a dis-
tinction between those rules that regulate conduct and those that allocate loss. Schultz v. Boy
Scouts, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684-85 (N.Y. 1985). As to conduct regulating rules, New York sim-
ply applies what is known in conflicts parlance as the “lex loci delicto,” that is, the law of the
place of the wrong. E.g., Padula v. Lilarn Props. Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001, 1002-03 (N.Y. 1994).
As to loss-allocating rules, the conflict is resolved by reference to three rules that flow from the
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dividual state level, but it becomes positively obscure when multiple
states are available venues and each state draws such distinctions and
makes such characterizations in differing ways. The art theft cases
provide a perfect illustration. As the next sections indicate, the con-
flict between differing rules on the continued existence of owners’
conversion and replevin claims has been characterized as a proce-
dural issue, a property issue, and a tort issue, all with varying methods
and potential outcomes.
A. Characterization—The Issue as a Conflict of Statutes of
Limitations
As Part I detailed, the ground upon which the original
owner/good-faith purchaser battle is fought most commonly, at least
in American jurisdictions, is the issue of whether the owner’s claim
for return of the art, or its value, is timely. If so, the owner’s title pre-
vails; if not, title is recognized in the good-faith purchaser. Seen as a
timeliness issue, the conflict would initially seem to be a rather
straightforward question of which jurisdiction’s statute of limitations
rules apply. This characterization, while facile, is faulty.
When examining cases in which theft-originated owner/purchaser
disputes are so analyzed, it is useful to understand the methods courts
generally employ to resolve limitations conflicts. The traditional
choice-of-law rule, to which a number of states remain committed,269
deemed statutes of limitations to be procedural.270 Thus, with rare ex-
ception,271 conflicts involving statutes of limitations were subjected to
the general command that the procedural rules to be applied in mul-
tijurisdiction cases were those of the forum. Because this rule pro-
juxtaposition of two variables, the domicile of the parties and the place where the tort occurred.
See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 458 (N.Y. 1972).
269. E.g., Charash v. Oberlin Coll., 14 F.3d 291, 296-97 (6th Cir. 1994) (interpreting Ohio
law such that where Ohio is the forum, the Ohio statute of limitations applies regardless of
where the claim arose and whether Ohio law governs the substantive aspects of the case).
270. The underlying notion of the traditional view, that statutes of limitations were proce-
dural for choice-of-law purposes and thus that forum law applied, flowed from the view that
“the bar of the statute does not extinguish the underlying right but merely causes the remedy to
be withheld . . . . [T]he right subsists, and the forum may choose to allow its courts to provide a
remedy, even though the jurisdiction where the right arose would not.” Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,
486 U.S. 717, 725 (1987).
271. E.g., Bournias v. Atl. Mar. Co., 220 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1955) (applying the exception
that “where the foreign statute of limitation is regarded as barring the foreign right sued upon,
and not merely the remedy, it will be treated as conditioning that right and will be enforced by
our courts as part of the foreign ‘substantive’ law”).
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vided a strong incentive toward forum shopping272 and often did not
serve forum policy goals, many courts, having acknowledged that
“[s]ound sense and policy reasons dictate that a suit on a foreign
cause of action should be processed and tried according to the proce-
dural rules of the forum state,”273 questioned whether statutes of limi-
tations should be considered strictly procedural for this purpose.274
The “sound sense and policy reasons” supporting a general pref-
erence for forum procedural rules flow from two variables. The first is
the difficulty of discovering and properly applying foreign procedural
rules and practices, and the second is the unlikelihood that applica-
tion of the foreign rule would change the outcome of the case.275 “The
more inconvenient it would be to find and apply a foreign rule and
the less likely it is that the rule will affect the result, the greater the
justification for a ‘procedural’ label.”276 As courts have noted, a stat-
ute of limitations issue presents the converse situation.277 A foreign
state’s statute of limitations will often be easier to discover and de-
termine than many aspects of that state’s substantive law that choice-
of-law rules may well direct the forum to apply.278 Correlatively, if the
choice of statutes of limitation matters, as it must to present a choice-
of-law issue at all,279 then that choice is quintessentially outcome-
determinative.280 On such reasoning, the characterization of the stat-
272. E.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 772-73 (1984) (adjudicating the claim
of the plaintiff, a New York resident, who sued the defendant, an Ohio corporation, for libel in
New Hampshire, the only state in which her claim was not time-barred).
273. Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412, 415 (N.J. 1973).
274. Id.; see also Johnson v. Pischke, 700 P.2d 19, 24 (Idaho 1985) (noting that statutes of
limitations are designed to protect defendants from stale claims); Cameron v. Hardisty, 407
N.W.2d 595, 597 (Iowa 1987) (noting that statutes of limitations do have substantive rationales).
275. This variable is akin to that employed for Erie purposes to determine whether a given
federal or state rule should be chosen by the federal court sitting in diversity. In Guaranty Trust
v. New York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), the United States Supreme Court cautioned against the con-
clusory labels of statutes of limitations as substantive or procedural for purposes of determining
whether state or federal law applied. Rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether the choice “sig-
nificantly affect[s]” the result of the litigation. Id. at 109.
276. MAURICE ROSENBERG, PETER HAY, RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, CONFLICT OF LAWS,
CASES AND MATERIALS 402 (10th ed. 1996).
277. E.g., Heavner, 305 A.2d at 415 (noting that there is less difficulty with statutes of limita-
tions from foreign jurisdictions than with “strictly procedural matters”).
278. See id. (“The limitation period of the foreign state can generally be ascertained even
more easily and certainly than foreign substantive law.”).
279. See supra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
280. As the Court noted in Guaranty Trust v. New York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), if the federal
rule of laches, which arguably would have allowed plaintiff’s claim to proceed, displaced the
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ute of limitations issue as procedural, thus requiring the use of the fo-
rum’s rule, is frequently abandoned. Instead, the court analyzes the
question of the governing limitations period through less mechanical
approaches. The connections of the parties and the transaction or
events underlying the plaintiff’s claim with the forum become prime
inquiries. As applied, such tests often result in a domestic plaintiff
getting the benefit of the forum’s longer statute of limitations, despite
the fact that the cause of action arose elsewhere, but a domestic de-
fendant gaining the benefit of the shorter statute in the place the
claim arose when sued by a foreign plaintiff.281 As we shall see, this
differing result can create a particularly unattractive result in the art
theft context.
O’Keeffe v. Snyder282 offers a straightforward example of a court
treating the conflict of law as simply a conflict of statutes of limita-
tions. In O’Keeffe, the choice was between New York and New Jersey
law.283 The theft of the art at issue had occurred in New York. The art
was in the possession of the defendant in New Jersey, where the de-
mand for, and refusal of, return was made.284 If the court chose New
state rule, which appeared to time-bar the suit, the outcome of the case would be significantly
affected. Id. at 109. The district court was directed to apply the state rule. Id. at 112.
281. E.g., Heavner, 305 A.2d at 417-48. The results are illustrated well by two New Jersey
cases, Heavner and Pine v. Eli Lilly & Co., 492 A.2d 1079 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1985).
Heavner was a suit brought in the courts of New Jersey by North Carolina plaintiffs against a
New Jersey defendant and a Delaware corporation on causes of action arising out of an auto-
mobile accident in North Carolina. In choosing the shorter North Carolina statute to time-bar
the claim, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
We need go no further now than to say that when the cause of action arises in another
state, the parties are all present in and amenable to the jurisdiction of that state, New
Jersey has no substantial interest in the matter, the substantive law of the foreign
state is to be applied, and its limitation period has expired at the time suit is com-
menced here, New Jersey will hold the suit barred. In essence, we will “borrow” the
limitations law of the foreign state. We presently restrict our conclusion to the factual
pattern identical with or akin to that in the case before us, for there may well be situa-
tions involving significant interest of this state where it would be inequitable or unjust
to apply the concept we here espouse.
Heavner, 305 A.2d at 418.
An example in which such significant interest of the state presents itself is Pine, in
which the court noted that if the plaintiff were a New Jersey domiciliary, the New Jersey statute,
under which the suit was timely, would apply over the foreign statute, where the cause arose and
under whose law it was time-barred. In such case, “New Jersey’s interest in compensating its
domiciliary is paramount [and] outweighs our policy of discouraging forum shopping.” Pine, 492
A.2d at 1083.
282. 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980), discussed supra at notes 132-52.
283. See supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text.
284. O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 868.
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York law, O’Keeffe’s claim would unquestionably be timely as dated
from the demand and refusal.285
The court noted that New Jersey had abandoned the traditional
rule that applied the statute of limitations of the forum in all but the
rarest situations.286 Instead, New Jersey applied its own statute unless
the cause of action arose in another state, all parties were amenable
to jurisdiction in that state, New Jersey had no substantial interest in
the matter, the other state’s substantive law would be chosen, and the
limitation period of that state had expired.287 Because O’Keeffe in-
volved a painting located in New Jersey and none of the parties were
from New York, the court determined that New Jersey’s statute of
limitations provided the applicable rule.288
This characterization of the conflict as one involving statutes of
limitations was pointedly referred to as a “misstep”289 by the dissent in
O’Keeffe:
[T]he Court . . . declines to follow the New York law on the theory
that the New York law is a statute of limitations and that the New
Jersey statute of limitations, rather than that of New York, should
be applied. The issue, however, is not whether the New Jersey stat-
ute of limitations should be followed rather than that of New York.
The New York rule of subsequent conversions, rejected by the ma-
jority, is not a “statute of limitations,” but rather is a substantive
principle of the law of torts. The majority simply sidesteps the ques-
tion of which state’s tort law ought to be applied to this case.290
The dissent is exactly right on this point. The characterization of
the dispute as one turning on differing limitations rules is tempting
but wrong. The conflicts were produced not by differing limitations
periods, but rather by different conceptions of what triggered the in-
ception of the period. The triggering event that commences the limi-
tations period is the accrual of the cause of action. An action typically
accrues on the date of injury or, put another way, “upon the occur-
rence of the last element essential to the cause of action.”291 The cru-
285. See supra notes 207-16 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
287. O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 868 (citing Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412, 412 (N.J.
1973)).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 879 (Handler, J., dissenting).
290. Id. (Handler, J., dissenting).
291. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Leuy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P.2d 421, 428 (Ariz. 1971).
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cial issue is precisely what is the “last event” essential to a cause of ac-
tion.292 As earlier stated, New York views the “last event” essential to
a cause of action by an original owner and the good-faith purchaser of
stolen art as the purchaser’s refusal of the owner’s demand for return
of the art.293 New Jersey views the cause of action as accruing at the
moment reasonable diligence by the owner would disclose the iden-
tity and whereabouts of the purchaser.294 Therein lies the most sub-
stantive of conflicts.
B. Characterization—The Issue as a Conflict of Moveable Property
Rules
The dispute between the original owner and the good-faith pur-
chaser of stolen art is more properly characterized as a question of ti-
tle to moveable property. The vast majority of American jurisdictions
and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws295 support the view
292. In other contexts, courts have treated the issue of when and where a cause of action
arose as a relatively straightforward one, resisting invitations to obscure it by introducing policy
considerations into its determination. A recent New York case, not involving stolen art, illus-
trates judicial resistance to clouding the accrual issue. In Global Financial Corp. v. Triarc Corp.,
715 N.E.2d 482, 483 (N.Y. 1999), the New York Court of Appeals identified the question as
“where does a nonresident’s contract claim accrue for purposes of the Statute of Limitations?”
Id. New York would normally apply its own statute of limitations but for its “borrowing” stat-
ute, which in a case brought against a nonresident would direct application of a shorter statute
of the place where the cause of action accrued. Id. The plaintiff, seeking to have New York’s
longer statute of limitations applied, argued that its claim accrued in New York because that is
where the contract had been negotiated, executed, substantially performed, and allegedly
breached. Id. These connections would clearly suggest application of New York’s substantive
law, but the question was whether the substantiality and quantity of contacts suggested that the
cause of action accrued in New York rather than in the two places, Delaware and Pennsylvania,
that the plaintiff suffered its injury. Id. The court refused to abandon the traditional definition
of accrual—”the time when, and place where, the plaintiff first had the right to bring the cause
of action.” Id. at 484. The court concluded its analysis by noting that the goal of New York’s
borrowing statute, to further interests in clarity and “the certainty of uniform application to liti-
gants,” would not be as well served by the substitution of “a rule dependent on a litany of events
relevant to the ‘center of gravity’ of . . . the dispute.” Id. at 485-86.
293. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 132-52 and accompanying text.
295. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 244 (1971):
Validity and Effect of Conveyance of Interest in Chattel
(1) The validity and effect of a conveyance of an interest in a chattel as between
the parties to the conveyance are determined by the local law of the state which,
with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the
parties, the chattel and the conveyance under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, greater weight will
usually be given to the location of the chattel, or group of chattels, at the time of
the conveyance than to any other contact in determining the state of the appli-
cable law.
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that the validity and effect of transfers of interests in tangible move-
able property are governed by the law of the situs of the property at
the time of the transfer.296 This is the view of foreign nations as well.297
As a consequence, if the situs validates the transfer of title, the state
or nation to which the chattel is later taken will recognize that title,
despite the fact that its law would not have validated the transfer.298
Effect of Conveyance on Pre-Existing Interests in Chattel
(1) The effect of a conveyance upon a pre-existing interest in a chattel of a per-
son who was not a party to the conveyance will usually be determined by the law
that would be applied by the courts of the state where the chattel was at the time
of the conveyance.
(2) These courts would usually apply their own local law in determining such
questions.
296. E.g., Dobbins v. Martin Buick Co., 227 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Ark. 1950) (applying the laws
of Tennessee to an action in replevin to recover an automobile where the sale took place in
Tennessee); Auto Auction, Inc. v. Riding Motors, 10 Cal. Rptr. 110, 112 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960)
(applying Louisiana law, as law of situs, to determine the effectiveness of a sale); Ellison v.
Hunsinger, 75 S.E.2d 884, 889 (N.C. 1953) (applying South Carolina law as law of situs to de-
termine the question of title to cotton).
There are strong policy concerns that underlie the so-called “lex situs” rule, including
“effectiveness, certainty, stableness of title, and general business convenience.” Peter B. Carter,
Transnational Trade in Works of Art: The Position in English Private International Law, in
GENEVA WORKSHOP, supra note 22, at 317, 324.
297. For example, British law recognizes that “[t]he validity of a transfer of a tangible
moveable and its effect on the proprietary rights of the parties thereto and of those claiming
under them in respect thereof are governed by the law of the country where the moveable is at
the time of the transfer (lex situs).” 2 ALBERT V. DICEY & JOHN H. C. MORRIS, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 942 (11th ed. 1987). Spanish, Swiss, and Italian law are in accord. See Julio D. Gonzalez-
Campos & Miguel Virgos Soriano, International Art Trade in Spanish Law, in GENEVA
WORKSHOP, supra note 22, at 355, 355-56 (stating that Spanish law adopts a lex situs choice-of-
law rule for determining the governing law regarding acquisition, transfer, and ownership of
moveable property, including art); Francois Knoefpler, Art Trade and Swiss Private Interna-
tional Law, in GENEVA WORKSHOP, supra note 22, at 385, 386 (stating the lex situs rule under
Swiss law); Riccardo Luzzatto, Trade in Art and Conflict of Laws: The Position of Italy, in
GENEVA WORKSHOP, supra note 22, at 409, 415 (stating that “the valid transfer of title on the
basis of the foreign law of the situs while the object was situated abroad shall be recognised by
the Italian law once the object has been brought to Italy”).
298. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 247 (1971):
Moving Chattel Into Another State: Effect on title interests in a chattel are not af-
fected by the mere removal of the chattel to another state. Such interests, however,
may be affected by dealings with the chattel in the other state.
See also Carter, supra note 296, at 329:
It would seem . . . that the mere fact of moving property across a frontier ought not in
itself to affect title. A contrary rule would be liable to promote chaos. Title should
only be affected by virtue of the occurrence of a new transfer taking place in the new
situs.
The converse is equally true, such that the mere removal of a chattel to a state that
would have recognized an interest had the transfer occurred there will not perforce validate an
invalid transfer under the law of the state or nation where the purported transfer occurred. Id.
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This rule is best illustrated in the art theft context by one of
England’s most famous art theft cases, Winkworth v. Christie, Man-
son & Woods, Ltd.299 Works of art were stolen from an English domi-
ciliary in England. The works were subsequently sold in Italy to a
good-faith purchaser who brought them back to England and deliv-
ered them to an auction house for sale. The owner brought suit in an
English court to affirm his title and recover the works. The purchaser
pled that he had acquired good title. English law maintained title in
the plaintiff; Italian law recognized title in the defendant.300 The Eng-
lish court, applying the lex situs rule, held that title was to be deter-
mined by Italian law.
In so holding, the court resisted pleas by the owner-plaintiff to
give decisive significance to several strong connecting factors to Eng-
land, including that the theft had occurred there, the owner was
domiciled there, the owner did not know that the art had ever been
removed from England, the art had been returned voluntarily to
England, and an English court was hearing the action.301 It concluded
instead that “[i]ntolerable uncertainty in the law would result if the
court were to permit the introduction of a wholly fictional English si-
tus when applying the principle to a particular case, merely because
the case happened to have a number of other English connecting fac-
tors.”302
The one widely-recognized exception to the lex situs rule in this
context occurs when the chattel’s presence in the situs is a transitory
or casual one.303 For example, the district court judge in Autocepha-
lous Greek-Orthodox Church304 applied this exception to avoid appli-
cation of the law of the situs, Switzerland, because the mosaics had
These rules are grounded in the policy that “[c]ommercial convenience and the needs of the in-
ternational and interstate relations alike require that interests in a chattel should not be affected
simply by its removal from one state to another.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 247(a) (1971); see also Luzzatto, supra note 297, at 415 (stating that under Italian law a
change of situs cannot give rise to a valid title if title was not validated by the law of the previous
situs).
299. [1980] 1 Ch. 496.
300. Id. at 500.
301. Id. at 502-03.
302. Id. at 509.
303. For example, under British law the lex situs rule does not apply when the moveable
item is in transit and its situs is either casual or unknown. 2 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 297,
at 946-47. In such cases, the law of the place most closely connected to the parties and the trans-
fer is chosen. Id.
304. 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff’d, 917 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir. 1990).
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been in Swiss territory for only four days and had never cleared cus-
toms there. The court characterized this contact as “fortuitous and
transitory.”305
When the conflict between the owner and the good-faith pur-
chaser is characterized as one involving title to property, a proper
analysis begins by focusing on the place at which the dispossession of
the true owner occurred. The place of the dispossession determines
the consequence of this dispossession. As noted in Part I, domestic
and foreign jurisdictions distinguish between good-faith purchases
that originated from voluntary disposition of the original owner and
those that originated from involuntary disposition.306
The law that characterizes the nature of the dispossession ought
to be that of the place where the dispossession occurred at the time it
occurred. For example, in Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon,307
the district court addressed in depth the good-faith purchaser’s con-
tention that he had acquired good title directly, rather than through
prescription, under the German law of “good faith acquisition.”308
This issue focused on the circumstances of the original owner’s dis-
possession, and the court decided it under German law because all
relevant connections with respect to the issue were with Germany.309
The original owner was German, the person alleged by defendant to
305. Id. at 1376. The court bolstered its conclusion that Swiss law should not apply by noting
that Switzerland’s choice-of-law principles would recognize and apply the exception as well. Be-
cause the situs of the property at the time of its sale was transitory, the general Swiss rule would
have displaced the law of the place of sale in favor of the law of the intended destination. Id. at
1395. Furthermore, considering arguendo that Swiss law governed, the trial judge concluded
that the same result would be appropriate because Swiss law would not recognize a valid title in
the purchaser where she purchased in “suspicious circumstances.” Id. at 1400.
306. See supra notes 37-255 and accompanying text.
307. 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982). Elicofon is dis-
cussed supra note 205.
308. Elifocon, 536 F. Supp. at 839. The court described this German law, at least as it was
agreed to by the parties, as containing the following elements required to obtain title from one
lacking title:
(1) the owner must have voluntarily parted with his dominion over the paintings, i.e.,
the paintings must not have been taken from the owner without his consent; (2) the
person from whom the purchaser acquired the paintings must have been in possession
of them; and (3) the purchaser must have believed in good faith that the person was
the actual owner of the paintings, and that belief must not have been grossly negli-
gent.
Id. at 840.
309. Id. at 839-46.
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have originally accomplished the dispossession was German, and the
act of dispossession took place in Germany.310
This reference to the law of the place of original dispossession of
the true owner can ultimately determine the rights of the owner and
the good-faith purchaser. For example, if that law had vested title in
the purchaser or his predecessor and stripped the owner of his title,
that legal outcome would not be reversed by the application of the
law of another jurisdiction with a later connection to the parties or
the artwork. If, as in Elicofon,311 the law applicable to the disposses-
sion does not dislocate title from the true owner, ensuing events and
contacts gain legal relevance.
Here again, Elicofon is illustrative. As noted immediately above,
the court determined that German law did not divest the owner of his
title at the time he was dispossessed of the painting. It then turned to
the good-faith purchaser’s alternative argument that German law
vested title in him as a result of his “good faith acquisition of the
property plus possession of it in good faith, and without notice of a
defect in title, for the statutory period of ten years from the time the
rightful owner [lost] possession.”312 The court did not reach the ques-
tion under German law, deciding that on this issue New York law ap-
plied rather than German law.313 Because the key focus was on the
purchaser’s behavior, which took place entirely beyond Germany’s
borders, Germany’s protective policy with respect to good-faith pur-
chasers was not implicated. The purchase and possession occurred en-
tirely in New York, so New York had an “interest in regulating the
transfer of title . . . in a manner which best promotes its policy.”314 Al-
though it was not the case in Elicofon, it is entirely possible, and un-
der the discovery rule315 likely, that the application of the situs rule
will give a good-faith purchaser title by extinguishing the owner’s
310. Id. at 839.
311. The Elicofon court concluded that Elicofon could not establish a “good faith acquisi-
tion” under German law because he could not establish that the alleged dispossessor met the
definition of a possessor. Id. at 840-43. The court further held that the law of good-faith acquisi-
tion, had it resulted in a legal determination that the true owner lost title, would have been su-
perseded by Allied Military Law No. 52, which rendered void any attempted transfer of cultural
property. Id. at 843.
312. Id. at 845.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 846. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling that New York law
applied “substantially for the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion.” Kunstsammlungen
zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1160 (2d Cir. 1982).
315. See supra notes 128-203 and accompanying text.
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claim against him. This would occur when situs law treats the owner’s
cause of action as accruing at the point when the owner’s diligence
would likely have disclosed the purchaser’s possession. The legal rec-
ognition of the owner’s cause of action triggers limitations periods
and, upon the close of those periods, recognizes at the least “de facto”
title in the possessor.316 The recognition of this title by situs law should
then be recognized by sister states and nations even if their laws, had
they been applicable, would not have reached the same result.317
This was exactly the situation in Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate of
Jerusalem v. Christie’s, Inc.318 A choice between France and New York
as the source of governing law was required because, although French
law recognized a good-faith purchaser’s title by prescription over a
thirty-year period,319 New York favored the true owner by applying
the “demand and refusal” rule of accrual. As had the Elicofon court,
the district court applied New York’s choice-of-law rule, which di-
rected application of the law of the place where the property was lo-
cated at the time of the alleged transfer to the question of the validity
of that transfer.320 That rule chose French law to determine the French
claimant’s title.321 The court noted that the relevant transfer was not
that from Madame Guersan, the French possessor through purchase,
to Christie’s in New York. Instead, the relevant transfer was the
transfer to Madame Guersan’s father in France, and the Guersans
claimed acquisition by prescription during more than thirty years of
possession in France.322
The Patriarchate argued unsuccessfully that public policy con-
cerns suggested that New York would choose her own law. These
concerns flowed from New York’s desire “as one of the leading cen-
ters of international commerce in art . . . [to avoid] a reputation as a
place where stolen art may be freely bought and sold.”323 Although
recognizing that New York’s policy concerns were “not insignificant,”
316. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 296-98 and accompanying text.
318. No. 98 Civ. 7664, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1999). The facts of
this case are discussed supra at notes 224-47 and accompanying text.
319. Id. at *12.
320. Id. at *13 (citing Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 845-46
(E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982)).
321. Id. The court recognized the Guersans’ title under Articles 2262 and 2229 of the French
Civil Code on the basis of possession that was “continuous and uninterrupted, peaceful, public,
unequivocal, and as owner.” Id. at *18-19.
322. Id. at *14.
323. Id. at *14-15.
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the court noted that the differences between New York law and
French law did not violate New York’s “fundamental notions of jus-
tice or prevailing concepts of good morals.”324 Because title passed to
Guersan by the law of France while the Palimpsest was in France,
New York’s “demand and refusal” rule would not be applied to ac-
complish a resurrection of the Patriarchate’s title, even if the equities
had favored the Patriarchate.
C. Characterization—The Issue as a Conflict of Tort Rules
The third approach in multijurisdiction art theft cases is to char-
acterize the choice-of-law dispute by the nature of the wrong claimed
by the plaintiff. Two cases well illustrate the characterization of
choice-of-law problems in a multistate owner-possessor dispute over
title to stolen art as a tort issue.
The first is Charash v. Oberlin College.325 The dispute involved
works of art painted by Eva Hesse326 that were donated to Oberlin
College, located in Ohio. Plaintiff Helen Charash, a New Jersey citi-
zen, was Hesse’s sister and sole heir at law. At the time of her death,
Hesse was a New York resident, and the alleged conversion probably
occurred in that state.327 The paintings came into the possession of
Donald Droll, a New York art dealer, who was also a friend and advi-
sor to Hesse.328 Droll gave the paintings to his brother, Phillip, who in
turn gave them to the college.329
It was Charash’s belief that Donald Droll “misappropriated” the
property.330 Oberlin claimed that Hesse had given the paintings to
Droll.331 Charash brought suit for conversion in the United States Dis-
324. Id. at *15. This conclusion was supported by the court’s finding that New York would
here favor the rights of the good-faith purchaser over the rights of the original owner on the eq-
uitable principle of laches. See supra notes 234-44 and accompanying text.
325. 14 F.3d 291 (6th Cir. 1994).
326. Hesse has been described as the “James Dean of Art.” Gregory Beals, Suit Asks For
Return of Stolen Artworks, THE RECORD, Mar. 31, 1991, at A3. She died of a brain tumor at age
34. A sample of Eva Hesse’s work is available at http://www.artchive.com.
327. According to the plaintiff’s deposition, it had been necessary immediately after Hesse’s
death to remove all her possessions from the New York City loft in which she lived. A trunk
containing a large number of Ms. Hesse’s drawings disappeared either from the loft or from the




331. Id. at 295.
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trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio. Sitting in diversity, that
court applied Ohio’s choice-of-law rules.332
Charash differs from the other cases discussed in this Article be-
cause the defendant did not base its claim of ownership on its status
as or through a good-faith purchaser. Instead, Oberlin claimed its
ownership by transfer from the original owner’s alleged donee. The
key question was whether Droll was a wrongful converter or a right-
ful donee. The first conflict-of-laws issue was the appropriate burden
of proof on this issue.
Ohio, the place of suit and the state under whose laws Oberlin
College was organized, placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff,
requiring her to prove that the property was converted.333 New York
“holds that people deal with property at their own risk, and therefore
the defendant must prove that his or her title is valid. In other words,
the defendant must prove there was no conversion.”334 Because Hesse
and Droll were both dead, meeting the burden of proof on the cir-
cumstances through which Droll obtained possession would be diffi-
cult. Charash therefore argued that New York law should apply,
placing that burden on Oberlin; Oberlin College argued that Ohio
provided the applicable rule and placed the applicable burden on
Charash.335
Ohio had committed itself in tort cases to the choice-of-law
methods suggested by the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws.
The Restatement Second specifically addresses choice of law in tort
suits alleging injury to tangible things, and it directs application of the
local law of the state of injury unless another state has a “more sig-
nificant relationship . . . to the occurrence.”336 The comments to this
section of the Restatement address conversion expressly.337 These
comments indicate an intent to bypass the state of the injury as the
presumptive source of law in favor of the state with the most signifi-
cant relationship to “the occurrence, the chattel, and the parties.”338
332. Id. at 296 (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)); supra
note 269 and accompanying text.
333. Id. at 295 (citing Burson v. Peoples Bank, No. 16-92-31, 1993 WL 373523, at *1 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 1, 1993)).
334. Id. (citing Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991)).
335. Id. at 294.
336. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 147 (1971).
337. Id. § 147 cmt. i.
338. Charash, 14 F.3d at 296 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 147
cmt. i).
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The court described the nature of the plaintiff’s dual burden.
Whether the suit is in conversion or replevin, the plaintiff is first re-
quired to establish his or her title. This is true in most jurisdictions,
including both Ohio and New York,339 so no conflict of law340 was pre-
sented on the first aspect of Charash’s burden. Second, the plaintiff is
required to prove that a conversion has occurred. The court held that
if a conversion occurred, it occurred in Ohio, because this was the
only state in which Oberlin, the alleged converter, acted.341 Thus,
Ohio law should apply unless some other state had the more signifi-
cant relationship to the parties and the chattels. Applying the sec-
tion 145 principles342 to such an analysis, the court found “little sup-
port under any of these [principles] for holding that New York law
governs this case.”343 In the court’s opinion, the alleged original con-
version by Donald Droll in New York was irrelevant, because the
only relevant behavior was that of the defendant currently in posses-
sion, Oberlin College.344 The court concluded that Charash had failed
to establish that the conduct that had caused the injury originated in
New York.345 The other two Restatement factors, the residence of the
parties and the place where any relationship of the parties was cen-
tered, also pointed away from New York.346 The court did acknowl-
edge, however, that “[i]f the drawings had been identified and in-
cluded in the inventory of the artist’s estate following her death, and
if Ms. Charash were suing on behalf of the estate of a New York de-
cedent [rather than in her own right as a New Jersey resident], there
might be some reason to consider her claims of New York’s inter-
339. Id.
340. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
341. Charash, 14 F.3d at 296. The court held that Ohio was the place of the injury, because
that is where Oberlin exercised its dominion over the property without Charash’s consent or
authority. Id.
342. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145.
343. Charash, 14 F.3d at 297.
344. Id. at 297-98.
345. Id. As described supra note 330 and accompanying text, Charash sought to prove that
Droll had originally misappropriated the property in New York. Considering this effort, the
court concluded, “[a]lthough she had ample opportunity to establish that Donald Droll took
wrongful possession of the drawings in New York, Ms. Charash’s proof was speculative at best.”
Id. at 297.
346. Id. at 298 (holding that neither party had a domiciliary, residential or business connec-
tion to New York and that there was no proof that the parties’ relationship was ever “centered”
in New York).
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est.”347 The court concluded that, should the district court reach the
merits of the case, Ohio law was to govern.348
The court then turned to the remaining choice-of-law issue, what
statute of limitations rules Ohio would apply in the instant circum-
stances. The court upheld the district court’s determination that Ohio
would apply her own limitations law.349 Under Ohio law, the cause of
action does not accrue “until the wrongdoer is discovered.”350 Oberlin
had conceded that Charash did not have actual notice of its posses-
sion of the drawings early enough to support the bar of the statute of
limitations, so the sole issue was whether she had constructive notice
of that possession. Because there were material issues of fact with re-
spect to whether Charash had such notice, the court concluded the
summary disposition was not appropriate and remanded to the dis-
trict court.351
The second case that illustrates the characterization of the choice
of right-defining rules in the art theft context as a tort is Autocepha-
lous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts.352
The court chose this characterization despite the defendant-
purchaser’s assertion that the question was one involving transfer of
chattels and thus was subject to the property situs rules.353 Applying
Indiana’s choice-of-law rules applicable to issues in tort,354 the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s determination that “Indiana law
and rules govern every aspect of this action, from the statute of limita-
347. Id.
348. Id. at 299.
349. Id.
350. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.09 (West 2000).
351. Charash, 14 F.3d at 300.
352. 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
353. The Greek Orthodox Church sought return of the mosaics through a replevin action.
Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals could find any Indiana case that characterized
replevin actions, but both courts choose to treat replevin as a tort action because it “is identical
in all relevant respects to a tort claim for conversion.” Id. at 286 n.10.
354. Indiana’s choice-of-law methodology in torts had been defined in Hubbard Manufac-
turing Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1073-74 (Ind. 1987). That case called for a two-step in-
quiry. First, courts were to focus on the place of the wrong to determine its connection to the
legal action. If that connection was significant or substantial, the substantive law of the place of
the wrong was to be chosen. If that connection was insubstantial or insignificant that law was
not chosen, and the court was to consider additional factors, including the place of the conduct
causing the injury, the residence of the parties, and the place where the relationship of the par-
ties, if any, was centered, to determine which state had the most significant contact. That state’s
law was then chosen. Id.
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tions issues through the application of the substantive law of re-
plevin.”355
The district court in Autocephalous began by noting that al-
though Switzerland was the place of the wrong, because that is where
the purchaser took possession of the stolen mosaics,356 Switzerland
bore little connection to the cause of action. None of the parties or
significant actors in the sale of the mosaics was Swiss.357 The mosaics
were never in the stream of commerce in Switzerland and in fact were
only on Swiss soil for four days.358 The court characterized Switzer-
land’s connection to “the heart” of the suit as “fortuitous and transi-
tory” and concluded that “Switzerland [had] no significant interest in
the application of its law to [the] suit.”359
Indiana’s choice-of-law rules instead pointed to Indiana as the
appropriate source of governing law. Among the contacts suggesting
this conclusion were that Indiana was the purchaser’s state of citizen-
ship, the purchase had been effected largely through the efforts of
another Indiana citizen, the purchase was financed by a loan from an
Indiana bank, the agreement as to sharing the profits from resale of
the mosaics was expressly made subject to Indiana law, and the mo-
saics were present in Indiana.360 In the opinions of both the trial and
appellate courts, Indiana had “the more significant contacts with and
interest in [the] action.”361
D. Reflections on Choosing Law in Stolen Art Cases
The choice-of-law model that best serves the shared policies of
certainty, predictability, uniformity of result, and protection of the
justified expectations of the parties is that which characterizes the is-
sue of the relative rights of original owners and good-faith purchasers
of stolen art as one involving title to moveable property.362 The move-
able property model focuses attention on the crucial question of the
legal patina that surrounds the art in any place where it has more than
355. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 917 F.2d at 287.
356. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. 1393, 1393 (S.D.
Ind. 1989), aff’d, 917 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir. 1990).




361. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldman & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917
F.2d 278, 287 (7th Cir. 1990).
362. See supra notes 295-324 and accompanying text.
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a temporary or transitional presence. The moveable property model
is also the model most likely to lead a court from the “misstep”363 of
seeing the question as one involving conflicting limitations periods. It
is that misstep that most seriously undermines the policies at stake,
because it permits the forum of the plaintiff’s choice to apply its own
rule despite limited and insignificant connections of the forum with
the parties and the art.364 The choice-of-law rules governing title to
moveable property ensure that the source of the governing rule is or
was intimately connected to the property for which title is in issue.
III.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHAOS
The introductory section of this Article noted that the variance
of right-defining rules and the multijurisdictional character of most
stolen art cases combine to create a legal regime that undermines all
private expectations of the parties, all public policies of states and na-
tions connected to the parties, and all individuals and institutions that
comprise the art world. This part examines these consequences and
explores the extent to which this chaos is different or more disturbing
than that which is created when multijurisdictional contacts mandate
a choice among differing rules in any legal context.
A. The Consequences Considered
Whenever a choice must be made between competing rules, one
of these rules, and the private interests and public policies that un-
derlie it, will be advanced and the other subordinated. The subordina-
tion of public and private concerns linked to the rule not chosen may
be felt in the individual case, but rarely will the choice undermine the
public and private interests in a universalized sense. In the art theft
context, however, the prospect of subordination of those interests in
an individual case virtually assures that public and private interests
will be undermined universally.
1. The Interests of the Parties. To appreciate the extent to which
this chaos undermines the interests and reasonable expectations of
the parties, imagine the legal advice counsel might give an original
owner or good-faith purchaser of stolen art. The owner, having
discovered the theft immediately, inquires what he must do to protect
363. O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 879 (Handler, J., dissenting).
364. See supra notes 289-94 and accompanying text.
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his rights. If the owner is domiciled or the theft occurred in a state or
nation whose right-defining rules allowed immediate acquisition of
good title by a good-faith purchaser, the lawyer and client could only
hope for movement of the art across state or national borders, such
that the foreign good-faith acquisition would at least offer the
possibility of application of more owner-favoring rules. If the law of
the owner’s domicile required the exercise of due diligence, the
owner would be well-advised to exercise that diligence, even if later
multijurisdiction connections might result in application of a legal
rule that did not require that exercise. By far the most problematic
scenario, however, is that of the owner who is domiciled and suffers
the theft in a “demand and refusal” state. His home state tells him not
only that he does not have to use reasonable diligence to recover the
art but also that the exercise of that diligence is likely to make
recovery far less probable. Thoughtful legal counsel to that owner
would never recommend sanguine reliance on the domicile rule,
because the owner cannot be assured that his domicile’s rule will be
the ultimate governing standard in any situation save that where the
art never passes outside of his state or nation. In addition, because the
owner in this situation does not know the location of the stolen art,
reliance on stasis would be ill-advised. Thus, the original owner must
do exactly what his domicile rule discourages.
The good-faith purchaser is in a similarly unattractive position.
First, in order to claim a superior status over the owner, the purchaser
must establish his good faith. Specifically, he must show that at the
time of purchase he did not know and did not have reason to know
that the art being purchased was stolen.365 Assuming that the pur-
chaser meets this standard, how, when, and from what source would
such a purchaser find repose with respect to the certainty of his title?
Because it is possible that the law of the owner’s domicile or the place
of theft may apply, and because the identity or even existence of an
original owner not in the purchaser’s known chain of title is unknown,
and often unknowable, the purchaser’s rights are subject to definition
by virtually any rule. The possibility that an unknown owner’s domi-
cile has a “demand and refusal” rule is present in any good-faith pur-
chase, and this possibility assures significant disquietude to the pur-
chaser. Such disquietude would be more than a psychic one. As a
matter of law or practicality, any claim the current purchaser might
365. On the complexity of this effort, see supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text and infra
note 440.
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have against his seller if a defect in title later emerges may be pre-
cluded. Perhaps more disconcerting would be the concern of such a
good-faith purchaser contemplating future sale of the art and fearful
of liabilities that might attach should the art, once sold, ultimately
prove to have been stolen. Whether focusing on his seller or his an-
ticipated buyer, the good-faith purchaser would hope for provenen-
cial—and providential—help from the owner-linked source, particu-
larly in the form of a substantive rule that either vested title in the
purchaser or his predecessor at sale or treated the owner’s action as
accruing immediately such that the purchaser could, with the passage
of time, rest with certainty of his own title.
2. The Interests of States and Nations. When valuable art is
stolen and both the original owner and the good-faith purchaser claim
it, the determination reached by individual states and nations as to
the proper balance between the two is not one that is casually
reached. Those jurisdictions adopting the “demand and refusal” rule
have done so expressly to protect the rights of owners.366 They have
rejected the discovery rule, not only because it undermines owners’
rights but also because they perceive it as driving stolen art
underground; thus preventing not only reacquisition by the owner but
also acquisition by a good-faith purchaser.367 It is significant that
“demand and refusal” adherents do not simply favor that rule as
more effective in accomplishing policy goals. They view the
alternative as destructive to those goals.368
In the absence of a universal “demand and refusal” rule, how-
ever, even an owner domiciled in a “demand and refusal” state can-
not rely on the favor of that rule. This is because his case is as likely
to be subject to a discovery rule or any other purchaser-favoring rule
as it is to be decided by the “demand and refusal” rule, assuming the
case has multijurisdictional connections.369 The only safe course for
any owner seeking to ensure the continued vitality of his title would
be to undertake precisely the destructive course of action that “de-
mand and refusal” states seek to avoid, a search for the stolen art. Put
simply, the policy goals to which “demand and refusal” states are
committed cannot be achieved unless the owner is willing to gamble
366. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 211-19 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
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on the unknown and the unknowable—that the stolen art has at all
times remained in the “demand and refusal” jurisdiction or that if the
stolen art has links to multiple jurisdictions the court in the place of
suit will choose the “demand and refusal” rule.
The policies underlying the discovery rule fare no better under
the current chaotic regime. Those policies, essentially grounded in no-
tions of repose,370 reflect a concern not only for the integrity of trans-
actions but also for the security of acquisition. “Integrity of transac-
tions” means the goal of honest transfers by requiring that buyers
make a careful investigation and is reflected by the requirement that
the purchaser meet the standard of good faith.371 “Security of acquisi-
tion” means the goal of protecting markets by ensuring that buyers of
art, especially art of considerable monetary value, do not suffer dis-
quietude or uncertainty regarding title to that which they purchase.372
As Winkworth concluded in refusing to abandon the lex situs rule,373
[w]ere the position otherwise, it would not suffice for the protection
of a purchaser of any valuable moveables to ascertain that he was
acquiring title to them under the law of the country where the goods
were situated at the time of the purchase; he would have to try to ef-
fect further investigations as to the past title, with a view to ensuring
so far as possible, that there was no person who might successfully
claim a title to the moveables by reference to some other system of
law; and in many cases even such further investigations could result
in no certainty that his title was secure.374
370. More than a century ago, the United States Supreme Court noted that limitations peri-
ods “promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs.” Wood v. Carpenter, 101
U.S. 135, 139 (1879).
371. Some of the defendants in the cases discussed earlier failed to clear this bar and would
have lost to the original owner whether a “demand and refusal” or a discovery rule were ap-
plied. See Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that King was not a good-faith
purchaser); Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine
Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that the circumstances of Peg Goldberg’s pur-
chase suggested a lack of good-faith status).
372. RAY A. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 193 (3d ed. 1975) (“The recogni-
tion of the original owner’s claim as against that of the innocent purchaser is moreover injurious
to the interests which society has in fostering trade and commerce. Business will suffer if pur-
chasers cannot be assured of the title to the goods which they buy.”); Alejandro M. Garro, The
Recovery of Stolen Art Objects from Bona Fide Purchasers, in GENEVA WORKSHOP, supra note
22, at 503, 514-15.
373. See supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
374. Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods, Ltd., [1980] 1 Ch. 496, 512-13.
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The result is “undesirable uncertainty in the commercial world.”375
Even so, states and nations committed to rules that seek to protect
the security of acquisition and that offer repose to a purchaser cannot
achieve those goals in a multijurisdictional context. No security or re-
pose is possible in a legal world that admits the possibility of choice of
a “demand and refusal” rule.
3. The Interests of Museums, Galleries, and the Art World. The
interests of the art world are as varied as the interests of the persons
and institutions that inhabit it. Although it is true that nearly all who
are part of that world desire to protect the rights of art owners,
defining who is the owner whose interests are to be protected
somewhat begs the question. Certainly the involuntarily dispossessed
owner can claim the legitimacy and propriety of rules that preserve
and protect his title. It is just as certain that the good-faith purchaser,
who has paid significant value and felt the attachment of long
possession, thinks of himself as the owner as surely as does his
dispossessed predecessor. The schizophrenia of the concept “owner”
can best be seen in the position of museums, which may well find
themselves cast at different times in each role:
In some situations, a work of art is in the possession of a museum,
where it has remained for many years after purchase from a reputa-
ble dealer; it subsequently develops that the work was stolen from
its original owner, who years after the theft claims the property from
the museum. In other situations, a work of art is stolen from a mu-
seum, which ultimately locates the work and claims it from the pos-
sessor who may have purchased the work from a reputable dealer.
Museums in possession of stolen art will probably think it preferable
to fashion rules that place some obligation on owners to act with
diligence in seeking to locate works they claim were stolen from
them. On the other hand, museums that are the victims of theft will
probably think it preferable to have rules that minimize the obliga-
tion of owners to locate their stolen property.376
To the extent that both original owners and good-faith purchasers
make sympathetic claims, the interest of the art world is doubly un-
dermined, because the current chaos supports neither of the claim-
ants.
375. Id. at 513.
376. Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, 933 F.2d 1131, 1139 (2d Cir. 1991) (Newman, J., concur-
ring).
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Of course, a primary concern of the art world, and particularly
the artists and galleries within it, is the vitality of the art market. That
market depends upon a measure, in fact a high dose, of security sur-
rounding galleries’ and purchasers’ acquisitions.377 Chaos undermines
security and thereby undermines the market for art.
Finally, the art world as a whole is committed to the celebration
and appreciation of art. Private owners of art are encouraged to loan
portions of their collections to museums and galleries for public
viewing, and they have largely been willing to do so. The shared col-
lections of museums and private owners have allowed exhibits that
foster public appreciation of whole schools of art, as well as the full
range of talent and style of individual artists. Such exhibits would
rarely be possible without the willingness of public and private own-
ers worldwide to loan portions of their collections. Although some
exhibits, especially those in galleries, are designed to reach a local
audience, others, like the Schiele retrospective,378 seek to draw audi-
ences worldwide. The intended transportability of those exhibits, and
the nature of the exhibits themselves, are multijurisdictional by intent
and design. As the multijurisdictional connections of a work of art in-
crease, so does the chaos of conflicting right-defining rules. To the ex-
tent that a private or public owner desires to avoid that chaos, the art
“stays put” to the detriment of its wider appreciation.
The encouragement that the chaos lends to keeping art out of the
wider public domain undermines another crucial interest of the art
world—the overarching goal of identifying and recovering stolen art
early enough to prevent or at least moderate financial, legal, and psy-
chic loss to a good-faith purchaser.379 Particularly in the case of a pri-
vate collector, a decision to avoid the chaos simply by not loaning pri-
vately owned works eliminates an opportunity for the original owner
to find the art by exercising due vigilance to discover the location of
art stolen from him.380 The chaos may, therefore, “end up short-
changing not only the public but also the families seeking to recover
lost works.”381
377. See supra notes 372-75 and accompanying text.
378. See infra notes 382-91 and accompanying text.
379. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
380. Lee Rosenbaum, Will Museums in U.S. Purge Nazi-Tainted Art?, ART IN AMERICA,
Nov. 1998, at 37 (addressing the Schiele seizures specifically).
381. Id.
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B. The Consequences Portrayed
No event better illustrates the chaotic result of multijurisdictional
connections in art theft cases than the seizures, first by the state of
New York and later by the United States, of two paintings in a collec-
tion sent by an Austrian state-owned museum to New York for exhi-
bition. In the autumn of 1997, the Leopold Foundation of Vienna,
Austria, sent more than 150 paintings by the late Austrian expres-
sionist Egon Schiele382 to New York City. They were to be displayed
in the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) as part of a Schiele retro-
spective.383 Although the loan was arranged through the Foundation,
the paintings were owned by Austria, which had purchased a vast
collection of expressionist works384 from Rudolf Leopold385 in 1994.
The Schiele paintings hung at MoMA for six weeks. On January 4,
1998, a few days before the close of the exhibit, two families asked
MoMA to retain two paintings so that their provenance could be es-
tablished. The two paintings were “Portrait of Wally,” which was al-
leged to have belonged to Lea Jaray Bondi, a Jewish Viennese art
dealer who fled Austria in anticipation of the Anschluss, leaving her
art collection behind,386 and “Dead City III,” which was alleged to
have belonged to Fritz Grunbaum, a Jew who was arrested in Vienna
and died in the Dachau concentration camp.387 The families claimed to
be heirs of Bondi and Grunbaum. At the time of the request, each
382. Egon Schiele lived only twenty-eight years but created more than 3,000 works on paper
and approximately 300 paintings. Although now considered the premier Austrian expressionist,
during his life he received little recognition and even less compensation. In 1918, on the brink of
commercial success, Schiele and his beloved wife, Edith, pregnant with their first child, con-
tracted Spanish influenza and died within three days of each other. See Mark Harden, Egon
Schiele (1890-1918), at http://www.artchive.com/ftp_site.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2001) (provid-
ing a short biography of the artist and a sampling of his work) (on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal).
383. Judith H. Dobrzynski, Appeals Court Tells Museum to Hold Austrian Paintings, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1999, at B3.
384. In re Museum of Modern Art, 688 N.Y.S.2d 3, 5 (App. Div.), rev’d sub nom. In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Museum of Modern Art, 719 N.E.2d 897,
900 (N.Y. 1999).
385. Rudolph Leopold, a Viennese ophthalmologist, amassed a collection of more than
5,000 works of art, including about 250 by Schiele. For an excellent description of, and reaction
to, the process by which Dr. Leopold acquired his collection, see Judith H. Dobrzynski, The
Zealous Collector—A Special Report; A Singular Passion for Amassing Art, One Way or An-
other, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1997, at E1.
386. Budick, supra note 16.
387. Id.
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painting had a value of approximately $2 million.388 Officials at
MoMA refused the heirs’ request, citing their contractual obligations
to return the paintings to the Leopold Foundation.389 On January 7,
literally hours before the paintings were to be returned to Europe for
exhibition in Barcelona, Spain, Manhattan District Attorney Robert
Morganthau served MoMA with a subpoena duces tecum390 barring
transfer of the two paintings pending a criminal investigation into the
theft alleged by the Jaray Bondi and Grunbaum heirs.391
The reaction of MoMA, the Leopold Foundation, Austria, the
art world, and major museums was immediate. In its statement,
MoMA noted the significance of the seizure: “At stake is the vital
ability of people all over the world to share the art treasures that il-
luminate all of our lives.”392 Leopold Foundation officials noted that
there was “no comparable instance in history” and suggested that the
seizure “could rise up to a very big scandal.”393 Austria immediately
388. Austrian Art Ordered Held in NYC: Court Wants Inquiry into Whether Paintings Are
Nazi Plunder, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17, 1999, at A5 [hereinafter Austrian Art Ordered Held in
NYC]. There is a certain sweet irony to the fact that Schiele has come to be regarded as “the
outstanding artist of turn-of-the-century Vienna” given that he was “despised by the Nazis and
his works [were] confiscated as ‘degenerate art.’” Ian Traynor, Seizure of Paintings Sparks Fear
over Loans: Art Dispute Widens, GUARDIAN, Jan. 10, 1998, at 17.
389. Budick, supra note 16.
390. A subpoena duces tecum is “a subpoena requiring the witness to bring with him and
produce specified physical evidence.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 610.10(3) (McKinney 1995).
391. People v. Museum of Modern Art, 688 N.Y.S.2d 3, 5 (App. Div.), rev’d sub nom. In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Museum of Modern Art, 719 N.E.2d 897,
900 (N.Y. 1999). The court briefly described the basis of the investigation:
Based upon information obtained from heirs of the original owners, the New York
County District Attorney alleges that one of the paintings, “Portrait of Wally” by the
Austrian expressionist Egon Schiele, was owned by the late Lea Jaray Bondi and was
stolen from her by a Nazi agent or collaborator shortly before she fled Austria during
World War II. After the war ended, the painting was found among the collections of
the Austrian National Gallery. Although Mrs. Bondi asked a noted Schiele expert,
Dr. Rudolph Leopold, for help in retrieving her painting, he instead obtained the
painting for his private collection. The second painting, “Dead City III,” also by
Schiele, was owned by Fritz Grunbaum in 1938 but was stolen just before his arrest
and death in Dachau. After the war, Dr. Leopold added this painting to his private
collection. In 1994, Dr. Leopold sold his collection to the government funded Leo-
pold Foundation of Vienna for $175,000,000.
Id. at 4-5.
392. Richard Pyle, MoMA to Relinquish Art Allegedly Stolen by Nazis, JERUSALEM POST,
Jan. 12, 1998, at 6.
393. Id. Interestingly, the Leopold Foundation was aware of the heirs’ claims and yet did not
seek the protection available in advance under the Federal Immunity from Seizure Act, 22
U.S.C. § 2459 (2000).
REYHAN 03/13/01 12:39 PM
2001] A CHAOTIC PALETTE 1031
protested the seizure to the United States.394 The Austrian Culture
Minister called the seizure a “heavy blow to the international ex-
change of art.”395 Newspaper articles published at the time character-
ized the seizure as “causing jitters of monumental dimensions in the
museum world”396 and described the international art world as “reel-
ing.”397 The Director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art suggested
that “[m]useums and the public could be severely damaged as a con-
sequence.”398 Part of the concern of New York museums was a com-
petitive rather than a universal one. As the same Metropolitan official
put it, “[a]ny number of institutions and individuals will not lend to
institutions in New York . . . and all the good shows will go to Wash-
ington, Boston and Philadelphia.”399
In other quarters, the seizure was heralded. One of the claimants
observed, “we can resolve what’s been a half century of great loss.”400
A United Nations Science and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) of-
ficial claimed, “A civil contract between two parties [MoMA and the
Foundation] cannot overtake a complaint of theft. People in the art
world might be worried. But there is a crisis of conscience coming. A
number of collectors are going to find things in their collections which
are dubious.”401
MoMA moved immediately to quash the subpoena. The lower
court granted the motion, citing section 12.03 of New York’s Arts and
Cultural Affairs Law.402 On appeal, the intermediate appellate court
394. Jane Perlez, Austria Protests Art Seizure, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 10, 1998, at 7. The
situation was described at the time as “what could become the touchiest diplomatic spat be-
tween Vienna and Washington since the peace of 1945.” Simon Beck, The Art of a Diplomatic
Row, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 11, 1998, at 11.
395. Robert Hughes, Hold Those Paintings!: The Manhattan D.A. Seizes Alleged Nazi Loot,
TIME, Jan. 1998, at 70.
396. Judith H. Dobrzynski, Ideas & Trends: Show and Tell; How Did You Get That Art in
the War, Daddy?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1998, at D4.
397. Traynor, supra note 388.
398. Judith H. Dobrzynski, Already, Schiele Case Is Reining in Art World, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 1998, at B7.
399. Id. Subsequent events suggest this particular fear is unfounded. First, the New York
Court of Appeals held the seizure unlawful under New York law. See infra notes 404-06 and
accompanying text. Second, the United States government stepped in and seized the Schieles
under federal law, which it presumably would have done in any state. See infra notes 408-11 and
accompanying text.
400. Pyle, supra note 392.
401. Traynor, supra note 388.
402. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 12.03 (McKinney Supp. 1999):
No process of attachment, execution, sequestration, replevin, distress or any kind of
seizure shall be served or levied upon any work of fine art while the same is en route
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reversed, holding that section 12.03 does not apply to subpoenas du-
ces tecum issued as part of a criminal investigation.403
The New York Court of Appeals—in a 6-1 opinion—reversed
the Appellate Division. The court saw itself called upon first to decide
whether section 12.03 applied only to civil proceedings. If not, the
court would decide whether the subpoena issued to MoMA effectu-
ated a statutorily prohibited seizure of the paintings.404 Despite the
fact that section 12.03 listed certain types of civil actions, the court
noted that the section employed unconditional language directing
“‘no process’ . . . ‘or any kind of seizure . . . .’”405 The effect of the sub-
poena directed at the Schieles was to “interfere significantly with the
Leopold Foundation’s possessory interests in the paintings by com-
pelling their indefinite detention in New York, and thus effectuat[es]
a seizure.”406
MoMA proclaimed the court of appeals decision “a victory for
all of the people and museums of our state because it means that New
to or from, or while on exhibition or deposited by a nonresident exhibitor at any ex-
hibition held under the auspices or supervision of any museum, college, university or
other nonprofit art gallery, institution or organization within any city or county of this
state for any cultural, educational, charitable or other purpose not conducted for
profit to the exhibitor, nor shall such work of fine art be subject to attachment, sei-
zure, levy or sale, for any cause whatever in the hands of the authorities of such exhi-
bition or otherwise.
403. In re Museum of Modern Art, 688 N.Y.S.2d 3, 8 (App. Div.), rev’d sub nom. In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Museum of Modern Art, 719 N.E.2d 897,
900 (N.Y. 1999). MoMA immediately characterized the Appellate Division’s holding as “deeply
troubling and disappointing” and indicated it would appeal. Austrian Art Ordered Held in NYC,
supra note 388.
404. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Museum of Modern Art, 719
N.E.2d 897, 900 (N.Y. 1999). One of the interesting facts about the circumstances after the
Schieles were seized is that in the twenty months between the seizure and the New York Court
of Appeals decision, the district attorney’s office had not produced an indictment against any-
one in connection with the case. Judith H. Dobrzynski, Strategy in Schiele Art Case Questioned,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1999, at E3. This fact was commented upon by the court of appeals and has
led to legal criticism of Mr. Morganthau’s strategy:
[L]awyers who handle art claims said they never understood where the subpoena
would lead or whom the District Attorney planned to indict. The Nazi who seized the
painting from Mrs. Bondi is long dead, as are the officials at the Austrian National
Gallery who took it and traded it to Rudolf Leopold, now of the Leopold Foundation.
Dr. Leopold, now in his seventies, lives in Vienna, and if the case were tried under
Austrian law as expected, the statute of limitations would absolve him.
Id. Some lawyers have gone so far as to question the motive of Mr. Morganthau “asking if the
politics of championing a popular cause and Mr. Morganthau’s well-known rivalry with the
United States’ Attorney’s office in Manhattan . . . led him to leap into a case.” Id.
405. Museum of Modern Art, 719 N.E.2d at 900 (quoting N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 12.03
(McKinney Supp. 1999)).
406. Id. at 904.
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York will continue to be the cultural center of the world.”407 MoMA’s
victory, and the exuberance of those who urged and celebrated it, was
short-lived. At 9 p.m. on the day the court of appeals announced its
decision, a seizure warrant from the United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York arrived at the museum for “Portrait of
Wally.”408 As might be expected, MoMA expressed deep disappoint-
ment that the U.S. Attorney’s office “has decided to ignore the im-
portant policy . . . so vigorously enforced on yesterday’s New York
Court of Appeals decision.”409 Just as predictably, Mr. Morganthau
heralded the action, stating “we applaud any effort that will bring us
closer to determining the true ownership of the painting, and believe
any step which prevents New York from becoming a safe haven for
stolen art is a positive one.”410
In a bizarre final twist, the Bondi and Grunbaum heirs appar-
ently had no legitimate claim to the seized Schieles:
Although we had assumed from the start the good faith of the peo-
ple claiming the pictures, it now appears likely that neither family
had a bona fide claim. In the case of one of these two claims, the
painting was claimed by a former reporter for The New York Times.
As it turned out, her claim was based upon her being the widow of a
son of the pre-war owner’s cousin, who in turn was not an heir to the
painting. The other claim is even more convoluted. The man who as-
serted his family’s rights in the painting wrote to us about his vivid
recollections of seeing the picture in his aunt’s house in Vienna be-
fore the war. But, according to the pre-war owner’s grandson, the
claimant never saw the painting, never set foot in the house in Vi-
407. Judith H. Dobrzynski, Modern Wins Ruling on Art Seizure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1999,
at E1. Robert Morganthau labeled it “a sad day.” Id.
408. Oddly, the federal government did not issue a warrant for “Dead City III.” That
painting has been returned to Austria. Bruce Balestier, Return of Painting Blocked by U.S. At-
torney, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1999, at 1.
409. Id.
410. Id. The federal government was not the only actor that responded to the court of ap-
peals’ opinion:
Not to be outdone in promptly responding to the Court of Appeals’ decision, [New
York] Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver later that week introduced legislation to al-
low State intercession when artwork on loan in New York is suspected of being stolen
property. [New York] Governor George Pataki immediately announced his support
for the bill.
Roy L. Reardon & Mary Elizabeth McGarry, Artwork Allegedly Stolen by the Nazis, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 14, 1999, at 3.
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enna, and is not, as a matter of fact, an heir—a fact the claimant re-
cently conceded in a British newspaper interview.411
In the meantime, the Museum of Modern Art has found itself the
target of seizure by a foreign court in a case that has been described
as a “mirror image” of the Schiele seizures.412 “Bauhaus Staircase” is a
1932 painting by Oskar Schlemmer and is considered “an icon of the
Modern’s collection.”413 The museum loaned the work for exhibit
around the world. A German court ordered that the painting be held
in Berlin for investigation of its provenance based on a claim to own-
ership by Schlemmer family members.414 Before the order could be
served, the painting was shipped back to the museum, where it re-
mains today. A German court will hear the matter.
C. Reflections on the Chaos
Those familiar with the vagaries of choice-of-law results in mul-
tijurisdictional art theft cases might suggest that the displacements of
private expectations and policy objectives described earlier in this
part characterize many, if not most, conflicts scenarios. In virtually
every scenario415 save this one, however, the source of the governing
411. Holocaust Assets: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th
Cong. 177 (Feb. 10, 2000) (testimony of Glenn D. Lowry, Director of the Museum of Modern
Art, New York).
412. Judith H. Dobrzynski, Modern Is Focus of a New Dispute over a Painting, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 10, 2000, at E3.
413. Id.
414. Oskar Schlemmer, who had been labeled a “degenerate artist” by the Nazis, sold the
painting to a curator at MoMA in 1933 but allegedly was never paid or was not paid adequately.
Dobrzynski, supra note 412, at E3.
415. Perhaps the most analogous multijurisdictional chaos to that which exists in original
owner/good-faith purchaser contests in art theft cases is the conflict in interests that arises when
security interests in different states are created in the same moveable chattel. Here, a secured
creditor perfects its interest in the state where the chattel is located. The debtor in possession of
the chattel takes the chattel to another state without knowledge of the original secured creditor.
There, the debtor pledges the chattel as security to the second lender, who is without knowledge
of the existence of the prior interest. This second creditor perfects its claim under the law and
filing system of the second state. Just as we have seen in the art theft context, “[i]t is a difficult
question to determine which of two or more innocent parties bears the risk in such a situation
when the debtor absconds or fails.” EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 968 (3d ed.
2000).
In addressing the issue of successive interests secured in multiple states, the U.C.C. un-
til recently committed itself to a situs rule, although not always to the benefit of the first secured
creditor. The code focused on the secured chattel and required the first secured creditor to
maintain a close watch on the situs of the chattel in order to protect the priority of that credi-
tor’s security interest over a later good-faith secured creditor in a second state. Creditor #1 was
REYHAN 03/13/01 12:39 PM
2001] A CHAOTIC PALETTE 1035
law is foreseeable if not predictable, at least within the United States.
The constitutional standard defining when a state may apply its own
substantive law416 will shield a party from application of an unex-
pected rule. Choice-of-law models themselves often require signifi-
cant contacts between the parties or transaction and the state or na-
granted a four-month window in which to file in the chattel’s new location. If the first creditor
did, it had priority over creditor #2, even if creditor #2 filed before creditor #1 in the second
state. U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d) (1972). If creditor #1 did not discover the location of the chattel and
act to preserve its security in the new situs state within this window, creditor #1 lost its priority
to creditor #2.
The 1998 version of Article 9 completely changes the focus in multijurisdictional secu-
rity priority conflicts, and it does so in a way that highlights the commonalities and differences
between those conflicts and the conflicts between owners and good-faith purchasers of stolen
art. Instead of focusing on the situs of the chattel, the relevant 1998 Code sections focus on and
give legal significance to the local law and security system of the state of the debtor’s location.
Thus, it is in the place of the debtor’s location, not the chattel’s situs, where security interests
are to be filed. U.C.C. § 9-301 (1998). As long as the debtor “stays put,” creditor #2 would be
directed, as was creditor #1, to the local law of debtor’s location and local filings there. Thus, in
our scenario, creditor #2 would have notice of creditor #1’s perfected interest. The multijurisdic-
tional problem under the 1998 version arises not when the chattel moves, but when the debtor
moves or changes location. If the debtor changes location between its dealings with creditor #1
and creditor #2, creditor #2 would file in the new location and, unless informed, would have no
knowledge of the prior interest. On the other hand, creditor #1, likely to be self-interested in the
whereabouts of the debtor, ought to be aware at some point of debtor’s departure from his prior
location. In recognition of these two perspectives, section 9-316 allows the first perfected inter-
est to remain perfected, as against the subsequent buyer or creditor, for four months after the
debtor changes location.
Why this brief foray into the complexities of multijurisdictional filing conflicts in an Ar-
ticle about owner-purchaser conflicts in art theft cases? Because each poses the problem of rela-
tive innocents, one of whose interests must be subordinated to the other. The shift in focus be-
tween the 1972 and 1998 versions of Article 9 illustrates the drafters’ appreciation of the
difficulty posed for the first secured creditor, akin to the owner in the art theft context, whose
legal rights are affected by the movement of collateral which is out of its possession. The 1998
version eases the first creditor’s task considerably by requiring that creditor only to track the
debtor’s location or business status. Precisely because the debtor is known to creditor #1, the
latter has a link to the protection of its legal interests.
Unfortunately, the art theft context denies the opportunity to define a conflicts rule
that would protect the interest of the original owner in the same way that the U.C.C. drafters
have sought to balance the rights of successive creditors. It is the “link” to the debtor, rather
than to the location of the chattel, that allows the first creditor the opportunity to protect its
rights through the exercise of appropriate diligence. The owner of stolen property nearly always
lacks that link because the theft creates not only a gap in the chain necessary to track the chat-
tel’s location, but also a gap in identifying any subsequent possessor who could guide the way to
either the art itself or its current possessor and ultimately to the possible source of governing
law. SCOLES ET AL., supra, at 970-76.
416. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1980), established that “for a State’s substan-
tive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a signifi-
cant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its
law is neither arbitrary not fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 312-13.
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tion whose law is chosen. Thus, the models buffer parties from unan-
ticipated or unforeseeable choices.417 In individual cases, courts often
take pains to explain the lack of unfairness or unpredictability in a
given choice-of-law result.418 Additionally, to the extent that the fo-
rum is likely to apply its own law, as would be true with respect to
those rules deemed to be procedural,419 constitutional limitations on
exercises of personal jurisdiction will prevent the defendant from
having to defend in a forum that could not reasonably have been an-
ticipated.420
So why do these buffers against unpredictable fora and sources
of governing law fail to protect party interests and public policies in
the context of original owner/good-faith purchaser contests? Personal
jurisdiction will exist on the traditional ground of domicile421 in the
typical owner/purchaser case in which the owner ventures to the pur-
chaser’s home state or nation to bring the suit for replevin of the
art.422 In other scenarios where the claimed art is not located at the
purchaser’s domicile, for example because it is on loan for exhibit423 or
consigned for sale,424 the forum-situs is not constrained in the exercise
of jurisdiction because the defendant has voluntarily placed his prop-
erty there, and the cause of action is directly related to that prop-
417. This is true of the Restatement (Second) “most significant relationship” test, see supra
note 336 and accompanying text, and various manifestations of government interest choice-of-
law analysis. See Patrick J. Borchers, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1992: Observa-
tions and Reflections, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 128 (1993) (observing that even those states not
purporting to engage in government interest analysis do so in another guise).
418. E.g., Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 282-84 (N.Y. 1993) (offering a
thoughtful explanation of why New York’s choice of a Missouri rule, which allowed a New York
company to be exposed to liability under circumstances in which New York would shield the
same company, was not unfair or unpredictable).
419. See supra notes 275-81 and accompanying text.
420. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (establishing that “due proc-
ess requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’”)
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
421. See generally Milliken, 311 U.S. at 457 (upholding jurisdiction over an absent domicili-
ary).
422. See supra note 420 and accompanying text.
423. Such was the case with the Schiele seizures. See supra notes 382-411 and accompanying
text.
424. Such was the case in Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate v. Christie’s, Inc., No. 98 Civ.
7664(KMW), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1999). See supra notes 224-
47, 318-24 and accompanying text.
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erty.425Second, the constitutional constraints on a state’s choice of its
own law do not extend to a state’s application of its procedural rules,
including its statute of limitations.426 Thus, to the extent that the con-
flict-of-law issue in the owner/purchaser dispute is treated as one in-
volving statutes of limitations,427 the constitutional buffer against the
application of unforeseeable laws is not implicated. Further, as we
have seen,428 until an owner and a purchaser are aware of each other’s
identity, both must anticipate the possibility of nearly any legal rule
being applied.
Third, the typical original owner versus good-faith purchaser liti-
gation occurs in the purchaser’s domicile, which is also the situs of the
disputed artwork. Both contacts, that of defendant’s domicile and si-
tus of the res, will suggest a strong interest of the forum in applying its
own law. This will be especially true in those fora committed to a dis-
covery rule.429 A forum that is the domicile of the owner430 or the situs
of the res431 will also be significantly connected to the dispute. It is,
therefore, not surprising that the law most often chosen in the cases
described above is forum law.432 Where forum law is routinely chosen,
forum shopping by the plaintiff predictably follows.
425. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held that
the “minimum contacts” standard of International Shoe governed the constitutionality of in rem
as well as in personam jurisdiction. The effect of this holding was to make the presence of the
defendant’s property within the state jurisdictionally relevant but not determinative. Id. at 207-
209. As the Shaffer Court itself noted, “when claims to the property itself are the source of the
underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the
State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction.” Id. at 207.
426. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727 (1988) (holding that a forum state may ap-
ply its own statute of limitations in any case, even one in which the state would be constitution-
ally barred from applying its own substantive laws).
427. See supra notes 269-94.
428. See supra Part III.A.1.
429. Because a discovery rule favors the good-faith purchaser, in contrast to a “demand and
refusal” rule, and the purchaser is domiciled in the discovery-rule state, that state will presuma-
bly be favorably inclined to apply its rule.
430. The corollary to the point made infra note 429 is applicable here. A forum that is the
owner’s domicile and has an owner-favoring rule, such as the “demand and refusal” rule, will be
strongly motivated to apply its own rule.
431. The United States Supreme Court has noted in a variety of contexts that a state that is
the situs of the res has an interest in such issues as the property’s marketability. E.g., Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 (1977) (noting this interest in the personal jurisdiction context).
432. E.g., Charash v. Oberlin Coll., 14 F.3d 291, 296-99 (6th Cir. 1994) (determining that
Ohio would apply Ohio law); Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman
Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 286 (7th Cir. 1990) (determining that Indiana would apply Indiana
law); DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1987) (determining that New York
would apply New York law). But see Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v. Christie’s,
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IV.  BRINGING ORDER OUT OF CHAOS
Order can be brought to the palette in stolen art cases, and broad
public and private policies can be served, only by the adoption of a
universal right-defining rule. Rendering the choice of law completely
predictable will accomplish little in enhancing private expectations or
policy goals in the stolen art context. The key feature of the varying
approaches to the choice-of-law issue—other than their variance—is
that they are neutral, both as between the immediate title or immedi-
ate wrongfulness and deferred title or wrongfulness and as between
the discovery rule and the “demand and refusal” rule. None of the
choice-of-law methods point to or even favor a particular result as be-
tween the original owner and good-faith purchaser or the policies
supporting the claims of each. Similar outcome neutrality will follow
if all states and nations agree on a universal mechanism to choose the
source of the applicable law. This will be true whatever that source
may be, whether a source linked to the owner (owner’s domicile at
time of suit or time of theft, or the place of theft), a source linked to
the purchaser (place of purchase or purchaser’s domicile), or a source
linked to the artwork’s situs at any given transactional point. Such a
universal mechanism, wherein the same law-choosing mechanism is
applied whatever the forum for suit, would certainly make the choice-
of-law outcome predictable at the point at which the original owner
discovered the good-faith purchaser, demanded possession, and was
refused. The knowledge of a fixed body and source of law defining
the rights of the parties might thus encourage the disputants to settle.
A universal choice of law would diminish forum shopping by plain-
tiffs433 to the extent that such shopping was driven by variant choices
made by alternative fora. Because any chosen forum would decide
the case by application of the same rule, plaintiff would not be advan-
taged, nor defendant disadvantaged, by suit in one available jurisdic-
tion rather than another.
What of the situation for owners and purchasers prior to the
owner’s discovery of the identity of the purchaser or current posses-
sor? Here, a universal model provides a lopsided advantage to one of
the parties and one set of sovereign policies and disadvantages the
others. This outcome can be illustrated by examining what practical
Inc., No. 98 Civ. 7664, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257, at *12-18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1999) (con-
cluding that New York would apply French law).
433. See supra note 432 and accompanying text.
REYHAN 03/13/01 12:39 PM
2001] A CHAOTIC PALETTE 1039
effects would flow to the parties, the art world, and concerned states
if fixed choice-of-law rules were universally adopted.
A. Owner-Linked Rules
Owner-linked rules are choice-of-law rules tied to either the
place of theft or the domicile of the owner. Such rules might focus on
domicile at the time of theft, at the time of good-faith purchase, or at
the time of suit. A universal owner-linked rule might take the fol-
lowing form: The validity and effect of a transfer of rights in stolen
property to a good-faith purchaser shall be determined by the local law
of the original owner’s domicile at the time of the theft. If an owner-
linked choice-of-law rule were universally adopted, the original
owner would immediately know the “rules of the game,” although not
necessarily the outcome. Only if the owner’s domicile embraced the
“demand and refusal” rule would the owner gain quietude as to the
protection of his interests. Any other rule (an immediate transfer of
title if sale is made to a good-faith purchaser, title acquired by such a
purchaser only upon adverse possession through prescription, or
wrongfulness deferred while the owner exercises due diligence) would
leave the ultimate outcome in limbo, but the rule would at least in-
form the owner about any immediate obligation he may have.
The good-faith purchaser, by definition not knowing of the exis-
tence of an original owner outside his chain of title, can gain no quie-
tude or repose absent a definable or identifiable source of law gov-
erning his rights. Here, the source of law would be definable but from
the purchaser’s perspective unidentifiable until the good-faith pur-
chaser knew the identity of the owner and the owner’s domicile at the
time of the theft.
B. Purchaser-Linked Rules
“Purchaser-linked” rules are choice-of-law rules that choose the
purchaser’s domicile or place of purchase as the source of substantive
rules with respect to original owner/good-faith purchaser rights. As
with owner-linked rules, purchaser-linked rules equalize the parties in
terms of litigation strategies by denying the plaintiff a forum-
shopping incentive. Unlike owner-linked rules, though, purchaser-
linked rules offer a slight advantage to the good-faith purchaser. This
is true whether the focus is on his purchase or on a predecessor’s pur-
chase, because the good-faith purchaser would either know or be able
to determine the source of law defining his right, title, or interest, at a
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point potentially far earlier than the original owner. Until the true
owner discovered the identity of the good-faith purchaser, the owner
could not begin to fathom the source of rules defining the nature of
his obligation.434
Although recognition of a universal choice-of-law rule would not
significantly advance the private expectations and public policies un-
derlying the various right-defining rules, universal adoption of a right-
defining rule itself would significantly achieve those goals. This would
be particularly so if the chosen rule lay somewhere in the middle of
the range of available rules. The potential problems that may arise
under a universally adopted rule from either extreme demonstrate
the need for a rule from the middle. At one end of the right-defining
range lies the rule that most favors the good-faith purchaser by im-
mediately vesting title in him upon his purchase. Although such a rule
would bring certainty if universally adopted, it risks rendering the
original owner helpless unless the theft is immediately discovered and
universally publicized. Perhaps because of the weight of this burden
on a faultless owner, the rule of immediate acquisition of title to sto-
len art435 has few adherents436 and does not suggest itself as worthy of
universal recognition. At the other end of the spectrum, the “demand
and refusal” rule suffers similar failings. Universal adoption of the
“demand and refusal” rule would bring certainty, but from the per-
spective of the good-faith purchaser, the only certainty would be un-
certainty. Repose would not and could not accompany most good-
faith purchases437 no matter how long the period of possession fol-
lowing the purchase. This rule has only one adherent,438 albeit a sig-
nificant one, and, therefore, demonstrably lacks universal appeal.
434. The Winkworth court, which applied Italian law vesting title to art stolen in England
but sold to a good-faith purchaser in Italy before being returned to England, noted that the
owner “neither knew of nor consented to the removal of the goods from England or anything
which made such removal more probable.” Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods, Ltd.
[1980] 1 Ch. 496, 503. Winkworth is discussed supra notes 299-302 and accompanying text. In
fact, from the owner’s perspective, “there was never any voluntary act on his part which con-
nected or was even likely to connect the goods to any foreign system of law.” Id. at 509.
435. Recall, however, that immediate acquisition of title by a good-faith purchaser is the
vastly more favored rule where the original owner voluntarily parted with possession. See supra
notes 62-89 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
437. The extent of the burden placed on the purchaser to qualify as having purchased in
good faith is discussed supra at notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
438. See supra note 204.
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To command universal appeal, a right-defining rule applicable to
original owners and good-faith purchasers of stolen art must reflect
the conflicting interests of both the claimants and the myriad policy
interests detailed in Part III.439 In this author’s opinion, only the dis-
covery rule can claim to serve such diverse masters. It can lay this
claim precisely because it places similar obligations on both the owner
and the purchaser. Under any of the right-defining rules, the pur-
chaser must meet the burden of establishing his good faith. Thus he
must not have known, nor have had reason to know, of the owner’s
superior claim. The purchaser is required to exercise diligence in this
regard, a diligence that may demand reasonable inquiry regarding the
chain of title to the work.440 A purchaser who fails to exercise such
diligence will be held to constructive knowledge of suggested defects
and will risk the withdrawal of good-faith status upon which his claim
to title is based. The diligence required of the purchaser presumably
makes the sale of stolen art on the open market more difficult and the
discovery of defects more likely.
The discovery rule of accrual demands diligence of the true
owner as well. That owner must pay sufficient attention to his prop-
erty to be aware of the theft. Once aware of the theft, he must be rea-
sonably diligent in searching for the property.441 If the search is under-
taken and continued, the cause of action will not accrue until it can be
concluded that the search would disclose the whereabouts of the art.
Herein lies the service of this rule to policy interests beyond the in-
terests of the immediate parties. The effect of the discovery rule is to
encourage, albeit indirectly, public acknowledgment of possession by
the good-faith purchaser. Because the owner’s due diligence must be
capable of bearing fruit, wholly private possession by the purchaser
disfavors his long term interests by continuing the vitality of the true
owner’s claim. Thus, the purchaser whose claimed ownership of the
stolen art is reported in publications and acknowledged in public ex-
hibits finds his interests better protected than the purchaser of stolen
art that has been languishing in garbage bags behind a dresser before
439. See supra notes 365-432 and accompanying text.
440. As a practical matter, this burden can be a significant one in financial and temporal
terms. As the director of the Museum of Modern Art put it, investigating and resolving prove-
nance issues are matters of “enormous complexity” that require “meticulous and dispassionate
research.” See supra note 411.
441. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
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private restoration by the purchaser.442 Tempered publicity of posses-
sion by the purchaser, even if it results in a claim by an original
owner, is likely to draw that claim by a diligent owner early enough
that the purchaser will still have meaningful legal rights against the
vendor from whom the work was purchased.443 Of course, if the owner
is not exercising appropriate diligence, time begins to run in favor of
the purchaser. To come full circle, the owner’s diligence and the pur-
chaser’s good-faith inquiry prior to purchase may prevent the sale, fa-
cilitate the return of the art to the original owner, and avoid the ne-
cessity of a choice between two relative innocents.
CONCLUSION
Law is always challenged when it must decide between two inno-
cents in situations where each has a claim worthy of accommodation
and a mutual accommodation is not possible. All that can be hoped in
defining rules by which such decisions are to be made is that the rules
are perceived as fair to the claimants, advance public policies, are cer-
tain, are applied predictably, and that, as a result, they can guide hu-
man conduct in a way that makes less likely the progression of events
that leads the innocents to the conflict. Were stolen art cases to play
themselves out wholly within the confines of a single state or nation,
any of the right-defining rules described in this Article would serve
these goals. Unfortunately, stolen art cases do not arrive at court-
house steps painted on such simple factual backgrounds. As the cases
examined in this Article illustrate, modern stolen art cases encompass
great distances in time and space. Their backgrounds are sometimes
subtle, sometimes darkly disturbing, and they do not admit of easy
evaluation or resolution under the most ordered of legal palettes. The
chaotic palette of current divergent right-defining rules and choice-of-
law methods has not produced what any observer would call a pretty
picture. It has instead produced a picture that defeats the ideals of all
who cherish art—artists, owners, purchasers, galleries, museums, and
442. Compare DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that the art-
work was pictured and discussed in several publications and faulting the original owner for fail-
ing to “undertake[] even the most minimal investigation”), with Erisoty v. Rizik, No. 93-6215,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096, at *29 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995) (explaining that “where a court
finds that an [original] owner has diligently searched for a painting but cannot find it or discover
the identity of the possessor, the statute of limitations will not begin to run” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
443. See supra note 25.
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the public. Universal commitment to one right-defining rule can bring
order to this chaos.
I am arguing for the unique importance of what, in modern par-
lance, is called the “settlement”444 or “coordination”445 function of law
in defining the relative rights of original owners and good-faith pur-
chasers of stolen art. The settlement or coordination function of law
“is to settle authoritatively what is to be done.”446 Justice Brandeis
said it this way, “in most matters it is more important that the appli-
cable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”447 My belief is
that universal adoption of the discovery rule would “settle it right.” In
the face of the current chaos, however, the fact of reaching a univer-
sal, or nearly universal, choice is more important than the precise rule
chosen. Here, the private and public interests at stake will only be
served by a settled set of rules, and “although a better set is prefer-
able to a worse one, even a worse one is, within bounds, preferable to
none at all.”448
444. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1371 (1997).
445. Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 165, 182-85 (1982).
446. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 444.
447. Commissioner v. Colo. Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
448. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 444.
